"Das Ding an sich", the thing-in-itself, and "das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet", the thing regarded as it is in itself, as it would be itself, if it were, said Kant, to describe his philosophy that
things in themselves are unknowable, beyond the appearances, and to express a question of some synthetic doubt and criticism in phenomenology. Thus he would begin to express his opinion that the knowable order of the world, and topology, for example, like
the riddle of the Seven Bridges of Konigsberg, would depend solely upon the cognitive activity of the subject rather than on the things in themselves.(1) In determining reality, for the Kantian outlook, there is a radical departure that happens in which the
intellect of the subject's sense impressions conforms objects to structures inherent in the mind, rather than the external objects of actuality conforming the sense impressions of a reasonable mind to themselves.
Of course, nature as an object of analysis and knowledge is a phenomenon arising from a synthesis of sensations and judgment. However, with modern transcendental
criticism, what gives those sensations is called unknowable beyond the mere concepts themselves, which already would contain structures inherent in the mind. Pure concepts, therefore, may be described as categories of the understanding, and that way they are
said to be wholly independent of experience. With Dr. Kant, modern philosophy would accomplish a fundamental and peculiar inversion of the order of perception, such that objects must follow the ways of thinking, for categories, rather than vice versa.
"The key to Kant's theory is the epistemological reversal, which he called his 'Copernican revolution'," for it may seem true at times that what we can know is only what appears also
in the mind, and what remains in itself is intrinsically unknowable, et cetera.(2) Even for the unmistakable pains of contradiction, the most simple things can never be known to us beyond the appearances. Things
in a day can change as fast as Bian Lian 變臉, the baffling Chinese art of face changing at the opera. What is merely seen would not be enough for certain knowledge and understanding of the world at large, since everything changes.
He would even go so far as to insist that "space and time are a framework provided by our thinking, rather than properties of the objective world,"(3) which is not credible for decent argument, however, since
irrational animals recognize also the same circumstances of time and place. Even the other animals of creation preserve the simple belief in external objects in all their natural thoughts, instincts,
designs, and actions.(333)
That Kant saw his change of perspective as a "Copernican turn", as he called it, was telling. He
almost said it all when he said that with his school of thought he would accomplish a "second Copernican revolution". Like the way of Copernicus before, in the circulation of astronomy, and later with Kantian metaphysics, the modernist instruction would instill
an epistemological reversal in the natural order of things; and for this Kant has been thought by many to be the greatest philosopher who ever lived; and Newton's so-called laws of motion were the collective paradigm from which he would develop his worldview.
"Kant's system is like Newton's idea of gravity", and "it is close to how we still see the world."(4) He has been reckoned as the Master of Modernity in philosophy, the mightiest thinker of the thinkers who
established themselves along the way of ideas(5), and his favorite book of science was the "Principia", which is almost impossible to read. Yet as much as Newton, it would appear that the old man took a residual leap of faith in the wrong direction, and fell
out of one of Porphyry's trees.
The aim of science as well as philosophy is ultimately to arrive at the words which give the
true representation of the world, and it is of primary importance to get things right in themselves, because merely saying it so does not also make it so. "Gratis asseritur gratis negatur", that
which is asserted gratuitously may be rejected with equal freedom, and philosophy should never be distinguished unfairly from common sense knowledge, for there is nothing in it which could not be said in everyday language.(6) "The order and connection of ideas
is the same as the order and connection of things".(7)
Things are usually known in the way that they are perceived and experienced,
even if not always by direct impression, and Copernicanism has a natural tendency to make an embarrassment out of common sense everywhere. To say that it cannot be judged with simple cognitive awareness on any given day whether the Earth moves is like saying
no one can really know the "thing-in-itself", for any trouble, even if it was something so simple as the day of the week, and whether the Earth is rolling along like a bowling ball through space, at midday of any given golf tournament, for example, when a
scorecard is signed.
Thus a philosopher would tell an astronomer or a tournament caddy that he cannot know what day it is or
the score --- as he would only be seeing lingering appearances, not das Ding an sich. The appearances of quality, quantity, relation, modality, concentration, and space may be obvious in a sense but not terribly useful in terms of epistemology, since the conclusion
is already contained in the subject, as much as it would only be true by analytic definition and tautology, like an oak tree is a tree, for example. Thus he cannot with certainty follow the succession of the seasons by the stars either, understanding the passing
of the weeks, months, and years, as he would put together his calendar, because logic can have no empirical part; and time is logical, of course; yet the calendar is a burden of empiricism and all data-based phenomena, ipso facto, and so forth, et cetera.
There are the problems of stellar aberration and retrogression, for example, and the problems of perigee and apogee, especially of the Moon, and then parallax and people who are late, and these
natural phenomena cannot be continuous like logic, except where it is to know more and more about less and less.
Yet if one narrows the field of equation and synthetic inquiry, where is proof of
the minor, and what is reality that a just society would be capable of understanding? What are the rules and what is a lost golf ball? Whose is whose, and where is the certainty and confidence of justification in the what-how of experience, that people know
should follow beyond mere schools of opinion? What is the sensible custom of observation and analysis at the corner, ignotum per ignotius, and obscurum per obscurius?
"We are unkown, we knowers, ourselves to ourselves. We men of knowledge remain of necessity strangers to ourselves. We understand ourselves not. In ourselves we are bound to be mistaken. As far as ourselves are concerned
we are not knowers"(8), wrote Nietzsche. The curiosity and the vanity of things fail, and so does love. Even with all good service and examination of names, "we are surrounded by mystery and cannot understand the common things of life. Nature speaks with a
thousand tongues, and each tongue voices an unknown language."(9)
Ease of intelligibility, after all, is suicide for philosophy.
As Sgt. Schultz from the Wehrmacht of "Hogan's Heroes" in TV Land used to say, "we know nothing"! He would even stomp his foot or his rifle. "For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life."()
"Nichts zoviel", nothing too much, nothing in excess either, especially for an agreement to avoid the Russian front.
"De gustibus, non est disputandum."
If all the strangeness of dissertation and blind digression of the human race were in the eyes and expression of one man, a forgotten sergeant from the Wehrmacht, he would say "I know nothing and you won't remember me, or these terms," and mean it very much.
So would say modern philosophy of existentialism and its phenomenology, that we overrun the subject with emphasis to imagine that it would be knowable at all. For instance, the thing-in-itself of which channel or what drill, as it would be recognizable
beyond the passing absurdities of a prison guard and TV land actor: or which way the Moon goes, or what day it is, and whether the Earth rotates.
If understood as perceived, it only comes from
a world of appearances, like
"THE apparition of these faces in the crowd;
Petals on a wet, black bough."
Et cetera, yet even when a man is deceived or sees illusions, he understands what it is to see; and if he only dreams, he still knows what it is to be awake. If such an academic reference weight as Kant would say that reality,
and finding one's way to a train station of the metropolis, is rather mind-dependent being, not mind-independent being, one can see how the art of solipsism --- besides that of heliocentrism and Judeo-Masonic deception --- could have become modernity's distinctive
For things to be what they seem or appear at all was a naive expectation of life from long ago. Who from today would expect that "doubt must be no more
than vigilance otherwise, it can become dangerous"(10), or "the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective were no practical results to follow"?(11)
Since so many things tie together, from ages past and present, the thing or image that is being seen by the eye exists in virtue of itself too, whatever it is in some combination, even if it is only an illusion.
As much as there are knots or the traces of a cloud, nature does not ask permission, and people passing by the wheel of life are bound to construe things like the weather, the calendar, and the world of experience by the most reasonable way of construction.
The human mind did not create the first simple attributes of being, like more or less, greater than or less than, equal to or not equal to, this way or that way, which already were. "Our presence
bestows not being on it; our absence does not annhilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings who perceive or contemplate it."(333) The human mind did not create pepper, for instance, and this
much or that much. And if people ask, "which came first, the chicken or the egg?" they may also ask, "which came first, pepper or the cook?"
However they look at the question of immanence, the
simple attribution of being is always in and of itself, and already was, before the natural sense opinion or human synthesis of it came around. The pre-existence of pepper to tastes and opinions, as such as it is, is difficult to deny. They are in contradistinction,
and like the day of the week, also being the one that it is, das Ding an sich all day long, and being the only one that it is, the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself, et cetera.
with such a secondary table for content or synthetic measure of things as the human mind in tow, would it be fair to say that any certain and unadulterated truth can be known naturally by the intellect
of any poor taxpayer in this life? The mind of a taxpayer exists to be known, for sure, as much as his income and his business, if not the other way around; and it seems a philosopher may know when he does not know either, as much as a mystified tax collector,
even if he would only count on his fingers to see how much it is. For all the trouble and pleasure of horns of dilemma, and to calculate a most difficult brand of critical philosophy, Osiander himself wrote that if hypotheses "provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough."
In the information age
of mass merchandising, philosophy is not taught as much as it is engineered, and sold, and "if Aristotle were alive today, he would have a talk show."(12) There is a satellite dish with signals coming in, too many channels to count, and even midget wrestling
from Mexico, to ask, "where is all the knowledge that we lost with so much information"?(13) For instance, out of all the accumulation, with so many channels for content, and whatever it is, wherever it may go on parade, ten has been considered to be the most
illuminating and simple crux among numbers --- versed like no other for division and order among things.
Ten is the unit of the decimal system, and "the perfect term of the numbers derived from
the monad"(14), and whatever das Ding-an-sich may be, it must have a number as much as a channel, for nothing exists without a number, or some content, some way that it must be. A priori and a posteriori,
just look at the TV.
"No ideas but in things, and so much depends upon a red wheel barrow glazed with rain water beside the white chickens."
