"Das Ding an sich", the thing-in-itself, and then "das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet", the thing regarded as it is in itself, as it would be itself, if it were, said Kant, to describe his philosophy
that things in themselves are unknowable. And lying down, pitchfork in hand, one may also be afraid of falling, as much as knowledge would be for mere accident. The world can be strange, a surprise as much as the funny farm, and beyond the appearances there
may be feelings on occasion and depth that may be difficult to express.
Perhaps an irony of criticism, to be sure of nothing
but the uncertain, and mistrust nothing but the certainties, and find nothing obscure but the obvious, where in the mind there follows an invisible thread, a question of some synthetic doubt in phenomenology, where the analyst would begin to express the opinion that the knowable order of the world, and even topology, for example, like the riddle of the Seven Bridges of Konigsberg, would depend solely upon the cognitive activity of the subject rather
than on the things in themselves.-1
Hume himself observed earlier that there is no perfect idea of anything, but only of perception; and that "a susbtance is entirely different from a perception.
We have, therefore, no idea of a substance."
If it were only the idea, it would also be why, and thus, in determining reality for the Kantian outlook too, there is a radical departure in
the continuation that happens, in which the intellect of the subject's sense impressions conforms objects to structures inherent in the mind, rather than the external objects of actuality conforming the sense impressions of a reasonable mind to themselves.
For the imaginative philosopher, therefore, there would be nothing more convenient and better to give assurance of the truth than the intellective conception and merely thinking it.
Of course, nature as an object of knowledge and analysis is a phenomenon arising from a synthesis of sensations and judgment. However, within the stream of modern transcendental criticism, what gives those
sensations is called unknowable beyond the mere concepts themselves, which already would contain, or be contained within, structures inherent in the mind. Pure concepts, therefore, may be described as ideas and categories of the understanding, and that way
may be said to be wholly independent of experience. With Kant, modern philosophy would continue to accomplish a fundamental and peculiar inversion of the order of perception and right judgment, such that objects must follow the ways that people engage
in thinking and opinion making, if they are that smart for categories, rather than vice versa.
Thus the key to Kant's theory became the epistemological reversal, which he also called his "Copernican
revolution," for it may seem true at times that what we can know after all is only what appears to be also in the mind, and what remains in itself is intrinsically unknowable.-2 Even for the unmistakable pains of contradiction, the most simple things
can never be known to us beyond the appearances, and the world is a place where things sometimes can change as fast as Bian Lian 變臉, the baffling Chinese art of face changing at the opera.
Therefore, what is merely seen would not be enough for certain knowledge and understanding, since everything changes: as much as the South moves North, the North moves South, and time marchs on, time marches
on, et cetera. "The only thing that stays the same is everything changes".
He would even go so far as to insist that "space and time
are a framework provided by our thinking, rather than properties of the objective world,"(3) which, however, is not credible for decent argument, since even irrational animals recognize the same circumstances of time and place. Certain realities are so openly available that everyone alive can appreciate them, and who should be so blind to the simplest facts because of their obviousness that they should be surprised when somebody calls attention to what everybody
ought to know? Llamas and goats in the mountains, as much as men, recognize the edge, and the other animals of creation preserve the simple belief in external objects in all their natural thoughts,
instincts, designs, and actions.(333)
-That Kant saw his change of perspective as a "Copernican turn", as he called it, was
telling. He almost said it all, when he said that with his school of thought he would accomplish a "second Copernican revolution". Like the way of Copernicus before, in the circulation of astronomy, and later with Kantian metaphysics, the modernist instruction
would instill an epistemological reversal in the noggin and natural order of things. For this Kant has been thought by many to be the greatest philosopher who ever lived; and Newton's so-called laws of motion were the collective paradigm from which he would
develop his worldview.
"Kant's system is like Newton's idea of gravity", and "it is close to how we still see the world."(4) If reckoned as the Master of Modernity in philosophy, the mightiest
thinker of the thinkers who established themselves along the way of ideas(5), his favorite book of science was the "Principia", which is almost impossible to read and make sense to retell it. Yet as much as Newton, it would appear that the old man took a residual
leap of faith in the wrong direction, and fell out of one of Porphyry's trees.
The aim of science as well as philosophy is
ultimately to arrive at the words which give a true representation of the world, and it is of primary importance, therefore, to get things right in themselves, because merely saying it so does not also make it so. "Gratis asseritur gratis negatur", that
which is asserted gratuitously may be rejected with equal freedom, and philosophy should never be distinguished unfairly from common sense knowledge, for there is nothing in it which could not be said in everyday language.(6) After all, "the order and connection
of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things".(7)
Things are usually known in the way that they are perceived
and experienced, even if not always by direct impression; and the way things are is also the way that they tend to remain; and Copernicanism has a natural tendency to make an embarrassment out of common sense everywhere. To say that it cannot be judged with
simple cognitive awareness on any given day whether the Earth moves is like saying no one can really know the "thing-in-itself", for any trouble involved, even if it was something so simple as the day of the week, and whether the Earth is rolling along like
a bowling ball at midday of any given golf tournament, for example, when a scorecard is signed.
Thus a philosopher would tell
an astronomer or a tournament caddy that he cannot know what day it is or the score -- as he would only be seeing lingering appearances, and cannot know what is essential, not as das Ding an sich. The appearances of quality, quantity, relation, modality, concentration,
and space may be obvious in a sense, but not terribly useful in terms of epistemology, since the conclusion is already contained in the subject, as much as it would only be true by analytic definition and tautology, like an oak tree is a tree, for example.
Thus one cannot with certainty follow the succession of the seasons by the stars either, understanding the passing of the weeks, months, and years, as one would put together a calendar, because logic can have no empirical part; and time is logical, of course,
yet the calendar is a burden of empiricism, and all data-based phenomena, ipso facto, and so forth, et cetera.
There are the problems of stellar aberration and retrogression, for example, and
the problems of perigee and apogee, especially of the Moon, and then parallax and people who are late, and these natural phenomena cannot be continuous like logic, except where it is to know more and more about less and less.
Yet even if the field of equation and synthetic inquiry is narrow, where is proof of the minor, and what is reality that a just society would be capable of understanding? What are the rules and what is a lost golf ball in fact? Whose
is whose, and where is the cognitive certainty and confidence of justification in the what-how of experience, that people should recognize beyond mere schools of opinion? What is the sensible custom of observation and analysis at the corner or the course,
ignotum per ignotius, and obscurum per obscurius?
"We are unkown, we knowers, ourselves to ourselves. We men of knowledge
remain of necessity strangers to ourselves. We understand ourselves not. In ourselves we are bound to be mistaken. As far as ourselves are concerned we are not knowers"(8), wrote Nietzsche. The curiosity and vanity of things fail, for example, and so does
the element of love. Even with all good service and examination of species and names, "we are surrounded by mystery and cannot understand the common things of life. Nature speaks with a thousand tongues, and each tongue voices an unknown language."(9)
"Ease of intelligibility, after all, is suicide for philosophy", as Sgt. Schultz from the Wehrmacht of "Hogan's Heroes" in TV Land used
to say. "We know nothing"! He would stomp his boot or the rifle. "Nichts zoviel", nothing too much, nothing in excess. "For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life," for example,() and
especially for the agreement to avoid the Russian front.
If all the strangeness and blind digression of the human race were
fixed in the eyes and expression of one man, an overweight forgotten sergeant, a prison guard from the Wehrmacht, perhaps he would say "I know nothing, and you won't remember me or these terms either," and so would modern philosophy of existentialism and its
phenomenology say the same. Inquiring minds, therefore, overrun the subject with stupid emphasis to imagine that it would be knowable at all.
For instance, the thing-in-itself, a dissertation
paper of which channel or what drill, as it would be recognizable beyond the passing absurdities of life in the land of the lost, or which way the Moon goes, or what day it is, and whether the Earth rotates, if understood as perceived, it only comes from
a world of appearances, like poetry
"THE apparition of these faces in the crowd;
Petals on a wet, black bough."
Et cetera. "De gustibus, non est disputandum," yet even when a man is deceived or sees illusions, he understands what it is to see; and if he only dreams, he still knows what it is to be awake. Love or hate
him, if such an academic reference weight as Kant would say that reality, and finding one's way to a train station of the metropolis, is rather mind-dependent being, not mind-independent being, one can see how the art of solipsism -- besides that of heliocentrism
and Judeo-Masonic deception -- could have become modernity's distinctive intellectual physiognomy.(10)
For things to be what they seem or appear at all was a naive expectation and generality
of life from long ago. Who from today would expect that "doubt must be no more than vigilance otherwise, it can become dangerous"(10).
Since so many things tie together, even from past and present, the thing or image that is being seen by the eye exists in some virtue of itself too. It must, for whatever it is in some combination, even if it is only an illusion, "the study
and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective were no practical results to follow (11). As much as there are knots in trees or the traces of a cloud, nature does not ask permission, and people passing by the wheel of life are bound to construe
things like the weather, the calendar, and the world of experience by the most reasonable way of construction.
For it is certain that the human mind did not create the first simple attributes
of being, like more or less, greater than or less than, equal to or not equal to, this way or that way, which already were. "Our presence bestows not being on it; our absence does not annhilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent
of the situation of intelligent beings who perceive or contemplate it."(333) The human mind did not create pepper, for instance, and this much or that much. And if people ask, "which came first, the chicken or the egg?" they may also ask, "which came first,
pepper or the cook?"
However they look at the question of immanence, the simple attribution of being comes always in and of itself, and already was, before the natural sense opinion or whatever
human synthesis of it came around. The pre-existence of pepper to tastes and opinions, as such as it is, is difficult to deny from the contradistinction. Like the day of the week, being the one that it is before tomorrow, das Ding an sich all day long, and
being the only one that it is, the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself.