For a universal wheelbarrow, formalized ad infinitum as much as
poetry of the TV, and the number ten, the substance of number could be applied to anything within a circle, and everything can fit in a circle. The first four numbers, in fact, provide exemplars that have been
thought to contain the whole nature of mathematics, since 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10; and when they are configured with little dots in a neato triangle, they make a radical little pyramind, the lesser tetractys, like a root element in Sierpinski gaskets, and the way
"The laws of mathematics are not merely human inventions or creations. They simply 'are'; they exist quite independently
of the human intellect."(15)
Thus, with the way the decade works in math, such a thing is not only a matter of opinion from appearance. Chance cannot account for the unique meaning and importance
of the number ten, since "what happens always and in all cases is not the result of chance but is in the nature of things."(16) Simple as one, two, three, and four, every instance of the first ten numbers provides a role model of simplification and necessary
truths, which cannot be changed by empirical evidence, and with which all empirical evidence must ultimately agree.
The number ten is referred by symbolic tradition to things of outstanding excellence,
and beginnings brought to perfection. If anything is brought to perfection, it could be signed over with a ten, since sign relations are ontological, and "of all the numbers from the monad and up, ten is the most perfect."(17) Plato's nephew Speusippis reckoned
the decade "to be the most natural and most creative basis for all things, being, as it were, in itself a sort of model for the things which constituted the universe".(18)
Ten is forever fixed
at the base of numbers, since it is produced by adding 1, 2, 3, and 4 and comprises even and odd, square and cube, prime and composite, linear and plane, and provides the beginning and resolution of all mathematical extension, containing all the hundreds and
thousands and millions and tens of millions within it, et cetera, and also all the decimals as well. According to Hughes of St. Victor, ten also represents straightness in faith, the right way to go; and it is the number from which all things come and to which
they must return.
Someone in an old casino comedy routine once asked a friend for change, requesting two tens for a five. "Can
I get two tens for a five" he said, and, without thinking about it, the friend who was high on a roll gave it to him out of a handful of cash he had just won. He suddenly realized the miscalculation of his generosity when he received one five for two tens
and remembered that two fives make ten, not the other way around. "Wait a second", he said, "two tens are twenty, not five. You owe me fifteen dollars", but the friend with two tens was in a rush and had already gone.
So it goes, and "time may consume the speculation of men but it confirms nature".(19) The way that birds fly, for instance, using their wings, proceeds by two's,
and the way that humans see and understand is the same. The power of nature has given man two eyes and five senses for the same reasons that birds have two wings and fine feathers to fly. Natural motion proceeds by two's, duo duo faciles, an easy two by two,
and human intelligence works by a method of division in virtue of comparison. Experience "turns you from one feeling to another and teaches by means of opposites so that you will have two wings to fly, not one”.(20) A simple process of sense
and perception, cognitive awareness in the human species is wired to operate along a line of comprehension that goes along noticing "this is" and "these are", and "that is" and "those are", duo duo, et cetera for sensitivity.
Rivers know there is no hurry, and roll on, "aequum memento enim rebus in arduis servare mentem". Burn on big river, burn on, and to save the mind of things remember balance in arduous matters.
Who has not ever noticed that the way of intellectual distinctions always functions, since it is conducive to knowledge to distinguish one attribute and its property from another, with a view to avoiding confusion? Exceeding with meekness
and subtlety of intelligence like Moses, counting goats in a rocky desert or not, "for Moses was a man unpretentious above all men that dwelt upon the Earth"(21), the number ten would also symbolize first principles, the wheel of fortune, the tree of life,
and the overall power of division in perception, et cetera. And, as to the certitude of first principles, "the terms of self-evident principles are so identical that it is evident that one necessarily includes the other"(22).
The overabundant and rich tautologies of self-adherence, rooted in first principles, abound of themselves, of course, it goes without saying; and the power of repetition by analysis in math and nature corroborates many things. If not
for the redundancy of assimilation and contrast, veritas vincit omnia vi divisione, truth conquers all by a power of division; and "it is not once or twice but times without number that the same ideas make their appearance in the world."(23) It cannot be an
accident, therefore, that the best number that fits to divide well the greatest total number and confluence of all things would be ten; and that mankind also has ten fingers of twenty-seven intricate bones on two hands. Three to the third power in twenty-seven
is like a little exponential trinity, pro manibus, and ten in two hands of five, with some subtle dexterity and intelligence, is at times a little perfection or magic.
Would everything like that and the nature of the world then only be a matter of appearance, "unknowable in itself", and are appearances always deceiving? Does the human cogitator's capacity lack the power to penetrate
the veil of appearance, and grasp the inner nature of reality? Does the octave exist in music and the calendar or not, if anybody has an ear or knows what day it is? If it does, would it not be more reasonable to reject the call for despair and the extreme
academic skepticism of some philosophers by,
a) certitude of first principles, and
b) experimental knowledge, and
c) also with knowledge of our own acts, and
d) certitude of sense knowledge?
Is there too much confidence for springtime fools in common sense knowledge, and songs they know by heart, from day to day, when one would say that he knows well enough what the thing is, in itself, for example,
when he has a dental appointment on Tuesday at 11:30 am? Is there no abscess of truth among mankind, no consensu gentium in communis, even for all the suffering? And what day of the week would it be when the Earth would spin because of Newtonian "gravity"
to orbit the Sun and nobody would notice?
Is there truth? What is reality that anyone shoud care? Does truth even exist --- das Ding an sich --- among general notions and specific days of the week?
If not, what is the best interpretation of the great silence? Even birds know the tropics of the Sun, and the seasons, as much as animal intuition and the measure used to measure allow them in their limit.
In fact, it should be recognized that a natural order exists among general notions, such that one
thing can be known from another: for instance, the notion of "being" and the notion of "true". "Being" is the major and more extensive, as "being is of stronger adherence", and the reason for this is that entity is something absolute, simple, and primary,
whereas truth implies a relation to an exemplar.(24) It comes from experience that a thing can be known as an entity even though its truth value is not clear and remains as yet unknown. From this it follows that the thing which is true can be known before
its truth value is also known.
The way the mind functions, we know that many aspects of things can be grasped by a simple act of understanding, and many times a day. In such cases when the things
involved are true they are also known. But the truth value itself of some circumstances at times may be somewhat hidden and reserved, obscure for a while, and recognized only later by an act of judgment. "Simple understanding, however, precedes an act of judgment."(25)
Knowledge of things gleaned from the senses is both of a general and particular nature, and in virtue of such knowledge we judge the truth of things and any occurrence. Nature does not ask for permission,
of course, and it is hardly fitting that any nature should exist without its proper activity. The more perfect the nature in question the less fitting that it should lack such an operation, and the proper operation of the intellect is to know the thing which
is true. Then it is hardly fitting that nature should not endow the intellect with the appropriate faculties of sense, perception, and reason for such an operation that fits it, namely one such as understanding and recognizing the natural world around it,
and the day of the week.
A simple example of a first
principle could be that one cannot have boiling water and ice from the same water at the same time. The water is not the pot, and if a quibbler would drop ice cubes into boiling water, the water that boils is not the water that is frozen. The water that is
frozen is never boiling at the same time that it is frozen. From the very fact that it grasps them, the intellect perceives and unites these terms in a logical and universal proposition of truth. By the elemental condition of water, the mind itself has present
before it the necessary and evident cause of the conformity of this proposition with the simple terms that compose it. Such an instance of conformity, where the intellect perceives the evident cause in the terms, cannot help but be known in itself, as the
thing that it is, das Ding an sich, the element water, and hot or cold. There is nowhere else for such an ontological basis as boiling or frozen in water to go except where it is, and by such terms of nature and temperature it always will be the same.
Where it is like that, boiling or frozen, when hot or cold, is everywhere. The intellect could not apprehend these terms and unite them so well in an effective proposition, effective for all times and places
of experience, without having this conformity of relationship arise between the proposition and the terms, ipso facto. Therefore, it always must be so, as much as two similar objects could not exist without some relationship of sameness between them.
It is impossible to perceive all this as the necessary way that it is, ita est, without perceiving the water in itself. It is precisely such conformity of a proposition to the terms that constitute it that
makes accurate the truth of a judgment, and such simple terms cannot be combined in a judgment without being true. So it is that one cannot perceive this proposition and its terms without also perceiving the conformity of the proposition to the terms; and
one is, therefore, also perceiving the truth of the element water as it is the thing-in-itself, as much as the oceans and the seas.
Once there is certitude of first principles, like water and the
number ten, for example, it becomes clear how one can be certain of the conclusions drawn from such principles, since the perfect syllogism is evident from logic and many things in themselves. The accuracy of such judgments depends solely upon the certitude
of the principles involved and the evidence of the inference.
As for b), what is known by experience, even though a person does not experience every single individual case, but only a great many,
nor does he experience them at all times but only frequently, still he knows infallibly that it always goes such and such a way and holds for all instances of such a thing --- as boiling water, for example, and ice cubes --- as it would be what it is in itself.
He knows this in virtue of comparison that "whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not free is the natural effect of that cause". The intellect knows this proposition even if the terms would be derived from erring senses, "because a cause
that does not act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that is the very opposite of what it is ordained by its form to produce".(26) The chance cause, however, in contrast, is ordained either to produce or not produce the opposite of the chance
effect at random. But everything does not happen by chance, of course. That would be absurd and worse than a motorcycle sidecar that keeps falling off in a movie, and if something occurs frequently enough, it is reasonable to know that it is not coming about
by chance, and its cause, therefore, will be a naturally determined cause if it is not a free agent.