The table of measures and motions is for percentages, and with such a subsequent mix for content as
the human mind in tow, would it be fair to say that any certain and unadulterated truth can be known naturally by the intellect of any poor taxpayer in this life? If a synthetic measure of things, the mind of a taxpayer still exists to be known, for sure,
as much as his income and his business, if not the other way around; and it seems a philosopher may know when he does not know either, as much as a mystified tax collector, even if he or the other would only count on fingers to see how much it is.
There is a satellite dish with signals coming in, too many channels to count, and even midget wrestling from Mexico, to ask, "where is all the knowledge that we lost with so much information"?(13) For
instance, out of all the accumulation, with so many channels for content, and whatever it is, wherever it may go on parade, ten has been considered to be the most illuminating and simple crux among numbers -- versed like no other parallel or parallax for division
and order among things, so many things.
So much, so
much, and Osiander himself wrote that if hypotheses "provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough." And ten is the unit of the decimal system: "the perfect term of the numbers derived from the monad"(14), and whatever das Ding-an-sich
may be, it must have a number as much as a channel, for nothing exists without a number, or some content, some way that it must be. So too in the information age of mass merchandising, one sees that philosophy is not taught as much as it is engineered, and
sold, and, therefore, also present, and "if Aristotle were alive today, he would have a talk show."(12) A priori to a posteriori, just look at the TV.
"No ideas but in things, and so
much depends upon a red wheel barrow glazed with rain water beside the white chickens."
For a universal wheelbarrow, in a classroom example, formalized ad infinitum as much
as poetry of the TV, and the number ten, the substance of number could be applied to anything within a circle, and everything can fit in a circle. The first four numbers, in fact, provide exemplars that have been thought to contain the whole nature of mathematics,
since 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10; and when they are configured with little dots in a neato triangle, they make a radical little pyramind, the lesser tetractys, like a root element in Sierpinski gaskets, and the way things are.
"The laws of mathematics are not merely human inventions or creations. They simply 'are'; they exist quite independently of the human intellect."(15)
Thus, with the way the decade works in math, such a thing is not only a matter of opinion from appearance. Chance cannot account for the unique meaning and importance of the number ten, since "what happens always and in all cases
is not the result of chance but is in the nature of things."(16) Simple as one, two, three, and four, every instance of the first ten numbers provides a role model of simplification and necessary truths, with which all empirical evidence must ultimately agree,
and which cannot be changed by a surface of illusion.
The number ten is referred by symbolic tradition to things of outstanding excellence, and beginnings brought to perfection. If anything
is brought to perfection, it could be signed over with a ten, since sign relations are ontological, and "of all the numbers from the monad and up, ten is the most perfect."(17) Plato's nephew Speusippis reckoned the decade "to be the most natural and most
creative basis for all things, being, as it were, in itself a sort of model for the things which constituted the universe".(18)
Ten is forever fixed at the base of the numbers, since it is produced
by adding 1, 2, 3, and 4 and comprises even and odd, square and cube, prime and composite, linear and plane. It provides the beginning and resolution of all mathematical extension, containing all the hundreds and thousands and millions and tens of millions
within it, et cetera, and also all the decimals as well. According to Hughes of St. Victor, ten also represents straightness in faith, the right way to go; and it is the number from which all things come and to which they must return.
Someone in an old casino comedy routine once asked a friend for change, requesting two tens for a five. "Can I get two tens for a five" he said and without thinking
about it the friend, who was high on a roll, gave it to him out of a handful of cash he had just won. He suddenly realized the miscalculation of the generosity when he received one five for two tens and remembered that two fives make ten, not the other way
around. "Wait a second", he said, "two tens are twenty, not five. You owe me fifteen dollars", but the friend with two tens was in a rush and had already gone.
So it goes, and "time may consume the speculation of men but it confirms nature".(19) The way that birds fly, for instance, using their wings, proceeds by two's, and the way that humans see and understand is the same. The power of
nature has given man two eyes and five senses for the same reasons that birds have two wings and fine feathers to fly. Natural motion proceeds by two's, duo duo faciles, an easy two by two, and human intelligence works by a special method of division in virtue
of comparison. Experience "turns you from one feeling to another and teaches by means of opposites so that you will have two wings to fly, not one”.(20)
A simple process of sense
and perception, cognitive awareness in the human species is wired to operate along a line of comprehension that goes by noticing "this is" and "these are", and "that is" and "those are", duo duo, et cetera for sensitivity. Rivers know there is no hurry,
and roll on. "Aequum memento enim rebus in arduis servare mentem". Burn on big river, burn on, and to save the mind from trouble, remember equanimity in arduous matters.
Who has not ever noticed
that the way of intellectual distinctions always functions, since it is conducive to knowledge to distinguish one attribute and its property from another, with a view to avoiding confusion? Exceeding with meekness like Moses, counting goats, "for Moses was
a man unpretentious above all men that dwelt upon the Earth"(21), the number ten would also symbolize first principles, the wheel of fortune, the tree of life, and the overall power of division in perception, et cetera for sensitivity. And, as to the certitude
of first principles, "the terms of self-evident principles are so identical that it is evident that one necessarily includes the other"(22).
The overabundant tautologies of self-adherence, rooted
in the richness of first principles, abound of themselves, of course, it goes without saying; and the power of repetition by analysis in math and nature corroborates many things. If not for the redundancy of assimilation and contrast, veritas vincit omnia
vi divisione, truth conquers all by a power of division; and "it is not once or twice but times without number that the same ideas make their appearance in the world."(23)
It cannot be an accident,
therefore, that the best number that fits to divide well the greatest total number and confluence of all things would be ten; and that mankind would also have ten fingers of twenty-seven intricate bones on two hands. Three to the third power in twenty-seven
is like a little exponential trinity, pro manibus, and ten in two hands of five, with some subtle dexterity and intelligence, is at times a little sign of perfection or perhaps magic.
Would everything like that and the nature of the world then only be a matter of appearance, "unknowable in itself", and are appearances always deceiving? Does the human cogitator's capacity lack the power
to penetrate the veil of appearance, and grasp the inner nature of reality? Does the octave exist in music with a root, and the calendar as well, or not, if anybody has an ear or knows what day it is? If they do, would it not be more reasonable to reject the
call for despair, and the extreme academic skepticism of some philosophers, by
a) certitude of first principles, and
c) also with knowledge of our own acts, and
d) certitude of sense knowledge?
Is there too much confidence in common sense knowledge for fools, when one would say that he knows well enough what the thing is, in itself, for example, when he also has
a dental appointment on Tuesday at 11:30 am? Is there no abscess of truth among mankind, no consensu gentium in communis, even for all the suffering in a bad tooth and the nerve? And what day of the week would it be when the Earth would spin because of Newtonian
"gravity", to orbit the Sun, and nobody would notice, between him and the dentist's drill?
Is there truth? What is reality that anyone should care? Why are some things so difficult to face, and
does truth even exist -- das Ding an sich -- among general notions and specific days of the week? If not, what is the best interpretation of the great silence in all the deception? Even birds know the tropics of the Sun, and the seasons, as much as animal
intuition guides a feather, and the measure used to measure allows them in their limit.
In fact, it should be recognized that a natural order exists among general notions, such that one thing can be known from another: for instance, the notion of "being" and the notion of "true". Being, qua qua to be, is the major and
more extensive, as "being is of stronger adherence". The reason for this is that entity is something absolute, simple, and primary, whereas truth implies a relation to an exemplar.(24) It comes from experience that a thing can be known as an entity, even though
its truth value may not be not clear and perhaps would remain as yet unknown. From this it follows that the thing which is true can be known before its truth value is also known.
The way the mind
functions, we know that many aspects of things can be grasped by a simple act of understanding, and many times a day. In such cases, when the things involved are true, they are also known. But the truth value itself of some circumstances at times may be somewhat
hidden and reserved, obscure for a while, and recognized only later by an act of judgment. "Simple understanding, however, precedes an act of judgment."(25)
Knowledge of things gleaned from the
senses is both of a general and particular nature, and in virtue of such knowledge people judge the truth of things and any occurrence. Nature does not ask permission, of course, and it is hardly fitting that any nature should exist without its proper
activity. The more perfect the nature in question the less fitting that it should lack such an operation, and the proper operation of the intellect is to know the thing which is true. Then it is hardly fitting that nature should not endow the intellect with
the appropriate faculties of sense, perception, and reason for such an operation that fits it, namely one such as understanding and recognizing the natural world around it, and the day of the week, for example.
A simple case of a first principle could be that one cannot have boiling water and ice from the same
water at the same time. If a quibbler dropped ice cubes into boiling water, the water that boils is not the water that is frozen. The water that is frozen is never boiling at the same time that it is frozen. From the very fact that it grasps these things,
the intellect perceives and unites these terms in a logical and universal proposition of truth. By the elemental condition of water, the mind itself has present before it the necessary and evident cause of the conformity of this proposition with the simple
terms that compose it. Such an instance of conformity, where the intellect perceives the evident cause in the terms, cannot help but be known in itself, as the thing that it is, das Ding an sich, the element water, and hot or cold. There is nowhere else for
such an ontological basis of experience, as boiling or frozen in water, to go except where it is, and by such terms of nature and temperature it always will be the same.
Where it is like that,
boiling or frozen, when hot or cold, is a universal way everywhere. The intellect could not apprehend these terms and unite them so well in an effective proposition, effective for all times and places of experience, without having the conformity of relationship
arise between the proposition and the terms, ipso facto. Therefore, it always must be so, as much as two similar objects could not exist without some relationship of sameness between them.
impossible to perceive all this as the necessary way that it is, ita est, without perceiving the water in itself. It is precisely such conformity of a proposition to the terms that constitute it that makes accurate the truth of a judgment, and such simple
terms cannot be combined in a judgment without being true. So it is that one cannot perceive this proposition and its terms without also perceiving the conformity of the proposition to the terms; and one is, therefore, also perceiving the truth of the element
water as it is the thing-in-itself, as much as the oceans and the seas.