Facts gathered from experience --- and their causes and effects --- are so frequent and numerous
that once we find a given nature associated at one time with this accident and then at another with that, "we have discovered that despite the accidental differences, such an effect invariably follows from this nature."(27) With bears and honey or salmon in
the stream, such effects are not the result of what is merely incidental to such a nature or accidetnal in the world but are rather the effects of this nature as it is in itself.
At times we may
experience the truth of an experimental conclusion, such as "the moon is frequently eclipsed", and granting the validity of the conclusion, because it is a fact, we then proceed by a method of division to discover the reason. A person may also arrive at self-evident
principles after beginning with such a conclusion from experience. In such cases, the conclusion, which at first was known only by experience, now is known by reason of such a principle with even greater clarity, namely that of a primary kind of knowledge,
for it has been deduced from a self-evident principle. Thus it is self-evident that when an opaque body is placed between a visible object and the source of light, the transmission of light to such an object is prevented by the interference. Such things and
first principles known from experience are appreciated most certainly by a demonstration of the reasoned facts.
As for c), people are as sure of many of their own acts as they are of the self-evident
first principles and propositions of philosophy. "There are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized until personal experience, generally of a painful kind, has brought it home and made it a reality."(28)
And it is impossible that something contingent should follow from a necessary cause, and people know well enough when they have a broken leg, like a comminuted compound fracture, or have fallen into a pit, or must have an abscessed
tooth pulled, and that what is in occurrence in those cases is something more than a mere possibility. Human intelligence may discover that what was a contingency outcome before is not any more, and that way also understand das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet.
There is an order among contingencies anyway, and some proposition is first and immediate, like the one who would have knowledge of his own acts, otherwise there would be an infinte regress, or something
contingent would follow from a necessary cause, both of which are impossible.
As for d), certitude of sense knowledge, "the
mind is not merely a vessel to be filled but a fire to be kindled",(29) and if the cradle and candle of the senses burn, how can a philosopher be sure that what he knows is not less than spent wax or wisps of smoke, merely dreams, if everything he knows
is only an appearance? As he may say himself, he knows "nothing", and if knowledge is only apparent, appearing in the mind by the bridge of mutable senses, and life itself disappears, like an apparition subject to change and mortality, what can one say he
really knows except chance and illusion, as much as nothing?
Descartes asked, "of what can I be certain"? "Cogito ergo sum" was his answer, but if the world is continually changing, we can have
no certitude about it by any kind of light, for there can be no certitude when an object is known in some way other than the way in which it is, and it is also impossible to know that which has no state, even if it would not change. It is difficult, therfore,
to say that there is real knowledge among mankind at all "if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge
changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, and ... there will be no one to know and nothing to be known".(30)
It could have been this way, or it could have been that way perhaps, therefore, how things look is only a matter of probability in outcomes. The mind judges about first things and other things and the probability of this and that,
and which is which, or would be, and many times it could be either, going this way or that, or only one chance of many for an appearance. Therefore, what people would say they know of the truth of things is only an ironic line of probability, derived from
the numerousness of mutabilities, and they always could be wrong; and in many cases they are, even for their own acts; and, for all the trouble of getting everything right, the assertion of truth yet remains within the resident power of the mind, even in the
case of something necessary which would occasion an act of judgment.(31)
"Ecce, maris magna claudit nos obice pontus. Deest iam terra fugae"(32). Behold, the great sea encloses us with the wall
of the deep. There is no more place for flight.
So the logical impasse between mind-dependent and mind-independent being, that would be set forth by Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", would
be so difficult, for opinionated people in the philosophy department, as to not readily give ground even for birds, even if the way they fly and the way humans see and understand is the same, duo duo.
If an ornithologist thinks he can overcome the rigors of philosophical skepticism, because he recognizes the difference between a flock of ducks and the murmurations of starlings, he is naive if he does not
realize it only is an appearance that he is judging. An innocent fool, he still does not know the thing-in-itself from what it is inside his head; and he might as well tell NASA and the Bank of England that the Sun orbits the Earth, the Earth is not moving,
obviously, and that the full Moon goes from East to West, when viewed from above the North pole, if he would say that he knows the difference between a duck and a starling. After all, what he knows is not outside of his mind. What he knows is inside his mind,
of course, since he only knows the knowledge as knowledge. The data cannot be handled any other way.
However, even if "the
mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions"(334), it does not follow that just because an object is mutable, therefore the knowledge produced may not represent anything under an immutable aspect. For it is not precisely the mutability of the
object that causes the knowledge; rather it is the nature of the mutable object in question that does so, and this nature is immutable. "Hence, the knowledge produced by it represents the nature itself. And if it is the nature, this nature may have an immutable
relation to something, and then both this nature and the other thing to which it is related, each by its own exemplar, are represented as immutably united."(33) And so by means of two perceived terms of experience, like a starling and a duck, produced by two
mutable creatures subject to probabilities, it is possible to have a knowledge of their immutable relation in virtue of their natures.
Numbers and the facts cannot be avoided, and the essence of
relation in mathematics itself is represented to the intellect as something immutable. If there is an exemplar, there must be an example, and if there is an example, there must be an exemplar. In so far as they are natures, one can tell the difference between
a starling and a duck mathematically, and see from the individuals that these birds will not fly the same by themselves or in flocks. Ducks do not cause murmurations, certainly, and they are not as agile as starlings. By the method of division in virtue of
comparison, between these two species, and with all the certitude of sense knowledge, an ornithologist can reasonably say to the philosopher that he knows some immutable principles of relation in virtue of natural motion: and that he knows the thing-in-itself
qua qua for the birds.
Otherwise philosophy would end by making even simple things false. And no one of good sense would prefer
to put himself, or the education of his mind, under the power of an instruction which condemns him to an unhealthy state of unreality. Some equations are false and some are true; and "virtue grows when the soul keeps the understanding according to nature.
It is according to nature when it remains as it was made. Now it was made beautiful and perfectly straight. For the straightness of the soul consists in the mind's being according to nature, as it was made; as, on the other hand, the soul is said to be evil
when it bends and gets twisted away from what is according to nature."(34)
Philosophy would not fairly serve a purpose that it would undermine virtue, and that we should all be made so stupid that
we cannot know some basic things about birds. "Usually the philosopher philosophizes in order to resign himself to life, or to seek some finality in it, or to distract himself and forget his griefs, or for pastime and amusement"(35), yet not to be made stupid.
Nature has been so wise, after all, that she has not been content with dividing men into happy and unhappy, wise and foolish, she also gives to the wise the spirit of wisdom, and to the foolish the spirit of nonsense, e.g., 1 + 2 + 3 ... = -1/12, as
if it would be reckoned for an "infinite sum identity" at Cambridge.
Therefore, if it is true that a mutable object, even in
so far as it is mutable, would yet signify something immutable, how is it that its relation to another thing is immutable? The relation is immutable in the sense that the opposite relation could not exist between the extremes, and neither could the relation
be non-existent, given these extremes. If one or both of the extremes would be destroyed, then the relation in them is also destroyed, yet the formal relation is destroyed only in the things, not in itself, since quantity has no contrary and entity is simple
and absolute: and every relationship should have an attribute of number and also of being, qua qua, qua qua.
The extremes of the measure cannot exist in thought without possessing the necessary
quantitative identity in question, more or less; and they may always exist as such, as much as the mind itself would be an object of involvement and knowledge in physics and the truth, and a vehicle for intelligent investigation, das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet.
If the identity did not exist, then the quanta and the way of it would not exist either. If the number property of a number, as much as any number, did not exist, at least from the first, then nothing would exist, since the first property of being is as numerical
as a number in itself, that namely could be called "number 1", and the "number 1 before many". Division by one is the most simple way for things to be perceived the way they are, and it works in everything, for all contiunations, more than gravity or the speed
of light; and it should become evident with enough time that even a trifle can be represented under an immutable aspect, even as it is mutable in itself, and the thing-in-itself can be known in both cases.
things and their relations by division, like the geometry of a golf ball, for instance, the logical essence of existence may be represented to the intellect as something immutable by something radically changeable and perishable, like the golf ball itself. People
know that geometry, algebra, and common sense have not been lost, uprooted and cast out of the cosmos by cruel fate, when a golf ball disappears, going out-of-bounds or landing in the lake.
a golfer has three sleeves of golf balls and one loose extra in his bag, he knows the thing-in-itself and the number ten with the certitude of sense knowledge as much as philosophy. And wherever it goes, a golf ball always lands between one place and another.
That is the only way that it can be. The arrow of direction in a golf ball cannot go in two different or opposite paths at the same time. From a principle as old as the hills, when one has seen one side of where the shot lands, one has seen the other from
which it came. As sure as a timeless course in civics, metaphysics, and geometry, taught by Janus, when one has seen one side or face of the shot, he has seen the other that is in the circle, and that way the link that is in the the face of the club also.
If a right-handed player tees off and hits a curving shot that goes off to the right and almost lands in the lake, he hit some sort of a slice. If a left-handed players tees off next, and hits a similar curving
shot that almost lands in the lake too, near the first shot, he hit some sort of a hook. Between right-handed and left-handed players, and all the shots and sides of the game, there are self-adhering and immutable pinciples of relation in physics and geometry
that do not go away, even if a golfer has lost all his golf balls and thrown his clubs into the lake. The formal qualities of mathematics are definitive, covering all sides, and without the proper delineation of quantitative attributions provided by geometry,
mathematics itself would become just a heap and nonsense. Without the geometry of space, no score card and its math would make any sense, and even average golfers know that about the game and the thing-in-itself, even if they just call it life.
With the Kantian style of rationalism in phenomenology, however, "perceptions come only from the senses where there is no grasp of necessity, but only of conjunctions and associations of phenomenon"(36),
et cetera, but the scientific necessity realized when a player's ball has gone to the bottom of the lake is common to everyone who sees it, and is not a matter of what is only inside somebody's head. Phenomenal play cannot continue from the bottom of the lake.