Once there is certitude of first principles, like water and the number ten, for example, it becomes clear how one can be
certain of the conclusions drawn from such principles, since the perfect syllogism is evident from logic and many things in themselves. The accuracy of such judgments depends solely upon the certitude of the principles involved and the evidence of the inference.
As for b), what is known by experience, even though a person does not experience every single individual case, but only a great many, nor does he experience them at all times but only frequently, still he
knows infallibly that it always goes such and such a way and holds for all instances of such a thing -- as boiling water, for example, or ice cubes -- as nature would be what it is in itself. He knows this in virtue of comparison that "whatever occurs in a
great many instances by a cause that is not free is the natural effect of that cause". The intellect knows this proposition even if the terms would be derived from erring senses, "because a cause that does not act freely cannot in most instances produce an
effect that is the very opposite of what it is ordained by its form to produce".(26)
The chance cause, however, in contrast, is ordained either to produce or not produce the opposite of the chance
effect at random. But everything does not happen by chance, of course. That would be absurd and worse than a motorcycle sidecar that keeps falling off in a movie, and if something occurs frequently enough, it is reasonable to know that it is not coming about
by chance, and its cause, therefore, will be a naturally determined cause if it is not a free agent.
Facts gathered from experience -- and their causes and effects -- are so frequent and numerous
that once we find a given nature associated at one time with this accident, and then at another with that, "we have discovered that despite the accidental differences, such an effect invariably follows from this nature."(27) With bears and honey or salmon
in the stream, for example, such effects are not the result of what is merely incidental to such a nature or accidental in the world at large, but are rather the effects of this nature as it is in itself.
times, we may experience the truth of an experimental conclusion, such as "the moon is frequently eclipsed", and granting the validity of the conclusion, because it is a fact, we then proceed by a method of division to discover the reason. A person may also
arrive at self-evident principles after beginning with such a conclusion from experience. In such cases, the conclusion, which at first was known only by experience, now is known by reason of such a principle with even greater clarity, namely that of a primary
kind of knowledge, for it has been deduced from a self-evident principle. Thus it is self-evident that when an opaque body is placed between a visible object and the source of light, the transmission of light to such an object is prevented by the interference.
Such things and first principles known from experience are appreciated most certainly by a demonstration of the reasoned facts.
As for c), people are as sure of many of their own acts as they are
of the self-evident first principles and propositions of philosophy. "There are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized until personal experience, generally of a painful kind, has brought it home and made it a reality."(28)
And it is impossible that something contingent should follow from a necessary cause, and people know well enough when they have a broken leg, like a comminuted compound fracture, or have fallen into a pit, or must
have an abscessed tooth pulled, and that what is in occurrence in those cases is something more than a mere possibility. Human intelligence may discover that what was a contingency outcome before is not any more, and that way also apprehend das Ding an
sich selbst betrachtet.
There is an order among contingencies anyway, and some proposition is first and immediate, like the one who would have knowledge of his own acts, otherwise there would
be an infinte regress, or something contingent would follow from a necessary cause, both of which are impossible.
As for d),
certitude of sense knowledge, "the mind is not merely a vessel to be filled but a fire to be kindled",(29) and if the cradle and candle of the senses burn, how can a philosopher be sure that what he knows is not less than spent wax and wisps of smoke,
if everything he knows is only an appearance? As he may say himself, he knows "nothing", and if knowledge is only apparent, appearing in the mind by the bridge of mutable senses, and life itself disappears, like an apparition subject to change and final mortality,
what can one say he really knows except chance and illusion, and that he merely dreams as much as nothing?
Descartes asked, "of what can I be certain"? "Cogito ergo sum" was his answer, but if
the world is continually changing, we can have no certitude about it by any kind of light. For there can be no certitude when an object is known in some way other than the way in which it is, and it also is impossible to know that which has no state, no way
to be, even if it would not change. It is difficult, therefore, to say that there is real knowledge among mankind at all, "if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing
always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, and ... there will be no one to know and
nothing to be known".(30)
It could have been this way, or it could have been that way, perhaps. Therefore, how things look is only a matter of probability in outcomes. The mind judges about first
things and other things and the probability of this and that, and which is which, or would be, and many times it could be either, going this way or that, or only one chance of many for an appearance. Therefore, what people would say they know of the truth
of things is only an ironic line of probability, derived from the numerousness of mutabilities, and they always could be wrong; and in many cases they are, even for their own acts; and, for all the trouble of getting everything right, the assertion of truth
yet remains within the resident power of the mind, even in the case of something necessary which would occasion an act of judgment.(31)
"Ecce, maris magna claudit nos obice pontus. Deest iam terra
fugae"(32). Behold, the great sea encloses us with the wall of the deep. There is no more place for flight.
So the logical impasse between mind-dependent and mind-independent being, that
would be set forth by Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", would be so difficult, even for opinionated people in the philosophy department, as to not give ground for the birds, even if the way they fly and the way humans see and understand is the same, duo duo.
If an ornithologist thinks he can overcome the rigors of philosophical skepticism, because he recognizes the difference between
a flock of ducks and the murmurations of starlings, he is naive, since he does not realize it only is an appearance that he is judging. An innocent fool, he still does not know the thing-in-itself from what it is inside his head; and he might as well tell
NASA and the Bank of England that the Sun orbits the Earth, the Earth is not moving, obviously, and that the full Moon goes from East to West, when viewed from above the North pole, if he would say that he knows the difference between a duck and a starling.
After all, what he knows is not outside of his mind. What he knows is inside his mind, of course, since he only knows the knowledge as knowledge. The data cannot be handled any other way.
However, even if "the mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions"(334), it does not follow that just because an object is mutable, therefore the knowledge produced may not represent anything
under an immutable aspect. For it is not precisely the mutability of the object that causes the knowledge; rather it is the nature of the mutable object in question that does so, and this nature is immutable. "Hence, the knowledge produced by it represents
the nature itself. And if it is the nature, this nature may have an immutable relation to something, and then both this nature and the other thing to which it is related, each by its own exemplar, are represented as immutably united."(33) And so by means of
two perceived terms of experience, like a starling and a duck, produced by two mutable creatures subject to probabilities, it is possible to have a knowledge of some immutable relations among things in virtue of their natures.
Numbers and the facts cannot be avoided, and the essence of relation in mathematics itself is represented to the intellect as something immutable. If there is an exemplar, there must be an example, and if there is an example, there
must be an exemplar. In so far as they are natures, one can tell the difference between a starling and a duck mathematically, and see from the individuals that these birds will not fly the same by themselves or in flocks. Ducks do not cause murmurations, certainly,
and they are not as agile as starlings. By the method of division in virtue of comparison, between these two species, and with all the certitude of sense knowledge, an ornithologist can reasonably say to the philosopher that he knows some immutable principles
of relation in virtue of natural motion: and that he knows the thing-in-itself qua qua for the birds.
would end by making even simple things false. And no one of good sense would prefer to put himself, or the education of his mind, under the power of an instruction which condemns him to an unhealthy state of unreality. Some equations are false and some are
true; and "virtue grows when the soul keeps the understanding according to nature. It is according to nature when it remains as it was made. Now it was made beautiful and perfectly straight. For the straightness of the soul consists in the mind's being according
to nature, as it was made; as, on the other hand, the soul is said to be evil when it bends and gets twisted away from what is according to nature."(34)
Philosophy would not fairly serve a purpose
that it would undermine virtue, and that we should all be made so stupid that we cannot know some basic things about birds. "Usually the philosopher philosophizes in order to resign himself to life, or to seek some finality in it, or to distract himself and
forget his griefs, or for pastime and amusement"(35), yet not to be made stupid. Nature has been so wise, after all, in the balance, that she has not been content with dividing men into happy and unhappy, wise and foolish, she also gives to the wise the spirit
of wisdom, and to the foolish the spirit of nonsense, e.g., 1 + 2 + 3 ... = -1/12, as reckoned for an "infinite sum identity" at Cambridge.
Therefore, if it is true that a mutable object, even in so far as it is mutable, would yet signify something immutable, how is it that its relation to another thing is immutable? The relation is immutable in the sense that the opposite relation
could not exist between the extremes, and neither could the relation be non-existent, given these extremes. If one or both of the extremes would be destroyed, then the relation in them is also destroyed, yet the formal relation is destroyed only in the things,
not in itself, since quantity has no contrary and entity is simple and absolute: and every relationship should have an attribute of number and also of being, qua qua, qua qua.
of the measure cannot exist in thought without possessing the necessary quantitative identity in question, more or less; and they may always exist as such, as such and such, as much as the mind itself would be an object of knowledge and invovlement in physics
and the truth, and a vehicle for intelligent investigation. Das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet, if the identity did not exist, then the quanta and the way of it would not exist either. If the number property of a number, as much as any number, did not exist,
at least from the first, then nothing would exist, since the first property of being is as numerical as a number in itself, that namely could be called "the number 1", and the number 1 before many.
by one from the beginning is the most simple way for things to be perceived the way that they are, and it works in everything, for all continuations, more than gravity or the speed of light. It should become evident with enough time that even a trifle among
trifles can be represented under an immutable aspect, even as it is mutable in itself, and the thing-in-itself can be known in both cases.