He must take a penalty drop, and in taking the penalty, he can also recognize again that "gravity" is not a lateral force. Thus the necessities encountered in an honest score card are not only from the mind, even if they say golf is mental, but they also procede
from nature itself, das Ding an sich.
"Knowledge of a
principle is immutable in the sense that it cannot change from truth to falsity".(37) The intelligible species of the truth (the natural what-how that instantiates it) may perish or disappear, as a golfer may die or quit the game, or lose all his golf balls,
but the true facts of a slice or a hook, or whatever kind of shot, continue and are unable to change from a true to a false representation. As a result, fundamental principles of nature are able to conform knowledge to themselves, and cause knowledge of truth
by being what they are, for "true entity, unable to become something false, virtually contains true knowledge immutably"(38). That which is necessarily and immutably true also causes evident knowledge of itself in the mind, and such truth is not subject to
the mind, so that it could appear true or false in the way of some probability or opinion.
The truth itself cannot be made false, even if it is clouded by a confusion of appearance. Not all men
are liars, and the Cretans have not conquered the world; and in many cases liars and Cretans still know and remember the truth, and that true entity is unable to become something false at the root. That way true knowledge is contained virtually in many things,
and even when people see illusions and mere after-images, there is still certainity that they see.
"Ce qu'on appelle une raison de vivre est en même temps une excellente raison de mourir.”
If one has found a reason to live, it also may be an excellent reason to die. And if someone dies without completing a project, and it appears that the knowledge is lost, others may rediscover the same ideas from the same principles on their own, since the
results that would follow the practice and skill of art in whatever things are inherent by nature. "Actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them. In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with
any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all."(39)
"The more I practice, the luckier I get", said Gene Sarazen, and the principles themselves are not extinguished with the death of an individual, because they operate at a formal level of sameness, and will always be the same for whomever
he would be who would discover them and the knowledge again, in whatever different circumstances. Since "everything has been said"(40), "it is hardly to be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of
If a philosopher does not meet the standard of a reasonable man but instead is a quibbler, there is no reason for the innocent to suffer his doubts of absurdity or his pain.
"By the dog of Egypt, are the good not wise?" asked Socrates, and an equitable court does not have to suffer the argumentative testimony of fools that facts are not obvious. Rather the determination of a reasonable man "is not merely a matter of speculative
curiosity; it may be of the most important service to the science of man and of the social system. It ought necessarily to precede every other inquiry into social physics, since it is, as it were, the basis."(42) And "it is indeed a great gift of God to possess
right, plain common sense".(43)
One way that people can be confident of certitude by sense knowledge is understanding that "either the same things appear opposite to different senses or they do
not appear so but rather all the senses knowing such an object judge the same about it".(44) If the latter be the case, then there is natural certainty perceived by the senses in virtue of the principle that "what occurs in most instances by means of something
that is not a free cause is the natural effect of this or that thing."(45) For instance, if the same change occurs repeatedly in the majority of cases of any objective sequence, it follows that the transformation and image produced is the natural effect and
paradigm of such and such a cause. As a paradeigma, παραδειγμα, for a short trip to the country, if the engine of a car is run without coolant for the radiator, and its blows out on
the road, and sits smoking by the way, the external thing that is known will be such as it naturally appears to be, according to the image in sequence that is so frequently produced by the power of cause and effect, etc.
People have a natural sense of the measure that obtains in things, and there is even some general agreement about the nature of justice. As Socrates described it,
justice is a penetrating power which passes through all things. It is the subtlest principle, the great measure of measures, and a power which none can keep out. It is the element which superintends over all things, and some would even say that there is even
a great mystery about it, as it remains the chief das Ding an sich selbst betratchtet, and perhaps the hidden cause of the world.
the judgment of different senses differs in regard to what is seen outside, people may still be certain of what is true and in common and know which sense is in error. For more certain than any sense judgment, there also is an intuitive circle of logic immanent
within a reasonable mind, there to set the intellect aright, when one of its senses may err in a given instance. This faculty within the mind ferrets out categorical facts and enthymemes for the intellect*, to capture and isolate which acts of the senses are
true and those which are false. The senses themselves do not cause but merely occasion this faculty of the mind to operate in view of the intellect.
For instance, if sight says that a golf club
that is partly in the water and partly in the air is broken, or that the Sun and the Moon are smaller than they really are, in all such instances we are still certain of what is true and may know which sense is in error. In the case of the golf club, the intellect
naturally retains the proof that "the harder object is not broken by the touch of something soft which gives way before it". This proposition is so simple and evident that upon analysis of its terms no reasonable mind could call it in doubt, even if the terms
were derived from erroneous senses. Indeed, the opposite of this proposition includes a contradiction that makes it impossible.
Now the sight, touch, and sense of every man attest that a golf club
is harder than water and that water gives way before it. That way the common intellect judges without difficulty that the golf club is not broken from simply being in the water. So it goes with other cases, where the terms may be derived from erring senses,
the intellect yet knows that the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself, and so it goes in all things. An element of simple logic stays within the rational mind to revisit the intellect more surely than the testimony of the senses, in cases
where an illusion would linger too long.
If sight says the Sun and the Moon and all objects in the distance are smaller than they really are, the common understanding is still certain of
what is true and knows which sense is in error. Without trouble, the sense of sight as well as touch know that the identical measure can be applied to a nearby object of vision as well as to any distant object. Therefore, the actual size of an object is equally
the same whether seen from up close or far away. Sight errs, consequently, when it says that ships, planes, and cars shrink in the distance. So let each man have the wit to go his own way, and from any corner under a cloud of light to the Sun, the same feet
that are present and near are not greater in size than when they have wandered, and are a hundred or two hundred yards away, "since reason can and must give a full account of its own procedure".
be vomited de phénoménologie out of the belly of a peculiar fish, and close a little chapter on Kant, with reason, "since reason can and must give a full account of its own procedure"(46), one must conclude that when the intellect
determines that the senses err, it does so in virtue of two appropriate ways of knowing and discerning the thing-in-itself. These two operations could be called the imaginative and the ordinary. The first is an imaginative and rational kind of knowledge reposing
within the lens of the mind, which requires the sense only as an occasion and not as a cause. This imaginative faculty also represents a level of objective awareness and defintion in which the intellect could not be deceived, even if all the senses were
deceived. There should be no doubt that as long as simple logic and justice have not been undermined, and as long as they remain the universal measure in all things, self-evident principles and the perception of their attendant images offer repeated testimony
and common inference of the truth, and das Ding an sich.
The second way proceeds by estimation and appreciation from an ordinary frequency of concurrence in knowledge that is acquired by the oft-repeated
testimony of the senses, which things are known to be true and reliable by the simple proposition that, "whatever occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural effect and indeed the occurrence of such and like things",
* the intellect is the memory and understanding, the mind is more and also the will
"The desire for knowledge,
like the thirst for riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it,"(48) and no one with the strength of common sense can accept the claim from a philosopher that he cannot know something as readily simple and common as the divisible present. Knowledge
functions for a sign of relation, to understand and appreciate things, and it may be as simple as an interpretation of the line at the post office. The mind "which is good for anything follows the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind
them."(48) Knowing and understanding "may be regarded as a kind of conclusion" and imply "the progression of the mind in company with the nature of things."(49)
The what-how and now that exists
wherever anyone opens his eyes is not too difficult to see. There is a pulse and twitter in the optic nerve that registers what is seen in the visual pathway about as fast as the "speed of light"; and without some acuity of vision and intelligence of perception,
who would propose to recognize, measure, or talk about the speed of light anyway?
Some anonymous voice from the peanut galleries
of the internet said that Socrates said, "the beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms", although the text is impossible to find; and for terms the divisible present is as simple as finding one's way to Scotland from the Hebrides, or Edinburgh, or St.
Andrew's. There is nothing in existence without its relation with the here and now, and there is nothing without the present. Without the present, there is no past or future, and without these there is no time which even God would transcend.
Would God transcend nothing? He may transcend more than history and monuments, "monumentum hoc exigitur aere perrenius", and bad corporate
speeches, but even He may not transcend nothing. It does not make any sense to say that the Supreme Being transcends nothing, and without the present now, quod adhuc est, time itself obviously would become like nothing, if it were possible. But that is impossible,
for something that God transcends to become nothing, since even God cannot transcend nothing, even for a little while; but any parallel of transcendence that could be such as would be one of the many little one's, that would also involve God, even if only
for a small way, always is and must be.
"Ecce, maris magna claudit nos obice pontus. Deest iam terra fugae." When the great
sea encloses one with the wall of the deep, there is nowhere else to flee, and in an impasse of impossibility it becomes evident that there is a hidden form of ontological necessity in the present, and some sort of creative circle that attends everything.
Therefore, with reason, and the fullness of geometry and geography, we must say that a bridge is a bridge is a bridge, as much as the lack of a way across is not; and, as "life is a reality to be experienced", the Firth of Forth is the Firth of Forth and not
the Dardanelles, et cetera.
"Whenever I think of the past, it brings back so many memories,"(50) and if the here and now are
the thing-in-itself, hic et nunc, everyone should know it as much as the day of the week, that follows in sequence 1,2,3, under the cope of heaven, and that it is impossible that the same thing be and not be, or that the same thing be all red and all
green all over. From one location, one hour is never another, and for one town it never is two days of the week at the same time. Space is the place for all the days of the year, of course, and time functions
in a circular pattern of identity like waves. Fairness in observation and judgment, and the divisible present are not only a question of time but also of place, "hic et ubique", and the "now" of therm is also everywhere. "One must always try to see the truth
of a situation. It makes things universal,"(51) and one of the mysterious things about now is that whenever it is, it always is local as it is everywhere.