Knowing things and their relations by division, like the
geometry of a golf ball, for instance, the logical essence of existence may be represented to the intellect as something immutable by something radically changeable and perishable, like the golf ball itself. People know that geometry, algebra, and common
sense have not been lost, cast out of the cosmos and uprooted by cruel fate, when a golf ball disappears, going out-of-bounds or landing in the lake.
If a golfer has three sleeves of golf
balls and one loose extra in his bag, he knows the thing-in-itself and the number ten with the certitude of sense knowledge as much as philosophy. And wherever it goes, a golf ball always lands between one place and another. That is the only way that it can
be. The arrow of direction in a golf ball cannot go in two different or opposite paths at the same time. From a principle as old as the hills, when one has seen one side of where the shot lands, one has seen the other from which it came. As sure as Janus and
timeless geometry, when one has seen one side or face of the shot, he has seen the other that is in the circle, and that way also the link that is in the the face of the club.
If a right-handed
player tees off, and hits a curving shot that goes off to the right and almost lands in the lake, he hit some sort of a slice. If a left-handed players tees off next, and hits a similar curving shot that almost lands in the lake too, near the first shot, he
hit some sort of a hook. Between right-handed and left-handed players, and all the shots and sides of the game, there are self-adhering and immutable principles of essential relation in physics and geometry that do not go away. There is something more to it
than mere coincidence or a series of accidents.
Even if a golfer has lost all his golf balls and thrown his clubs into the lake, the formal qualities of mathematics remain definitive, covering
all sides; and without the proper delineation of quantitative attributions provided by geometry, mathematics itself would become just a heap and nonsense. Without the geometry of space, no score card and its math would make any sense, and even average golfers
know that about the game and the thing-in-itself, even if they just call it life.
With the Kantian style of rationalism in phenomenology, however, "perceptions come only from the senses where there
is no grasp of necessity, but only of conjunctions and associations of phenomenon"(36), et cetera, but the scientific necessity realized when a player's ball has gone to the bottom of the lake is common to everyone who sees it, and is not a matter of what
is only inside somebody's head. Phenomenal play cannot continue from the bottom of the lake. He must take a penalty drop, and in taking the penalty, he can also recognize again that "gravity" is not a lateral force. Thus the necessities encountered in an honest
score card are not only from the mind, even if they say golf is mental, but they also procede from nature itself, das Ding an sich.
"Knowledge of a principle is immutable in the sense that it cannot change from truth to falsity".(37) The intelligible species of the truth (the natural what-how that instantiates it) may perish or disappear,
as a golfer may die or quit the game, or lose all his golf balls, but the true facts of a slice or a hook, or whatever kind of shot, continue and are unable to change from a true to a false representation. As a result, fundamental principles of nature are
able to conform knowledge to themselves, and cause knowledge of truth by being what they are, for "true entity, unable to become something false, virtually contains true knowledge immutably"(38). That which is necessarily and immutably true also causes evident
knowledge of itself in the mind, and such truth is not subject to the mind, so that it could appear true or false in the way of some probability or opinion.
The truth itself cannot be made false,
even if clouded by a confusion of appearance. Not all men are liars, and the Cretans have not conquered the world; and in many cases liars and Cretans still know and remember the truth, and that true entity is unable to become something false at the root.
That way true knowledge is contained virtually in many things, in the ways they actually are; and even when people see illusions and mere after-images, there is still certainity that they see.
qu'on appelle une raison de vivre est en même temps une excellente raison de mourir.” If one has found a reason to live, it also may be an excellent reason to die. And if someone dies without completing a project, and it appears that the knowledge
to be accomplished is lost, others may rediscover the same ideas from the same principles on their own, since the results that would follow the practice and skill of art in whatever things are inherent by nature.
"Actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them. In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according
to the natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all."(39)
"The more I practice, the luckier I get", said Gene Sarazen,
who invented the sand wedge from the wing of an airplane. The principles themselves are not extinguished with the death of an individual, because they operate at a formal level of sameness, and will always be the same for whomever he would be who would discover
them and the knowledge again, in whatever different circumstances. Since "everything has been said"(40), "it is hardly to be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of the past".(41)
If a philosopher does not meet the standards of a reasonable man but instead is a quibbler, there is no reason for the innocent to suffer his doubts of absurdity or his pain. "By the dog of Egypt, are the
good not wise?" asked Socrates, and an equitable court does not have to suffer the argumentative testimony of fools that facts are not obvious. Rather, the determination of a reasonable man "is not merely a matter of speculative curiosity; it may be of the
most important service to the science of man and of the social system. It ought necessarily to precede every other inquiry into social physics, since it is, as it were, the basis."(42) And "it is indeed a great gift of God to possess right, plain common sense".(43)
One way that people can be confident of certitude by sense knowledge is the understanding that "either the same things appear opposite to different senses or they do not appear so but rather all the senses
knowing such an object judge the same about it".(44) If the latter be the case, then there is natural certainty perceived by the senses in virtue of the principle that "what occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural
effect of this or that thing."(45) For instance, if the same change occurs repeatedly in the majority of cases of any objective sequence, it follows that the transformation and image produced is the natural effect and paradigm of such and such a cause.
As a paradeigma, παραδειγμα, for a short trip to the country, if the engine of a car is run without coolant for the radiator, and
its blows out on the road, and sits smoking by the way, the external thing that is known will be such as it naturally appears to be, according to the image in sequence that is so frequently produced by the power of cause and effect, etc.
People have a natural sense of the measure that obtains in things, and there is even some general agreement about the nature of justice. As Socrates
described it, justice is a penetrating power which passes through all things. It is the subtlest of principles, the great measure of measures, and a power which none can keep out. It is the element which superintends over all things, and some would even say
that there is even a great mystery about it, as it remains the chief das Ding an sich selbst betratchtet, and perhaps the hidden cause of the world.
If the judgment of different senses differs in regard to what is seen outside, people may still be certain of what is true and in common, and know which sense is in error. For more certain than any sense judgment, there also is an
intuitive circle of logic, immanent within a reasonable mind, there to set the intellect aright, when one of its senses may err in a given instance. This faculty within the mind ferrets out categorical facts and enthymemes for the intellect*, to capture and
isolate which acts of the senses are true and those which are false. The senses themselves do not cause but merely occasion this faculty of the mind to operate in view of the intellect.
if sight says that a golf club that is partly in water and partly in air is broken, or that the Sun and the Moon are smaller than they really are, in all such instances we are still certain of what is true and may know which sense is in error. In the case
of the golf club, the intellect naturally retains the proof that "the harder object is not broken by the touch of something soft which gives way before it". This proposition is so simple and evident that upon analysis of its terms no reasonable mind could
call it in doubt, even if the terms were derived from erroneous senses. Indeed, the opposite of this proposition includes a contradiction that makes it impossible.
Now the sight, touch, and sense
of every man attest that a golf club is harder than water, and that water gives way before it. That way the common intellect judges without difficulty that the golf club is not broken from simply being in the water. So it goes with other cases, where the terms
may be derived from erring senses, the intellect yet knows that the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself, and so it goes in all things. An element of simple logic stays within the rational mind to revisit the intellect more surely than
the testimony of the senses, in cases where an illusion would linger too long.
If sight says the Sun and the Moon and all objects in the distance are smaller than they really are, the common
understanding is still certain of what is true and knows which sense is in error. Without trouble, the sense of sight as well as touch know that the identical measure can be applied to a nearby object of vision as well as to any distant object. Therefore,
the actual size of an object is equally the same whether seen from up close or far away. Sight errs, consequently, when it says that ships, planes, and cars shrink as they go away in the distance. So let each man have the wit to go his own way, and from any
corner under a cloud of light to the Sun, the same feet that are present and near are not greater in size than when they have wandered, and are a hundred or two hundred yards away, "since reason can and must give a full account of its own procedure".
To be vomited de phénoménologie out of the belly of a peculiar fish, and close a little chapter on Kant, with fair reason, "since reason can and must give a full account of its
own procedure"(46), one must conclude that when the intellect determines that the senses err, it does so in virtue of two appropriate ways of knowing and discerning the thing-in-itself. These two operations could be called the imaginative and the ordinary,
which correspond to both human ideas and impressions.
The first is an imaginative and rational kind of knowledge reposing within the lens of the mind, which requires the sense only as an occasion
and not as a cause. This imaginative faculty also represents a level of objective awareness and defintion of ideas in which the intellect could not be deceived, even if all the senses were deceived. There should be no doubt, that as long as simple logic
and justice to the subject have not been undermined, and as long as they remain the universal measure in all things, that self-evident principles and the perception of their attendant images offer repeated testimony and common inference of the truth, and das
Ding an sich.
The second way of impression, "qui in duo equa dividitur", proceeds by estimation and appreciation from an ordinary frequency of concurrence in knowledge, that is acquired by the
oft-repeated testimony of the senses, which things are known to be true and reliable by the simple proposition that, "whatever occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural effect and indeed the occurrence of such and
like things", etc.(47)
* the interpretation here is that the intellect is the memory and understanding, the mind is more the
"We're off to Scotland," said Tom clandestinely.
"That way the desire for knowledge, like the thirst for riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it."(48)
“I used to be a paratrooper,” he explained, and no one with the strength
of common sense can accept the claim from a philosopher that he cannot know something as readily simple and common as the divisible present.
There are four mintures for any degree of arc of the
ecliptic, for example, and knowledge functions also for a sign of relation. To understand and appreciate things, not just for the stars, at times it may be as simple as an interpretation of the lines at the post office or traffic of the road.
The mind "which is good for anything follows the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them."(48) Knowing and understanding,
therefore, "may be regarded as a kind of conclusion", and implies "the progression of the mind in company with the nature of things."(49)
The what-how and now that exists wherever anyone opens
his eyes is not too difficult to see. There is a pulse and twitter even in the optic nerve that registers what is seen in the visual pathway about as fast as the "speed of light"; and without some acuity of vision and intelligence of perception, who would
propose to recognize, measure, or discuss the speed of light anyway?