It may be impossible to get rid of it,
even if it is meaningless or absurd, since there still comes the sentence that is meaningless or absurd, which yet would try to express something to be heard. If all things known to mankind by experience were withdrawn from the comsos, and all the world was
made perfectly deaf, it would still be impossible to ever withdraw those properties which are strictly attributive to substance. "Now" is such a case of connection that it may even become like the representation of a corporate body. And suppose then, in the
manner of the empirical idea of a body or a vehicle, that science successively removed all its empirical constituents, such as color, consistency, weight, even passability or impassibility, and so forth, then science shall still find it impossible to remove
the space that it occupied.(52)
Glimpse or discern the riddle, if it is, that "hoy es siempre todavia", today is still always. "Adivina adivinanza, entre el vivir y el soñar, hay
una tercera cosa. Adivínala".(53) Between living and dreaming is a third part. Guess it, the continuation, if there is second sight or any fondness from reflections.
By all means of experience
and logic, if it is somebody's turn to move in a game, it is that way now for the entire game at the table, and also in concurrence for everywhere else, since entity is absolute and quantity has no contrary. "Numbers must be just what they are, or not be at
all; for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number."(54)
So it goes that the science of numbers "can have a foundational
status lacking in any other form of knowledge,"(55) including when it is somebody's turn. "Mathematics consists of necessary truths which cannot be changed by empirical evidence"(56), and it would not really make fair sense for science to count numbers and
numbers and crunch them over people's heads, without including the principles and proofs of geometry for background analysis.
By some ontological necessity then, mathematics would even seem connected
to theology, where there is the direction called "up", where people look on high, or "above", and up above for tables. For if empirical knowledge would be regarded as fallible, mathematics would yet remain infallible. So the infallibility of mathematics could
be regarded as having a source beyond the human, even as it includes simple arrangements around a counter or table.
Then the fundamental characteristic that sensible people should know in common
about das-Ding-an-sich-selbst-betrachtet is that like "now", and windows and doors, or somebody's turn, it is divisible, even if it would be everywhere and here at the same time. The cognitive impression of divisibility that comes from human experience is
unmistakable, and everybody knows it as well as dust in the wind. "Pulvis et umbra sumus", we are but dust and shadow, sometimes sifted in a handful of worry.
"All dust is the same dust.
To go peacefully
And enjoy the eternal nap."(57)
... and Satan said that he would sift poor St. Peter like wheat.
Unopposed to ordinary notions, compassed within the domain of reason, the sphere
of now is as comprehensible as any bookstore receipt; and it is everywhere, "ubique", since the divisible present abides comprehensively. One thing leads to another, whether by contact or succession, and even little trivial things, if people take note of them,
have a way of becoming connected. Like the old philosophical contention of the one and the many, now always adds up. "All that is transitory is but a metaphor",(58) but the divisibility of transition must be something real, a knowable thing-in-itself, otherwise
mankind would not know the breath of despair and the way of living in denial and escape as well as he does.
Like a turning ritual in pain, a passage of some existential doom, "with every increase
in the degree of consciousness, and in proportion to that increase, the intensity of despair increases: the more consciousness the more intense the despair"(59). Kierkegaard and the metaphor of oblivion would not exist without the extremes, and the extremes
must exist beyond the veil and curtain of appearance, because there is no other simple way, and the simple way is best, and the best is good enough, since things must also be in themselves as well as others. Besser ist besset und das beste ist gut genug. Like
putting one's toe in the water, one knows the water and one knows the pool. Without having to put one's toe in every single part, that sort of knowledge should not be a problem for a philosopher to comprehend das Ding-an-sich, and that the Earth does not rotate
or orbit the Sun.
Simplicity of thought is common to beatitude, for it constitutes the happy form of peace, and "to be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being."(60) "We seek
happiness by our very nature and man's happiness consists in understanding."(61)
"The intellective form, in fact, is proper to man and, as you can see, I am a clown and I collect moments", he said
in his jolly costume and make-up, as he went riding his highwheeled bicycle by the Rockefeller Compound of the UN. "The operation in which this felicity consists is in me too, formally, and is part of the act". A man of bells and balls and whistles to all the theory of the central banking system 2016, and heliocentrism, etc., he liked to toot his horn and wave to the innocent children. He would do funny pratfalls and slapstick
routine by the Judeo-Masonic Foucault pendulum, which he knew was one of the most absurd hoaxes in all humanity and the history of the world: driven damped, and tuned.
"We have a little commotion",
he said, tapping his over-sized old leather shoe, "and a wave of sweetness shoots through me from top to toe when the sun shines". "Esse quam videri", he declared, "for a clown. So it goes a
long way, if all the world were a birthday cake, and you should take a piece, but not too much."
"The difference between a philosopher and an actor", he said one time, when he took a dangerous
spill from his highwheel bike, "is that an actor knows what he's doing, and he can feel it more" he added.
"Drinking as thinking's no good if you don't feel it," an unknown man from the crowd cried
He was a splash in his colorful costume, and he would carry tunes all of a sudden. It was a little strange, kind of funny, but "sunshine almost always makes me high", he used to sing. "Sunshine
on the water looks so loverly", and between any extremes there is always something there.
"Almost all absurdity of conduct
arises from the imitation of those whom we cannot resemble"(62), and should the idea that there is no fair explanation for comportment, as such-and-such in common, be accepted? For some it may become an apodeictical reflection of apperceptive apprehension,
if not a matter of direct intelligence, that the shortest distance between two points is forever a straight line. After all, there are two sides to everything, and "he that keepeth justice shall get the understanding thereof"(63).
Yet "there is no understanding where there is bitterness, and the heart of a fool is like a broken vessel, and no wisdom at all shall it hold,"(64) and even
that way an inattentive clown among bicycles and volkswagens may fall into the accidental subsistence of nothingness one day. "We can regard our life as a uselessly disturbing episode in the blissful repose of nothingness"(65), yet memory is a mirror,
sine qua non, that dwells as much as it informs.
If it could have happened anywhere, some occurrence of authenticity and a little circle of intelligence, it could have happened in pure space perhaps,
yet as much as the hand writing was on the wall at Belshazzar's feast --- mene, mene, tekel, upharsin --- and not at the North pole, locality has definite importance and time is easily fixed by events. Certain places and events have an atmosphere all of their
own like words, names, and memes, and an affective rapport, even for what could be a sort of universal fame and declination by the stars. For some they may create a sense of special awareness, viz. das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet. In its own way, between
mind, cloud, and tower, the sense of verbal awareness and etymology of place may become of the greatest importance for access to meaning, as much as a castle and its drawbridge by the river. For "without knowing the force of words, it is impossible to know
If the question is how do we rightly know about the world, and that the Earth does not orbit the Sun, for example,
and what is possible for the human mind to know beyond that, it may be an equivalent status question, not unlike a game of Scrabble. There are games in life and Charades, and a holy mountain with clouds on top, where the gods look down to see what nations
and contracts will do. "For our God is a gallant foe that playeth behind the veil,"(67) and Scrabble may be an interesting way for a circle of knowledge and entertainment to develop, as much as there are governments and money.
And as much as Charades "where the lightnings meet", at times it may prove difficult to win. Without the right letters, words may become difficult or impossible
to spell. The circle of perception and the bag of tiles are like a well for the intellect, in view of the mind, but if one does not draw the right letters, and the well runs dry, he may be left "naked as a blade", and he will have to exchange, which could
cripple his score. Most Scrabble players prefer to place small, low-scoring words that get rid of one or more of the letters they do not like, instead of executing the swap maneuver. If the situation arrives that one simply cannot place a word on the board
at all, then he can swap out the letters he does not want, and choose from the remaining pile of unused tiles, as he would when replacing letters he has already successfully put in the game. "The supreme accomplishment", said Arnold J. Toynbee, "is to blur
the line between work and play". Learning rare word lists may help a professional obtain higher scores, and win a little money. Q, V, J, X, and Z are difficult letters, for example, but sometimes may allow placement of a winning combination, and so forth.
Just as sounds and letters go in the right place in words, there are natural relationships of veriloquium hidden between different meanings and the ways of saying things. Some are as obvious as the similarity
of divisibilty and visibility, for instance, which show right away that the powers of division and vision go together. "Omnia Gallia in tres partes divisa est", and the one who wrote it could see it, like "visa". There are TV commercials,
passports, countries, and credit cards and people almost everywhere like Billy Pilgrim who can see the visible since it is divisible, and see that every Visa account starts with a 4, but the indivisible is invisible. Hidden from natural sight, the indivisible
and invisible invincible home of the immortal gods is far away and difficult to find. Without some special magic, to cross the Rubicon with a legion is one thing, yet another to catch a mysterious bull like Jupiter by the tail not the horns even for a moment.
The Spanish verb "divisa, divisar", which means to see from afar, shows the same intuitive sense of things: that to see in natural terms is also to divide, like the Latin verbs dividere and videre.
is aesthetically pleasing and a blessing of nature, of course, that humans have two eyes, and it also parallels the way affection produces knowledge and understanding. What the eye sees also depends on what is sought, with preference, a poco a poco, and people
develop a dominant eye as much as they develop a dominant interest. And one must admit that if he likes something in itself, or even merely the appearance, even if it is only a word that he wants to spell, he should also know what it is as much as it would
come close to the apple of the eye. For what is in the apple of the eye touches the soul, and the soul is the principle of life, "the ordering and containing principle of all things"(68).