There once was an anonymous voice from the peanut galleries of the internet who said that Socrates said, "the beginning of wisdom
is the definition of terms". Although the text is impossible to find, for terms the divisible present is as simple as finding the way to Scotland from the Hebrides, or Edinburgh, or St. Andrew's. There is nothing in existence without its relation to the here
and now and nothing without the present. Without the present, there is no past or future, and without these there is no time which even God would transcend.
An omnipotent being may transcend
"the countless series of years and flight of ages", and monuments "more lasting thant bronze", but not nothing, since it does not make sense to say that a Supreme Being transcends nothing. Without the present now, quod adhuc est, time itself obviously
would become like nothing, if it were possible. But that is impossible, for something that God transcends to become nothing, since even God cannot transcend nothing, even for a little while; but any parallel of transcendence, that could be such as would be
one of the many little one's, that would also involve God, even if only in a small way, always is and must be.
"Life is a reality to be experienced", and some sort of creative circle attends everything.
If the sea encloses the land with the wall of the deep, and there is nowhere else to flee, in an impasse of impossibility, it becomes evident that there is hidden in the present a form of ontological necessity. Therefore, with reason, and the fullness
of geometry and geography, science must say that a bridge is a bridge is a bridge, as much as the lack of a way across is not, and the Firth of Forth is the Firth of Forth and not the Dardanelles, et cetera.
one location, one hour is never another, and for one town it never is two days of the week at the same time. Space is the place for all the days of the year and funny things, of course, and time functions in a circular pattern of identity like waves. "One
must always try to see the truth of a situation. It makes things universal,"(51) and one of the mysterious things about now is that whenever it is, it always is local as much it is more than that.
"Whenever he thought of the past, it brought back so many memories, that sometimes he could not let it go"(50). He was only a clown, but if the here and now are the thing-in-itself, hic et nunc, everyone
should know it as much as the day of the week, that follows in sequence, the succession 1,2,3, under the cope of heaven. For it is impossible that the same thing be and not be, or that the same thing be all red and all green all over. Therefore,
the divisible present and fairness in observation and right judgment are not only a question of time but also of place, "hic et ubique", and the "now" of them is also everywhere.
It may be impossible to get rid of, even if meaningless or absurd, since there still comes the sentence that is meaningless or absurd, which yet would try to express something to be heard. If all things known
to mankind by experience were withdrawn from the comsos, and all the world was made perfectly deaf, it would still be impossible to ever withdraw those properties which are strictly attributive to substance. "Now" is such a case of connection. It may even
become like the representation of a corporate body. And suppose then, in the manner of the empirical idea of a body or a vehicle, that science successively removed all its empirical constituents, such as color, consistency, weight, even passability or impassibility,
and so forth, then science shall still find it impossible to remove the space that it occupied.(52)
Glimpse or discern the
riddle, if it is, that "hoy es siempre todavia", today is still always. "Adivina adivinanza, entre el vivir y el soñar, hay una tercera cosa. Adivínala".(53) Between living and dreaming is a third part. Guess it, and the continuation if
there is one, like second sight or any world of fondness from reflections.
By all means of experience and logic, if it is somebody's turn to move in a game, it is that way now for the entire game
at the table, and also in concurrence for everywhere else, since entity is absolute and quantity has no contrary. "Numbers must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted,
and so of any other number."(54)
So it goes that the science of numbers "can have a foundational status lacking in any other form of knowledge,"(55) including when it is somebody's turn. "Mathematics
consists of necessary truths which cannot be changed by empirical evidence"(56), and it would not really make fair sense for science to count numbers and numbers and crunch them over people's heads, without including the principles and proofs of geometry for
By some ontological necessity then, mathematics would even seem connected to theology, where there is the direction called "up", where people look on high, or "above" to higher
realms. For if empirical knowledge would be regarded as fallible, mathematics would yet remain infallible. So the infallibility of mathematics could be regarded as having a source beyond the human, even as it includes simple arrangements around a counter or
Then the fundamental characteristic that sensible people should know in common about das-Ding-an-sich-selbst-betrachtet is that, like "now", and windows and doors, or somebody's turn at
a game, it is divisible, even if it would be everywhere and here at the same time. The cognitive impression of divisibility that comes from human experience is unmistakable, and everybody knows it as well as dust in the wind. "Pulvis et umbra sumus", we are
but dust and shadow, sometimes sifted in a handful of worry.
"All dust is the same dust.
To go peacefully
And enjoy the eternal nap."(57)
... and Satan said that he would sift poor St. Pete
Where thought is unopposed to ordinary notions, compassed within the domain of reason, the sphere of now is as comprehensible as any bookstore receipt, and everywhere too, "ubique",
since the divisible present abides comprehensively. One thing leads to another, for example, whether by contact or succession, and even little trivial things, if people take note of them, have a way of becoming connected.
Like the old philosophical contention of the one and the many, now always adds up. If "all that is transitory is but a metaphor",(58) the divisibility of transition at least must be something real, a knowable thing-in-itself, otherwise
mankind would not know the breath of despair, and the way of living in denial and escapism as well as he does. The passage of existential doom, quo vadis and a turning descent with age, is like a ritual of pain impossible for many if not all to avoid.
.. facilis descensus Averno
noctes atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis.
gates of hell are open night and day
Smooth the descent, and easy is the way
And "with every increase in the degree of consciousness,
in proportion to that increase, the intensity of despair increases: the more consciousness the more intense the despair"(59).
Kierkegaard and the metaphor of oblivion would not exist without the
extremes, and the extremes must exist beyond the veil and curtain of appearance, because there is no other simple way, and the simple way is best, and the best is good enough, since things must also be in themselves as well as others. If a pain, besser ist
besset, und das beste ist gut genug. Like putting one's toe in the water, one knows the water and one knows the pool. Without having to put one's toe in every single part, that sort of knowledge should not be a problem for a philosopher to comprehend
das Ding-an-sich, and that the Earth does not rotate or orbit the Sun. The caverns of hell may be smoky, yet
.. to return, and view the cheerful skies,
In this the task and mighty labor lies.
If there is any faith in the earth, "nothing is more active than thought, for it travels over the universe, and nothing is
stronger than necessity for all must submit to it." Therefore, simplicity of intention is common to beatitude, for it constitutes the happy form of peace, and "to be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being."(60)
"We seek happiness by our very nature and man's happiness consists in understanding,"(61) since the intellective form, in fact, is proper to man.
For example, there was
a clown at the UN who admitted to the audience that he was driven by an interest in entertainment and popularity. He confessed that he would "collect moments", as he called it, as he went riding his highwheeled bicycle by the Rockefeller Compound of the UN.
"The operation, in fact, in which this felicity consists is in me too, formally, and is part of the act", he said.
man of bells, balls, and whistles, to all the social theory of the central banking system 2017, and heliocentrism, etc., he liked to toot his horn for contracts and wave to the innocent children. He was a splash in his colorful costume and make-up and
would carry tunes all of a sudden. It was a little strange, kind of funny, but "sunshine almost always makes me high", he used to sing at times, when he would do funny pratfalls and slapstick routine by the Judeo-Masonic Foucault pendulum, which he knew was
one of the most absurd hoaxes in all humanity. For the history of the world: driven damped, and tuned.
"Sunshine on the water looks so loverly", and the angels who sing know that between any extremes
there is always something there.
"We have a little commotion", he said for proof, tapping his over-sized old leather shoe, "and a wave of sweetness shoots through me from top to
toe when the sun shines. Esse quam videri", he declared, "for a clown. So it goes a long way, if all the world were a birthday cake, and you should take a piece, but not too much."
between a philosopher and an actor", he said one time, when he took a dangerous spill from his highwheel bike, "is that an actor knows what he's doing, and he can feel it more" he added.
as thinking's no good, if you don't feel it," an unknown man from the crowd cried out.
"Almost all absurdity of conduct arises from the imitation of those whom we cannot resemble"(62), the clown
replied. He dusted himself off as needed, and should it be that the idea that there is no fair explanation for comportment, as such-and-such in common, be accepted?
For some it may become
an apodeictical reflection of apperceptive apprehension, if not a matter of direct intelligence, that the shortest distance between two points is forever a straight line. After all, there are two sides to everything, and "he that keepeth justice shall get
the understanding thereof"(63).
Yet "there is no understanding where there is bitterness, and the heart of a fool is like a
broken vessel, and no wisdom at all shall it hold."(64) Even that way an inattentive clown, with schizo-affective disorder, lost among bicycles and volkswagens, may fall into the accidental subsistence of nothingness one day. "We can regard our life as
a uselessly disturbing episode in the blissful repose of nothingness"(65), said one, yet memory makes a mirror, sine qua non, that dwells as much as it informs.
If it could have happened anywhere,
therefore, some occurrence of authenticity and a little circle of intelligence, it could have happened in pure space perhaps, yet as much as the hand writing was on the wall at Belshazzar's feast --- mene, mene, tekel, upharsin --- and not at the North pole,
locality has definite importance, and time is easily fixed by events. Certain places and events have an atmosphere all their own, like words, names, and memes, and there comes an affective rapport, even for what could be a sort of universal fame and declination
by the stars. For some they may create a sense of special awareness, viz. das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet. In its own way then, between mind, cloud, and tower, the sense of verbal awareness and etymology of place may become of the greatest importance for
access to meaning, as much as a castle and its drawbridge. For "without knowing the force of words, it is impossible to know more."(66)
the question is how do we rightly know about the world, and that the Earth does not orbit the Sun, for example, and what is possible for the human mind to know beyond that, it may be an equivalent status question, not unlike a game of Scrabble. There are games
in life, and Charades, and a holy mountain with clouds on top, where the gods look down to see what nations and contracts will do. "For our God is a gallant foe that playeth behind the veil,"(67) and Scrabble may be an interesting way for a circle of knowledge
and entertainment to develop, as much as there are governments and money.