In Scrabble, like life, every player gets his turn, and not only is it a matter of time but also of place, of course. A natural desire like that cannot be in vain(69), and as much as the little days of the
week and cosmology of the stars have theirs, confusion should not reign over places, and everybody wants his turn, and everybody wants to be a winner, certainly. At least that much is known for sure about the divisible and visible present and the sphere of
das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet that humans inhabit.
"Veni, vidi, vici", and "there is a place for everything,
everything in its place".(70) If there is a when there is always a where, yet it is still better that we should hold our destiny in ourselves than in the stars. "The whole collection of rules applies to anybody"(71), and from words about science to space
and philosophy, proper spelling, pronunciation, and inner direction of meaning are no accident, any more than the number ten, or the element water that comes rolling in whitewater and waterfalls. The circle of return for any feeling of certainty can only remain
open, for things that would come back continue in substance. St. Robert Bellarmine knew the location of the Earth within the cosmos also, and what the difference would be between a dental appointment instead of a round of golf, for instance.
"To assert that the earth revolves around the sun is as erroneous to claime that Jesus was not born of a virgin",(72) and so it goes without saying
that the days of the week and the months and seasons of the year fall in where they belong like circular functions. The meaning is natural and conventional, and as much as pirate skulls and bones, sticks and stones, and lost treasure maps, and a key on a kite
in a thunderstorm, nothing can describe better the smallest point of division in space than a tiny circle of light. It is the smallest things sometimes that may start us seeing anew: a glimmer of light reflected in a river or mountain lake, a little circle
of visibility, that owing to the three dimensions of space would also be the center of another sphere, and some little particle of a day, et cetera. Like sundrops on cars, "one may conceive light to spread successively, by spherical waves".(73)
And "without light, vision is impossible and that the inner part of the eye consists of water is easily intelligible, water being translucent" and divisible.(74)
Since any primary status is formal, whatever exists is also inevitably part of some triangle, since there is no math without trigonometry, and there is no quantity that
people can understand without its division and a light, which provide some simple form of distinction for intelligence. Between that object where there is some light and another object that is close or far away is some space, and the places these two points
represent are not infinite, because like any visible divisible object, a simple plane in itself is not infinite any more than one of its lines. "Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province of pure a priori cognitions, without needing
to ask from philosophy any ceritificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental conception of space," etc.(75)
does not fill up everything with merely a line or plane of an argument, so there is always a third separate point that is not of the same placement or direction and radius as the first two, since everything cannot go only one way. Therefore, it is apodeictically
clear for all retro-analysis that from any first point there always must follow at least two more and a triangle. If there are so many triangles, as there would also be so many points, then there are also so many pyramids, boxes, spheres, and presents of area
"Tiny bubbles in the wine", she used to sing and smile like she was Cheryl Ladd, "make some people so happy, they
make some people feel so fine". Even if they added up all of the things in space and all of the time, it could not take up all of the area qua orignis infinitum more than tiny bubbles, unless it were infinity that was caught somewhere in the mix of an infinitesimal,
and there is no summation of objects or fine points that is infinite anyway. Another way to consider the big picture is that infinity will never run out of room. So much that infinity cannot be overcrowded or cramped for space, even in an elevator.
Socrates described justice "as that which penetrates all things"(76), including intelligence and reflection, and Kant described judgment as the faculty or power "for thinking the particular under the universal"(77),
and then went on to some length to distinguish transcendental apperception from empirical perception. In epistemology, to summarize, apperception is the "introspective or reflective apprehension by the mind of its own inner states."(78) For philosophy class,
the question whether one knows something also becomes a question of metacognition and self-conscious percolation, which is "cognition about cognition", "thinking about thinking", or "knowing about knowing". There are generally two features of awareness involved
in metacognition: namely the knowledge of the notion, and the regulation of the cognition as it happens as well.
It may seem
elusive, and mostly a resource for meta-headaches, to investigate the wisest interpretation of some of the obscurities of metaphysics, that turn around metamemory and metacognition; but via studious contemplation it should become apparent one day that truth
and right judgment concur with the realists, and that the concurrence also must be substantial. After all, if one has a Ph. D. as deep as the mountains in philosophy but has not the correct sort of diligence, it could be for nothing and only complications,
and a poor way of subsistence. The best reward for diligence is love, and "love is patient, love is kind, it always hopes and perseveres, and love never fails",(79) but "odi et amo", wrote Catullus, which is true as science for confession. I hate and I love,
and that can simplify things too --- or "odero si potero; si non, invitus amabo." I will hate if I can, but otherwise, reluctantly, I will love.
"Quare id faciam, fortasse requiris?" Why do I do this perhaps you ask? "Nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior". I do not know but I feel it happen and am excruciated.
If at one turn a philosopher describes judgment as the faculty or power "for thinking the particular under the universal", at another
point of triangulation he could say as well that it is the faculty or power for considering the universal under the particular, and there where and when he spies the form of a universal, he can be certain that he has also spotted the thing-in-itself, and something
substantial, for in those cases there can be no other way. To the mind of a reasonable man, it becomes apparent one day that living reality is substantial, and a composite of at least two shells, duo duo faciles, an easy two by two that manifest in matter
and form. As entity is absolute and governed by form, ultimo ratio, it follows by logic that there are also at large an extensive set of abstract entities known as universals. Thus the world of common experience is built up in two layers of particulars and
universals, as much as a hammer is still a hammer no matter how or from what it is made. If it works, it is still called a hammer, and thus is in the form of a hammer.
Hoo eee, and with all the recluse powers and flowers of tautology and theorems of geometry all over the place, in a summer's day, the divisible present abounds yet more than sunshine.
"All the heights of the high shores gleam
Red and gold at the sunset
There comes the spell of a magic dream,
And the Harbour seems a lotus-flower;
A blue flower tinted at dawn with gold,
A broad flower blazing with light at noon,
beauty burns like a ceaseless fire,
For all mute things it would seem, aspire
To catch a glimpse of the lotus-flower."(80)
Everywhere we go we perceive an abridgment of substance, and it is from the relation of substance and recapitulatiom of forms that bubble
on like a river that people have their perception. Si ascenderis in altitudines ibi est, et si iacueris in antro adest adhuc. If you ascend into the heights, it is there, and if you fall down into a cave, it is still present.(81) If there is a secret ontology
of the ages hidden in any bridge of good fortune, it is that "excellence resides in quality not in quantity".(82) Quality comes before quantity, qualitas refert potius quam quantitas, and so does form come before matter.
In the simple way of a bridge, without which there is no passage, the form and quality in the connection are prior to the matter and quantity. The way things work properly is as necessary as the way they fail, and the strength of things
is not only strength of materials but also of essential forms. The way things are put together is as important as what is put together, and the how comes before and after the what. The spring line and the rise, and the columns and keystone of an archway, are
in the forms of the elements as they are in the extremes, which are consubstantial from end to end.
The wings of repetition
of consubstantial similarities and dissimilarities flutter and then whisper in the wind between the cemetery trees. "For while the elements are changed in themselves, as in an instrument the sound of the quality is changed, yet all keep their sound"(83);
and space is a formal property also, as important for attributions as much as the ladder of the octave goes up, and then goes down, and as much as entity is absolute and essential.
The same thing
cannot be red and green all over, and what must be must be, and there is no situation that is totally informal, or that is totally without something in contrast. Whether Aristotle says "substance" or Plato says "form", there is little question for comparison
that if elemental things would be reduced to the subject of matter and quantity alone, such radical reductions of content would only rehearse and objectify something like chaos. "Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary,
you in a manner annhilate it and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of our perceptions".(336)
victis, and not only are math and a formula necessary to have, so is faith, and "woe to him who believes in nothing."(84) He would deny everything of necessity, and if an absolute removal process of form and substance from the elements were possible, extinguishing
appropriate properties in quale quid, leaving only matter qua matter, qua qua chaos and qua the blob would not even survive the terrible violence of nihilism for logic and a win, since the objects of scientifc knowledge are only as necesssary and universal
as mathematics allows. A formless heap cannot account for itself in a nice way or balance of a math equation since there must be a form. If there is no outline, if there is no content, and if the thing that is unintelligible cannot be recognized, the meaning
is lost as sure as it has been utterly confused.
In the medieval past of castles and sand pebbles, a divergence developed in metaphysics between two schools of thought, the via antiqua and
the via moderna, and logic would still show that the via antiqua was correct where the via moderna was wrong. "Men were deceivers ever", especially modernists and liberals. "One foot in sea and one on shore, to one thing constant never; then sigh not so",
Shakespeare said, and once it was that way then, it will be that way forever, in regard to the truth about liars, skeptics, and fools. "Then sigh not so".
"The fraud of men was ever so, but let them go."(85) In its ironic way of confusion and denial as progress, heliocentrism is another nominalist school, in a line where truth exists in name and theory only not reality. Nominalism and
modernist phenomenology and Copernicanism have a strange blend. As Anthony trollope confessed the liberal position, "life is so unlike theory", but there are still at least three simple universals to refute them:
1. the universal of resemblance
2. the unviversal of impossibility
3. the universal of the city
Yet things should not be too simple, for "making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy"(86), if not martyrdom, and martyrdom is never easy. As much as an omen, seen from another angle, there is no theory of
resemblance that can avoid postulating any characteristic similarity among many pairs of particular things without postulating a universal resemblance among them as well. If they are all unlike something, then they are all alike in being unlike something,
as much as that is in common, even if each would be different, since to the degree that they are unlike something, they are all alike in another way. Still it is not so easy to say that the Earth is not moving any more than hundreds of parked cars in a lot,
and that everyone can tell; and once the scientist says that the parked cars on emergency brakes are moving, even though no one can tell, and the emergency brake would grind, if the car was on the road, then so for the lot and the Earth, of course, with the
roots of the trees, and all the other things that are at rest or would be.