And as much as Charades, "where the lightnings meet",
at times it may prove difficult to win. Without the right letters, words may become difficult or impossible to spell. The circle of perception and the bag of tiles are like a well for the intellect, in view of the mind, but if one does not draw the right
letters, and the well runs dry, he may be left "naked as a blade", and he will have to exchange, which could cripple his score.
Most Scrabble players prefer to place small, low-scoring words that
get rid of one or more of the letters they do not like, instead of executing the swap maneuver. If the situation arrives that one simply cannot place a word on the board at all, then he can swap out the letters that he does not want, and choose from the remaining
pile of unused tiles, as he would when replacing letters he has already successfully put in the game. "The supreme accomplishment", said Arnold J. Toynbee, "is to blur the line between work and play", and learning rare word lists may help a professional obtain
higher scores, and win a little money. Q, V, J, X, and Z are difficult letters, for example, but sometimes may allow placement of a winning combination, and so forth.
Just as sounds and letters
go in the right place, in words, there are natural relationships of veriloquium hidden between different meanings and the ways of saying things. Some are as obvious as the similarity of divisibilty and visibility, for instance, which show right away that the
powers of division and vision go together. "Omnia Gallia in tres partes divisa est", and the one who wrote it could also see it, like "visa".
There are TV commercials, passports,
countries, and credit cards, and people almost everywhere, like Billy Pilgrim, who can see the visible since it is divisible, and see that every Visa account starts with a 4, but the indivisible is invisible. Hidden from natural sight, the indivisible and
invisible invincible home of the immortal gods is far away, even from airplanes, and difficult to find.
Without some special magic, to cross the Rubicon with a legion is one thing for Caesar,
yet it is another to catch a mysterious bull like Jupiter by the tail, if not the horns, even for a moment. The Spanish verb "divisa, divisar", which means to see from afar, shows the same intuitive sense of things: that to see and grasp things in natural
terms is also to divide, like the Latin verbs dividere and videre.
It is aesthetically pleasing and a blessing of nature, of course, to see that humans have two eyes; and it also parallels the
way affection produces knowledge and understanding. What the eye sees also depends on what is sought, with a little preference, a poco a poco, and people develop a dominant eye as much as they develop a dominant interest or taste. And one must admit that if
he likes something in itself, or even merely the appearance, even if it is only a word that he wants to spell, he should also know what it is as much as it would come close to the apple of the eye. For what is in the apple of the eye touches the soul, and
the soul is the principle of life, "the ordering and containing principle of all things"(68).
In Scrabble, like life,
every player gets his turn, and not only is it a matter of time but also of place, of course. A natural desire like that cannot be in vain(69), and as much as the little days of the week and cosmology of the stars have theirs, confusion should not reign over
places, and everybody wants his turn, and everybody wants to be a winner, certainly. At least that much is known for sure about the divisible and visible present, and the sphere of das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet that humans inhabit.
"Veni, vidi, vici", and "there is a place for everything, everything in its place".(70) If there is a when, there is always a where, yet
it is still better that we should hold our destiny in ourselves more than in the stars.
"The whole collection of rules applies to anybody"(71), and from words about science to space and philosophy,
proper spelling, pronunciation, and inner direction of meaning are no accident, any more than the number ten, or the element water that comes rolling in whitewater and waterfalls. The circle of return for any feeling of certainty can only remain open, for
things that would come back continue in substance. Bellarmine and Socrates knew the location of the Earth within the cosmos also, and what the difference would be between hemlock or a dental appointment instead of a round of golf, for instance.
"To assert that the earth revolves around the sun is as erroneous to claim that Jesus was not born of a virgin",(72) and so it goes without
saying that the days of the week and the months and seasons of the year fall in where they belong like circular functions. The meaning is natural and conventional, and as much as pirate skulls and bones, sticks and stones, and lost treasure maps, and a key
on a kite in a thunderstorm, nothing can describe better the smallest point of division in space than a tiny circle of light. It is the smallest things sometimes that may start us seeing anew: a glimmer of light reflected in a river or mountain lake, a little
circle of visibility, that owing to the three dimensions of space, would also be the center of another sphere, and some little particle of a day, et cetera. Like sundrops on cars, "one may conceive light to spread successively, by spherical waves".(73)
And "without light, vision is impossible and that the inner part of the eye consists of water is easily intelligible, water being translucent" and divisible.(74)
The eye creates its own reflection, and since any primary status is formal, and space is a prime concept, whatever exists is also inevitably part of some triangle. Necessity
has an excellent way of influence, since there is no math without trigonometry, and there is no quantity that people can understand without its division and a light, which provide some simple form of distinction for intelligence.
Between that object where there is some light and another object that is close or far away is some space, and the places these two points represent are not infinite, because like any visible divisible object, a simple plane in itself
is not infinite, any more than one of its lines.
The, the, and ...
"How many miles to Babyland?
Anyone can tell
Up one flight, to the right
Please to ring the bell"
... "geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province of pure a priori cognitions, without needing to ask from philosophy any ceritificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental conception
of space," etc.(75)
Merely a line or the plane of an argument is not enough for everything and space, so there is always a
third separate point, that is not of the same placement or direction and radius as the first two, since everything cannot go only one way. Therefore, it is apodeictically clear for all retro-analysis that from any first point there always must follow at least
two more and a triangle. If there are so many triangles, as there would also be so many points, as much as there are "tiny bubbles in the wine", then there also must be so many pyramids, boxes, and spheres, and places of destination.
However, even for destiny, if they added up all of the things in space and all of the time, it could not take up all of the area, qua orignis infinitum,
more than tiny bubbles, unless it were infinity caught somewhere in the mix of an infinitesimal. Yet so, there is no summation of objects or fine points that is infinite anyway. Another way to consider the big picture, therefore, is that infinity will never
run out of room, as infinity cannot be overcrowded or cramped for space, even in an elevator or bottle of wine.
In the 5th century BC, Socrates described justice "as that which penetrates all things"(76),
including intelligence and reflection; and Kant described judgment as the faculty or power "for thinking the particular under the universal"(77). To be fair to the subject, he then went on to some length to distinguish transcendental apperception from empirical
perception. In epistemology, to summarize, apperception is the "introspective or reflective apprehension by the mind of its own inner states."(78) For philosophy class then, the question whether one knows something also becomes a question of metacognition
and self-conscious percolation, which is "cognition about cognition", "thinking about thinking", or "knowing about knowing". There are generally two features of awareness involved in metacognition: namely the knowledge of the notion, and the regulation of
the cognition as it happens as well.
It may seem elusive, mostly a resource for meta-headaches, to investigate the best interpretation
of some of the obscurities of metaphysics, that turn around metamemory and metacognition -- but via studious contemplation, it should become apparent one day that truth and right judgment concur with the realists, and that the concurrence also must be substantial.
After all, if one has a Ph. D. as deep as the mountains in philosophy but not the correct sort of diligence, it could be for nothing and only complications, and a poor way of subsistence. The best reward for diligence is love, and "love is patient, love is
kind, it always hopes and perseveres, and love never fails".(79) It is not supposed to be wrong, but "odi et amo", wrote Catullus, which is true as science for confession. I hate and I love, and that can simplify things too --- or "odero si potero; si non,
invitus amabo." I will hate if I can, but otherwise, reluctantly, I will love.
"Quare haec rerum faciam, fortasse requiris?"
Why do I do these things perhaps you ask? "Nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior". I do not know but I feel it happen and am excruciated.
If at one turn a philosopher describes judgment as the faculty or power "for thinking the particular under the universal", at another point of triangulation, he could say as well that it is the faculty or power for considering the universal
under the particular: and there where and when he spies the form of a universal, he can be certain that he has also spotted the thing-in-itself, and something substantial, for in those cases there can be no other way.
To the mind of a reasonable man, therefore, it becomes apparent one day that living reality is substantial, and a composite of at least two shells, duo duo faciles, an easy two by two, that manifest in matter and form. As entity is
absolute, and governed by form, ultimo ratio, it follows by logic that there are also at large an extensive set of abstract entities known as universals. Thus the world of common experience is built up in two layers of particulars and universals, as much as
a hammer is still a hammer no matter how or from what it is made. If it works, it is still called a hammer, and thus it is in the form of a hammer.
Hoo eee, and with all the recluse powers, flowers, and songs of tautology, and theorems of geometry, all over the place in a summer's day, the divisible present abounds yet more than sunshine.
"All the heights of the high shores gleam
Red and gold at the sunset
There comes the spell of a magic dream,
And the Harbour seems a lotus-flower;
A blue flower tinted at dawn with gold,
A broad flower blazing with light at noon,
beauty burns like a ceaseless fire,
For all mute things it would seem, aspire
To catch a glimpse of the lotus-flower."(80)
Everywhere we and poor suckers go, we perceive an abridgment of substance, and it is from the relation of substance and a recapitulation
of forms that bubble on like a river that people have their perception. Si ascenderis in altitudines ibi est, et si iacueris in antro adest adhuc. If you ascend into the heights, it is there, and if you fall down into a cave, it is still present.(81) If there
is a secret ontology of the ages or in any good fortune, it is that "excellence resides in quality not in quantity".(82) Quality comes before quantity, qualitas refert potius quam quantitas, and so does form come before matter.