Without falling into the colors of some vicious infinite regress, or some strange system of denial, admitting even one
universal resemblance among things makes it absurd to avoid others. If one would say that each resemblance among many pairs of similarities is not the same, but is unique and different from the others, and, therefore, not too much alike in sameness, to avoid
the evident fact of a universal, then it still must be acknowledged "that these resemblances resemble each other", by an odd modicum at least. For a little difference, even as much as they do not fit one exact thing, they may fit another: "and thus at last
we shall be forced to admit resemblance as a universal. The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal. And having been forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer worth while to invent difficult and implausible theories
to avoid the admission of universals", even such ones as would be merely of colors, pigments, or figures of imagination that any artist may prefer, one to the other, etc.(87)
The ironies in life
at times become so rich and diverse, for hue and contrast, that for all the difference in the world, there could be as many universals of resemblance as there are ways of being. A universal could be hidden in the question and the answer at any time, as much
as in the cause and the effect.
As to the ontological medium itself, besides the universal of resemblance, there follows the universal of impossibility, for it is impossible that any property of
being should not concur with its own nature. The nature of something like a car or a tree, or the color of paint in a can, or of a cat in the neighborhood, must have a universal form, since all these instances are examples of the unification of concurrence:
and any concurrence is an actual mode of duality, at least for the material essence involved. The existence of matter by itself can account only for one part in the sensible dynamic of impression. Whenever the subsistence of form is dissolved or removed from
matter, the dissolution of the subtlety that was in the missing substance of the form becomes obvious through lack of the continuing concurrence.
The expression of sameness is another sign of a universal, when there is no other way for something to be than the way that it is. The same questions and answers bring themselves around to the end, so they can bring themselves around to the
begining, and around again.
"Virtus semper viridis", virtue is always green, or young. The color green, for instance, has no other way to be than the way that it is, and matter destitute
of form is unaccountable to any improvements of nature, color, style, and to everything else. Except for materialistic deconstruction and chaos, science has no way better to go without form, except down, and nothing better to become, since it is impossible
that any property of being should not concur with its own nature.
In the fields and forests of the climate map there is a quantum leap in green. As much as it is impossible for it not to be green,
where vine roots may come sprouting through the masonry, after human habitation, something more than separable parts makes green green. When by nature the color cannot be separated from itself, there is discovered something secret of a universal. Something
already was green, since it is not only an impressionable mask of atomic theory but something vibrant. And all the instances of green are indifferently related in terms of being green. Therefore, the simple color is evidence of a universal and a sign of some
material essence and relation of substance in common. If someone sings for a "rainbow connection" that "it is not that easy being green", as much as green is green, and that way "it seems you blend in with so many ordinary things", it follows that green is
indifferently related to its own material essence or substance of form, and property of being, and thus offers the embodiment of a universal.
Sometimes people notice that in terms
of the breeze and temperature alone, it could be like it was any year, by the golf course or the library, and that way the weather that comes back around is another sign of a universal; and Aristotle says that "each of the units in 2 must be prior to the 2",
which is true, even in the seasons.(88) And as the concurrence of matter and form is divisible to the intellect, but the unity of the form itself in itself is not, the one that is first must come first.(89)
there is a typical first principle of the concurrence of quality and form with matter, in a knowable triangle, that would also be a knowable property in itself, it would have to be expressed in the act of seeing and knowing. To see and know for the standard
of reason forms a definitive triangle, a sign also with a note of existential clarity as in a universal. The acuity which follows from the intellect (dwelling in the memory and understanding) and from the will that are united in sense and perception
would be a knowable property and something primary in itself. That way a wave or particles of light, where there is the shadow and breath of the living, would represent a third universal, the universal of the city.
Ghengis Khan said, "remember that you have no companions but your shadow". And over the hills and through the trees is where they go to find bright lights and big city,
and the realization of archetypes that come out of civilization and art, trade, society, science, wealth, treasure chests, architecture, vocations, and terrilble struggles for existence, et cetera, and the people who must encounter various impossibilities
and crazy dreams in the course of life.
The universal of the city is like an office of signs and numismatics, "relatio secundum
esse", related according to the way it has being. The employee of the month and the Mayor have their parking space, and people see the stamp or the sticker, and the numismatics of relation as such and such, coined according to the way it has being. A formula
is coined of the one over the many, and the many everywhere around the one, and, like all the other universals, the one in the city is a type of necessity. A lapstrake ship in comparison to a carvel in a medieval harbor town shows that the what-how of workmanship
and the method is the same coin and stamp in all times and places. Whoever did it, necessarily did it the same way for everywhere that he built the boat that he built. Being the one way done by the one who did it, for all times and places, the universal sign
penetrates through all the matter. The image of the city and ship of state are stamped like universals in the treasured exchange in the process of commerce --- as much as the consonant, vowel, and breath are set in any syllable of Scrabble. The universal
sign pentrates through all the matter, as much as words are things themselves, and there are no words and no cities without universals.
Yet "let no rank puff up anyone; for faith and love are paramount
- the greatest blessings in the world; and nothing is more precious than peace, by which all war, both in Heaven and Earth, is brought to an end."(90)
Adding to the logical justification of universals, as they relate to the refinement of ultimate substance, and the form of reality, there are many illustrations of the distinction that exists between the formal and material predication
in things. A strange one in particular comes from a Renaissance painting of St. Lucy by Domenico Beccafumi. She was martyred in 304 AD, being tortured and having her eyes gouged out, and in the painting is shown with them on a plate looking out at the audience.
Like St. Lucy's eyes in the painting, not only can one know das Ding-an-sich-selbst-betrachtet, one can also recognize the universal in the meaning and the sign that is there without too much effort. One way to know the thing-in-itself is to know that all
things, as much as they are properties of being, should belong to God, if not somebody else. People know the lost-and-found, and the activity of the optic nerve, and when they have an abscessed tooth or hear screams of torture. Even not knowing is knowing,
since people know when they do not know why, or when they have forgotten, as much as when one cannot see except for total darkness and pitch black.
It is simple to know how the elements of mere
appearance, even in a painting, are predicated one by one and related in quale quid, and to know also the relation and reiterations of the end of a sensitive nerve to its function, as it would be known as the thing in itself. For fear of dangers along the
way, the blind man knows his blindness and his nerves better than philosophy, and senses the form of perception that is missing as much as an epiphany. If by chance he has been robbed, he understands again that something essential has been lost, and can recognize
the universal form of things in himself and the mystery of the thief. People always know and see the form in itself come whatever of the matter.
A poor bloody eye that has been plucked out has
lost its better form and first color of light in its natural connection, as much as any circle would have lost its geometry. The removal of the form of vision that obtained in the thing in itself has left the native property of sight that was in the object
to remain in name only. For an eye is called an eye, even if one that has been plucked out becomes something like a ghost; haunting eyes that have been plucked away, after a sort of cruel nominalist reduction, are still eyes over the matter.
"Los ojos por que suspiras,
los ojos en que te miras
son ojos porque te ven."
"The eyes how why you sigh
one knows it well,
the eyes that look at yourself
they are eyes because they see you" (91)
When the essential property of the universal form has been lost, due to materialist deconstruction of the meaning, and violent invasion of the
thing-in-itself, it is agony and oblivion, pain that is too heavy to describe, scattered around the broken sphere of a ruined castle like a lost soul, to be less than moonlight in shards of glass.
Et cetera, and no matter how fast the race or the career, the shadow more than keeps up for the radius and curve. Sometimes in front, and it never tires, and if an hour of darkness was a candle, "vision is
the art of seeing what is invisible to others"(92).
"Is there truth", the Bishop asked, "and does justice penetrate all things, even ghosts? What is truth? Quid est veritas?"
Kant proposed that his purpose was "to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its circumference as
well as in its contents," yet he only undermined the effort to be reasonable by reducing the sensible world to skeptical indifferentism and dismissive terms of illusion(93). A Copernican and Newtonian academic, a skeptic and modernist in phenomenology, and
another synthetic nominalist, he missed the boat to say that it was only an appearance.
Like the tiny bubbles in the wine that make some people so happy, and make some people feel fine, transcendental
numbers like Pi would reinforce metaphysical realism, and the authenticity of the circle and apple of the eye, rather than nominalism, since nominalism is lacking that sort of formality and apple of apperceptive appreciation in the first place. To say that
one does not know Pi in itself, but only the appearance, is to say that the circle does not really exist and neither does its color or the universal equivalence of circumference over diameter. The same thing cannot be red and green all over, and the nominalist
academic would even say that colors do not exist in themselves, but in name only, and that they do not have entity beyond the appearance. In an ironic and repetitive way painful to reason and history, heliocentrism and relativity are only a nominalist school
of synthetic illusions, where truth exists in name only not reality.