In the simple way of a bridge, without which there is no passage, the form and quality in the connection are prior to the matter and quantity. If there is no shape to the atoms in the void, there is no way across,
and the way things work properly is as necessary as the way they fail. The strength of things and materials is not only strength of matter but also of essence in forms. The way things are put together is as important as what is put together, and the how comes
before and after the what. The spring line and the rise, and the columns and keystone of an archway, are in the forms of the elements as they are in the extremes, which are consubstantial from end to end.
The wings of consubstantial similarities and dissimilarities flutter and then whisper the repetition in the wind between the churchyard cemetery trees. "For while
the elements are changed in themselves, as in an instrument the sound of the quality is changed, yet all keep their sound"(83); and space is a formal property also, as important for attributions as much as the ladder of the octave that goes up, and then goes
down, and as much as entity is absolute and essential.
Et cetera, the same thing cannot be red and green all over, and what must be must be, and there is no situation that is totally informal,
or that is totally without something in contrast. Whether Aristotle says "substance", or Plato says "form", there is little question in the comparison, that if elemental things would be reduced to the subject of matter and quantity alone, such radical reductions
of content would only rehearse and objectify something like chaos. "Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annhilate it and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of our perceptions".(336)
Vae victis, and the way of the blind and math follow a formula that is necessary, to have faith, and "woe to him who believes in nothing."(84)
He would deny everything precious of necessity.
If an absolute removal process of form and substance from the elements were possible, extinguishing appropriate properties in quale quid, leaving
only matter qua matter, qua qua chaos and qua the blob would not even survive the terrible violence of nihilism for logic and a win, since the objects of scientifc knowledge are only as necesssary and universal as mathematics allows. A formless heap cannot
account for itself or balance a math equation, since there must be a form to numbers. If there is no outline, even a poor one, there is no content; and if the thing that is unintelligible cannot be recognized, the meaning even of the unknown is lost, as surely
as it has been utterly confused or destroyed.
"Men were deceivers ever, one foot in sea and one on shore, to one thing constant never", said Shakespeare, and once it was that way then, it
apppears that it will be that way forever.
"The fraud of men was ever so,"(85) and in the medieval past of castles, sand pebbles, and metaphysics,
a divergence developed between two schools of thought, the via antiqua of the realists, and the via moderna of the nominalists. Logic would still show that the via antiqua was correct, where the via moderna was wrong. As Anthony Trollope confessed the
liberal position, "life is so unlike theory"; and, years later, in its ironic way of confusion and denial as progress, heliocentrism is another nominalist school in the via moderna, where truth exists in name and theory only not reality. Nominalism and modernist
phenomenology and dialectical Copernicanism have a strange blend, but there are still at least three simple universals to refute them:
1. the universal of resemblance
2. the unviversal of impossibility
3. the universal of the city
One of the certainties about knowledge as necessity
is the appreciation one feels when one sees that that is the way that it must be, and the theory of forms as much as universals answers the impossibility and impossible problem of infinite regress with a greater simplicity: that things simply are the way they
are between this and that and these and those and the others here and there. With the greatest convenience, the here and there in the universals creates a mysterious circle and parallel to make things make sense in finis in the function and form. The universal
projection of the elements of relation in the forms is interesting to note, and also that so much simplicity could represent so much work, yet "making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy"(86), if not martyrdom.
As much as an omen, seen from another angle, there is no theory of resemblance that can avoid postulating any characteristic similarity among many pairs of particular things without postulating some other resemblance about them as
well. If all are unlike something, then all are alike in being unlike something, as much as what they share is in common, even if each would be different, since to the degree that they are unlike something, they are alike in another way.
Still it is not so easy to say that the Earth is not moving, any more than hundreds of parked cars in a lot, with emergency brakes, and that everyone can tell; and once the scientist says that the parked cars on emergency
brakes are moving, even though no one can tell, and the emergency brake would grind, if the car was on the road, then so for the lot and the Earth, of course, with the roots of the trees, and all the other things that are at rest or would be.
Without falling into the colors of some vicious infinite regress, or some strange system of denial, admitting even one universal resemblance among things makes it absurd to avoid others. If one would say that each
resemblance among many pairs of similarities is not the same, but unique and different from the others, and, therefore, there is not too much sameness in likeness at the root, to avoid the evident fact of a universal, then it still must be acknowledged "that
these resemblances resemble each other", by an odd or distant modicum at least.
For a little difference, even as much as they do not fit one exact thing, they may fit another ... "and thus at last we shall be forced to admit resemblance as a universal. The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal. And having been forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no
longer worth while to invent difficult and implausible theories to avoid the admission of universals", even such ones as would be merely of colors, pigments, or figures of imagination that any artist may prefer, one to the other, etc.(87)
The ironies in life at times may become so rich and diverse, for hue and contrast, that for all the difference in the world, there could be as many universals of resemblance as there are ways of being. Therefore,
even if it is strange, a universal could be hidden in the question and answer at any time, as much as in the cause and the effect.
As to the ontological medium itself, besides the universal of
resemblance, there follows the universal of impossibility, for it is impossible that any property of being should not concur with its own nature. The nature of something like a car or a tree, or the color of paint in a can, or of a cat in the neighborhood,
must have a universal form, since all these instances are examples of the unification of concurrence: and any concurrence is an actual mode of duality, at least for the material and essence involved. The existence of matter by itself can account only for one
part in the sensible dynamic of impression. Whenever the subsistence of form is dissolved or removed from matter, the dissolution of the subtlety that was in the missing way and substance of the form becomes obvious through lack of the continuing concurrence.
The expression of sameness carries another sign of a universal, when there is no other way for something to be than the way that it is.
The same questions and answers bring themselves around to the end, so they can bring themselves around to the begining, and around again.
semper viridis" is an old school motto, where virtue is always green, or young. The color green, for instance, has no other way to be than the way that it is, and matter destitute of form is unaccountable to any improvements of nature, color, style, and to
everything else. Except for materialistic deconstruction and chaos, science has no way better to go into things without form, except down, and nothing better to become, since it is impossible that any property of being should not concur with its own nature.
In the fields and forests of the climate map, there is a quantum leap and connection in green, since there is also a oneness behind all things that are that is. There is sameness for all such things and the
oneness of relation that is the parallel between the difference and the measures. The trope is the trope is the trope from the tropics to the poles, as much as it is impossible for it not to be green, where springtime vines and roots may come sprouting through
the masonry after human habitation has gone. Something more than separable parts and crumbled ruins makes green green.
When by nature the color cannot be separated from itself, there is discovered
something secret of a universal, and that something already was green. Since it is not only an impressionable mask of atomic theory but something vibrant that makes green green, all the instances of green are indifferently related in terms of being green as
green. Therefore, the simple color is evidence of a universal and a sign of some material essence and fundamental relation of substance in common.
If someone like Kermit the frog or Eddie Rabbit
sings for a "rainbow connection", and that "it is not that easy being green", as much as green is green as green, and that way "it seems you blend in with so many ordinary things", it follows that green is indifferently related to its own material essence,
or substance of form and property of being, and thus offers the embodiment of a universal in a wavelength spectrum.
people also notice that in terms of the breeze and temperature, it could be any year, by a golf course or the library, and that way the weather that comes back around is another sign of a universal, besides the colors. Aristotle says that "each of the units
in 2 must be prior to the 2", which is true, even in the seasons.(88) And as the concurrence of matter and form is divisible to the intellect, but the unity of the form itself in itself is not, the one that is first must come first.(89)
If there is a typical first principle of the concurrence of quality and form with matter, in a knowable triangle, that would also be a knowable property in itself, it would have to be expressed in the act of
seeing and knowing. To see and know for the standard of reason forms a definitive triangle in the way of being, a sign also with a note of existential clarity, as in a universal. The acuity which follows from the intellect (dwelling in the memory
and understanding) and the will united in sense and perception would be a knowable property and something primary in itself. That way, where there is the shadow and breath of the living, what there is of light and skill, would represent a third universal,
the universal of the city.
Ghengis Khan said, "remember that you have no companions but your shadow". And over the hills and
through the trees is where they go like a band of shadows to find bright lights and big city. Where the realization of archetypes that come out of civilization, art, trade, society, science, and terrilble struggles for existence, transform the people who must
encounter various impossibilities and crazy dreams in the course of life.
The universal of the city is like an office of signs
and numismatics, "relatio secundum esse", related according to the way it and they have being. The employee of the month and the Mayor have their parking space, and people see the stamp or the sticker and where. The numismatics of relation, as such and such,
coined according to the way of being, is what the universals address, and they are in the numbers and the ways of processing facts and frequency.
The universals are in the ones, and the ones like
so, and the numbers and ways of being must be expressed when truth is discovered, as much as a formula is coined of the one over the many, and the many everywhere around the one. Without a background of universals, the depth of forms in the ones does
not make good sense. The ones and the universals and their clues are in the dualities of existence, and every duality has a process: some way that at the very least makes a little sense.
the other universals, the one from the city is a type of necessity. And the necessity that exists within any expression is in the order of what is first. As in the Latin verb exprimere, and the French exprimer, from the parts (ex), from, out of, and (primo),
at first, from the first: in the beginning.
If the way the number one relates to the number four is always the same, from the way a squirrel recons pecans, for example, to the way John McEnroe
played tennis, then science has discovered another universal in the hand of nature at least, and the hand of nature is never very far from the way of things or the city.
A lapstrake ship in comparison
to a carvel in a medieval harbor would show that the what-how of workmanship and the method is the same coin and stamp, and expression, in all times and places. Whoever did it, necessarily did it the same way for everywhere that he built the boat that he built.
Being the one way done by the one who did it, for all times and places, the universal sign penetrates through all the matter. The image of the city and ship of state, therefore, are stamped like universals in the treasured exchange, in the process of
commerce -- as much as the consonant, vowel, and breath are set in any syllable of Scrabble. The universal sign pentrates through all the matter, as much as words are things themselves, and there are no words and no cities without universals.