To say that the Earth moves at astronomical rates to orbit
the Sun is to say a lot. To say that it all happens with an unaccelerated and undetectable motion due to universal gravitation is to say even more. Yet for practical experience, the theory and applied science of it add up to less than zero, less than dust
in the wind. The theory is only for an appearance of opinion that plays in the mind, a sort of mental illusion, an unscientific prop and escape from reality, and it is the reverse of what everybody sees.
no one from the philosophy department, and the world unknown of the unknown can know the material content and form of the thing in itself, then can one notice its complete removal, when it is taken away? Einstein abolished the aether and Kant
paved the way a century and thirty-seven years before by abolishing reality, so how did a straight line survive?
proportion are in each other all along, a tautology of nature and space. In all the theorems of geometry, and even in the relative way and relation of a vacuum, and its division by zero, or one, there are no evaulations without ratios. It is as impossible
to remove Pi from the iron ball at the end of a prisoner's chain as it is to remove the center from a circle and the straight line from inside the radius of a sphere. If people cannot know the essence of things like iron, and the ratio of Pi, when they are
inside the circles of a prisoner's ball and chain, but only the appearance, how do they know with such greater clarity the ratio and proportion and the heavy weight of it, when they would be removed?
a blind prisoner does not know or understand the form of the sentence placed on his head, and the substance of imprisonment that follows, with an act of simple understanding and right judgment, how does he notice the removal of the punishment so well? To notice
the removal is to know somewhat the matter and the form that were before, and to know the universal involved between before and after is to know a thing as much as a bond. Justice would penetrate all things, and solving the problem in the mathematical sense
is sufficient for all cases, as there is no prisoner of reason who cannot add up and understand a convict's ball and chain. All numbers are not equal and division by zero is impossible. If the system of relativity, and the Copernican and Newtonian reversals
of epistemology, would say that one does not see and understand a ball and chain for what it is, and whether it spins, or an abscessed tooth, or eyes that have been gouged out, how does it say that one does not notice the removal process of so much pain?
If one cannot recognize with an act of simple understanding and right judgment --- and the complete proof of mathematics --- that the Earth is not rotating, can one then at least recognize its removal
from space? Would a modernist skeptic of phenomenology not notice if the Earth were totally removed, as much as if it had moved away from under his feet, one day, as much as he would notice the taking away of a ball and chain?
In the movie "Castaway", an expressive character named Chuck Holland developed a talking relationship and friendship of some projection with a volley ball. To be on the deserted island was a question of survival, and he talked to the
volley ball, and it seemed that the volley ball talked to him. He even named it "Wilson", and it seemd "Wilson" said good things. He was for Aristotle and the good, and if a castaway can talk to a volley ball, any prisoner of modernist phenomenology and the
philosophy department can talk to a ball and chain as well as the Earth or an island cave.
Like a playable word in Scrabble,
what any of them would say that would be logical and true would have to be the same inference among all of them. The difference between them and what they say is the same when they say what is true. The truth is not without its place among things, and universals,
and it has the simplest property of sameness, and transcendence of comparison, among as many things as there may be. Through the extent and repetition of so many things, it remains the simplest second measure, a healthier and better coconut, since what is
false always involves complication.
If they played Scrabble, they would all have to follow the same rules of participation and verbal interaction. What goes for words from Scrabble also goes for
things and actions. The word has an image that represents a thing, that is the way that it is written and pronounced, that represents another thing that is the concept and the object involved. It is about the meaning and the sign at the table, and the rules
are for the proper communication and love of the game itself, and that way they are for more than mere humans. There is a sign in the word and a measure more than the sound and the letters, which is the actual thing in itself. Actuality has the greatest potential
excellence of meaning, and it is as knowable as the lime in the coconut, and as the one and the other are potential and divisible.
If the volley ball was named "Wilson", the iron ball and chain
could be "Philo", from one of the Greek words for industry, φιλοπονία. In head to head scrabble, "Philo" and "Wilson" would prove that a placement value and unity of form obtains in the thing-in-itself that is the
word and the referent object in virtue of the connection with reality and the mind. There is only one way to spell the one syllable word bat, for example, even if the word bat may have at least three different meanings in two or more languages. Scrabble has
the same government everywhere, and the syllable is the syllable as much as any syllogism is a valid argument.
"Everything possesses its own certitude, which is its own essence." Unaquaeque res
habet certitudinem propriam quae est eius quidditas.(94)
The concrete identity of individual entity and haecceitas among survivable and correctly spelled words, and their things, and attributes
of relation, may be something "Philo" would want to emphasize, from his own experience with heavier weights, and "Wilson" could not agree more about apparent density of an object.
rebus intentio esse", or "in rebus necesse quod intentionum esse habere", being is a necessary tension in things, especially if "Wilson" played Scrabble as light as a volley ball, floating like a feather and stinging like a bee, and better. Necessity and the
measure used to measure remain equal to themselves, and when something like a lucky word in Scrabble crystallizes, it is unlikely that such a particular score will come again. Not soon anyway, and the way of being, in virtue of the neccessity of space, ebbs
and flows like an alphabet rhyme, yet the signs and meanings always must fit, as much as correct spelling. A missing letter is like a missing tooth, and it is the same one problem, relatio secundum esse, for all the words.
A map maker knows he knows what the thing is that is metacognition of place, and the validity of its universal representation: in the geometric form of intersecting lines of longitude and latitude, around a geographic sphere of location.
The rule of place prevails in cause and effect as much as correct grammar and spelling. Materially, formally, efficiently, and eminently the one that is real is the one that is the closest to itself within itself and is itself of itself in loco etiam. Proxissimus
suimet sibi enim in ipso est. The closest one to himself is in himself also. The first and simplest necessity of being rests the most, and subsists as something simple, as one precedes that which is compounded and contingent.
The orb and notion of Jupiter in the cosmos is as much a question of logical consequence as anything else: Z results of necessity from A and B, if it would be impossible
for Z to be false when A and B are true. And if science counted sheep from Earth to Jupiter, and called the distance and total number an "EJ", as a number and sign of relation it would have no contrary.
Where it would represent simple entity qua entity (ens realissimum sed et rationis) it would also be absolute. As Aristole and Euclid would say, the line from A to B is AB: and as Earth is to Jupiter, or
Jupiter is to Earth, there is still no contact in numbers but only separation and succession, and overall unity of form. Since a number is realized as it is, like a color is a color, and white is in and on rice, everything that people know and understand is
also for some proportion or relation of realization. One does not have to see the infinite home of the gods or catch a leprechaun to know the divisible finite thing in itself, like where Jupiter is in the sky. One may see, recognize, and understand the unitary
way of words and measures in as many instances as there may be, where there is enough room to fit them in the mind.
Wise people know when a situation speaks for itself, and good sense knows the
relation of the thing in itself, as much as there is any straight line from Earth to Jupiter. As much as Sarazen's double eagle at number 15 in Augusta 1935, and Earth to Jupiter or the Sun, the method of division in virtue of comparison, between straight
lines and circles, can be interpreted as a mirror of the golden ratio in a wilderness of mirrors, like any other universal line in space.
Before he hit the shot, Sarazen said, "they might go in
from anywhere", and the argument begun from a gnomon is still the same as the argument from a straight line, and are the same as the argument from a circle, that nothing represents A better than A, and nothing represents B better than B, and the shape of thought
is in the extremes and the means, none of which exist without the measure, or the score. Thoughts can be scanned by measuring the waves, and as much as 1 is a point and a circle, and 2 is a straight line and a pillar, all numbers are figurate and confederate
quanta. If ever there was a confederacy of dunces, there always has been a confederacy of numbers. For as impossible as it is to get the white out of rice or cotton, and the right eye out of Horace, it is as impossible to get geometry and the golden mean out
of the shape of everyday life, and every day thought, and the sheep in the distance to Jupiter.
The measure of things is not only for quantity but quality, and science must know how to choose the
means and avoid the extremes on either side, if it would be a wise witness for improvement; and as much as the distance between Earth and Jupiter is the only one that it is, absolute and with no contrary, like Sarazen's score card, by convention or nature,
there is also no better for place for it to go, or way that it should be represented, other than by itself, where and when it is.
As much as there is only one way to spell "bat", there is only
one series of do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si, do to sing an octave. And there is, at any given time, one straight line distance between this point and that point, that are this way and that way, from the center between Jupiter and the Earth. There is only one
measure of the golden ratio, phi, that it represents, as a measure of simple entity for distance, qua qua, qua qua, and for the birds. This is the way that space is between all the stars, and between perigee and apogee; and it is the same space from point
to point around the world for all the days of the year and twinkling stars.
Overrunning everywhere with the simplifying measures of logic, frequency, and form, and of ratio and proportion, the
great space and outer space contain all the things in themselves, hidden or revealed; and, as much as the day of the week, science can be sure what many of them are, as much as the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself.
The measure cannot exist without the extremes, and the extremes cannot exist without the measure. If either of the extremes is destroyed, so the
measure, and it is as difficult to remove the one singular distance that is between the Earth and Jupiter from simple entity, as it is pure quantity at any given time, as it is to remove the Earth away from itself, or any straight line from geometry, as much
as geometry is in all of them. Straight lines are universally simple and some in particular may disappear, but "what is simple cannot be separated from itself"(95). Simplicity in consequence cannot be separated from its existence, "for it does not have its
existence in virtue of some form other than itself",(96) and it can be gratifying. If anybody from science would notice the Earth being removed from itself, or from under where he is, he should have noticed it spinning and turning in the first place, as much
as it is a simple question of where it is, and that he could recognize which star is Jupiter, and that it also goes around the Earth from east to west every day, just like the Moon and the Sun, et cetera.
A from Z can go for a "bat", and all the signs and meanings of Scrabble, the concurrence of the "what for" and "what how" is from the primary place that it went, where it was supposed to go. With particular and universal virtue, the necessity of being and
the extremes of the measure, and the measure used to measure, remain equal to themselves. It is a circular funcation that every man would like to have good teeth, and not be struck by bolts of lightning, and for everybody the concurrence of relation in the
question would have the same place, 16 over 16, and not struck by lightning, as much as place is placement and placement is for a universal.
But for everybody, the life and the teeth, and
the place to fit in are unique, even if there is sameness among many things and clockwork, and a ghost in the machine. "With what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again": in qua mensura mensi, fueritis metietur vobis,(97) as much as Jupiter is
in only one sign at the end of a line at a time, and the Earth is in the same one and all the others, which cannot be without one going around the other. A mystery in the cosmos maybe, that as many stars as there are, there could be almost "infinitely" more,
and as many places from the center of an umbrella, even if the when and where are always only one line of direction along all the location.