Yet "let no rank puff up anyone; for faith and love are paramount - the greatest blessings in the world; and nothing is more precious than peace, by which all war, both in Heaven and Earth, is brought to an end."(90)
Adding to the logical justification of universals, as they relate to the refinement of ultimate substance and the form of reality, there
are many illustrations of the distinction that exists between the formal and material predication in things. A strange one in particular comes from a Renaissance painting of St. Lucy by Domenico Beccafumi.
in 304 AD, she was tortured and her eyes were gouged out. In the painting, she is shown with them on a plate looking out at the audience, and she also has normal eyes in her face. Like St. Lucy's eyes in the painting, not only can one know das Ding-an-sich-selbst-betrachtet,
one can also recognize the universal emotion and archetype in the meaning, and the sign that is there without too much effort, since the eyes are not only about themselves, but also the sign of relation.
One way to know the thing-in-itself is to know that all things, as much as they are also properties of being, should at least belong with some credit to the ultimate responsibility and probability of God,
if not to somebody else. People know the lost-and-found, and the activity of the optic nerve, and when they have an abscessed tooth or hear screams of torture and pain. Even not knowing is knowing, and sometimes from across the street.
Since people know when they do not know why, or when they have forgotten, as much as when one cannot see except for total darkness and pitch black, the funny feeling of knowledge still seeps in. It is simple
to know how the elements of mere appearance, even in a painting, are predicated one by one, and related in quale quid, and to know also the relation and reiterations of the end of a sensitive nerve to its function, as it would be known as the thing in itself.
For fear of dangers along the way, the blind man knows his blindness and his nerves better than philosophy, and senses the form of perception that is missing. As much as an epiphany, if by chance
he is robbed, he understands again that something essential has been lost, and can recognize a universal form of things in himself and the mystery of the thief. People always know and see the form in and for itself, come whatever of the matter.
For instance, as well as a doctor, one sees that a poor bloody eye plucked out has lost its better form and first light of color in the natural connection. As much as any circle would have lost its geometry,
the removal of the form and property of vision that obtained in the thing-in-itself has left the native sight that was the principle faculty in the object to remain in name only.
Eyes are for
seeing and so are eyeballs, for an eye is called an eye, even if one has been plucked out, and becomes something like a ghost. Haunting eyes that have been plucked away, after a sort of cruel nominalist reduction, are still eyes over the matter.
"Los ojos por que suspiras,
los ojos en que te miras
son ojos porque te ven."
"The eyes how why you sigh
one knows it well,
the eyes that look at yourself
they are eyes because they see you" (91)
Right knowledge is full of eyes, and when the essential property of the universal form has been lost, due to materialist deconstruction of the
meaning, and violent invasion of the thing-in-itself, it is agony and oblivion, pain too heavy to describe. Crushed and scattered around the broken sphere of a ruined castle, like lost souls, to be less than moonlight in shards of glass, the formless void
is no cakewalk, no pleasure cruise.
It is no bed of roses to be damned, et cetera, and no matter how fast the race or the career,
the shadow more than keeps up for the radius and curve. Sometimes in front, and it never tires, and if an hour of darkness was a candle, "vision is the art of seeing what is invisible to others"(92).
there truth", the Bishop of River-by-the-Sea asked, "and does justice from the mountain penetrate all things, even ghosts? What is truth? Quid est veritas?"
Kant proposed that his purpose was "to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its circumference as well as in its contents," yet he only undermined the effort to be fair and reasonable
by reducing the sensible world to skeptical indifferentism and dismissive terms of illusion(93). A Copernican and Newtonian academic, a skeptic and modernist in phenomenology, and another synthetic nominalist, he missed the boat to say that it was only an
appearance and a perception.
However, like tiny bubbles in the wine, that make some people so happy, and make some people feel fine, transcendental numbers like Pi would reinforce metaphysical
realism, and the authenticity of the circle, and apple of the eye, rather than nominalism, since nominalism is lacking that sort of formality and apple of apperceptive appreciation in the first place. To say that one does not know Pi in itself, but only the
appearance, is to say that the circle does not really exist, and neither does its color or the universal equivalence of circumference over diameter.
The same thing cannot be red and green all
over, and the nominalist academic would even say that colors do not exist in themselves, but in name only, only as reflections, and that they do not have entity beyond the appearance. In an ironic and repetitive way painful to reason and history, heliocentrism
and relativity are only a nominalist school of synthetic illusions, where truth exists in name only not reality.
To say that
the Earth moves at astronomical rates to orbit the Sun is to say a lot. To say that it all happens with an unaccelerated and undetectable motion due to universal gravitation is to say even more. Yet for the dimension of practical experience, the theory and
applied science of it add up to less than zero, less than dust in the wind. The theory is only for an appearance of opinion that plays in the mind, a sort of mental illusion, an unscientific prop even, and escape from reality, and it is the reverse of what
If no one from the philosophy department, and the world unknown of the unknown unknowers, can know the material content and form of the thing in itself, then can one notice
its complete removal, when it is taken away? Einstein abolished the aether, and Kant paved the way a century and thirty-seven years before by abolishing reality, so how did a straight line survive?
Ratio and proportion are in each other all along. A tautology of nature and space, in all the theorems of geometry, the division by zero is impossible, even
in the relative ways and relations of a vacuum, but not by one, and there are no evaulations without ratios. It is as impossible to remove Pi from the iron ball at the end of a prisoner's chain as it is to remove the center from a circle and the straight line
from inside the radius of a sphere. If people cannot know the essence of things like iron, and the ratio of Pi, when they are inside the circles of a prisoner's ball and chain, but instead know only the appearance, how do they recgonize with such greater clarity
the ratio and proportion and the heavy weight of it, when they would be removed?
If a blind prisoner does not know or understand the form of the sentence placed on his head, and the substance of
imprisonment that follows, with an act of simple understanding and right judgment, how does he notice the removal of the punishment so well? Since noticing the removal is to know somewhat the matter and the form that were before, and to know the universal
involved, between before and after, is to know a thing as much as a bond, they would say justice is that which penetrates all things. Solving the problem, therefore, in the mathematical sense is sufficient for all cases, as there is no prisoner of reason who
cannot add up and understand a convict's ball and chain.
All numbers are not equal, and division by zero is impossible. If the system of relativity, and the Copernican and Newtonian reversals
of epistemology, would say that one does not see and understand a ball and chain for what it is, and whether it spins, or the nerve of an abscessed tooth, or eyes that have been gouged out, how does it say that one does not notice relief in the removal process
of so much pain?
If one cannot recognize with an act of simple understanding and right judgment -- and the complete proof of mathematics -- that the Earth is not rotating, can one then at least
recognize its removal from space? Would a modernist skeptic of phenomenology not notice if the Earth were totally removed, as much as if it had moved away from under his feet, one day, as much as he would notice the taking away of a ball and chain?
In the movie "Castaway", an expressive character named Chuck Holland developed a talking relationship and friendship of projection with a volley ball. To be on the deserted island was a question of survival,
and he talked to the volley ball, and it seemed that the volley ball would talk to him.
He even named it "Wilson", and it seemd "Wilson" said good things. If his comments were brief, he was for
Aristotle and the good, in his spherical sort of way; and if a castaway can talk to a volley ball, any prisoner of modernist phenomenology and the philosophy department can talk to a ball and chain, as well as the Earth, or the well of an island cave.
Like a playable word in Scrabble, stuck between friends, what any of them would say that would be logical and true would have to be the
same inference among all of them. The difference between them and what they say is the same when they say what is true. The truth is not without its place and reference among things, and universals, and it has the simplest property of sameness and transcendence
of comparison. Among as many things as there may be, through the extent and repetition, it remains the simplest second measure, and a healthier and better coconut, since what is false always involves complication.
If they played Scrabble, they would all have to follow the same rules of participation and verbal interaction. What goes for words from Scrabble also goes for things and actions. The word has an image that represents a thing, that is in the
way that it is written and pronounced, that represents another thing that is the concept and the object involved. It is about the meaning and the sign at the table, and the rules are for the proper communication and love of the game itself, and that way they
are for more than mere convention. There is a sign in the word and a measure of nature more than the sound and the letters, which is the actual thing in itself. Actuality has the greatest potential excellence of meaning, therefore, and it is as knowable as
the lime in the coconut, as much as the one and the other are potential and divisible.
If the volley ball from "Casataway" was named "Wilson", the iron ball and chain from the philosophy department
could be "Philo", from one of the Greek words for industry and diligence, φιλοπονία. In head to head scrabble, "Philo" and "Wilson" would prove that a placement value and unity of form obtains in the thing-in-itself
that is also shared in the word and the referent object. In virtue of the connection with reality and the mind, there is only one way to spell the one syllable word bat, for example, even if the word bat may have at least three different meanings in two or
more languages. Scrabble has the same government everywhere, of course, and the syllable is the syllable as much as any syllogism is a valid argument. "Everything possesses its own certitude, which
is its own essence." Unaquaeque res habet certitudinem propriam quae est eius quidditas.(94)
The concrete or discret identity of individual entity, and haecceitas, among lasting and correctly spelled
words, and their things, and attributes of relation, may be something "Philo" would want to emphasize, from his own experience with heavier weights and advantages, and "Wilson" probably could not agree more about apparent density of an object.
There is a necessary tension in things. "Necesse in rebus intentio esse", or "in rebus necesse quod intentionum esse habere", and being is a part of that, especially if "Wilson" played Scrabble as light and
fast as a starquest volley ball, floating like a feather and stinging like a bee, and spelling better.
Necessity and the measure used to measure remain equal to themselves, and when something like
a lucky word in Scrabble crystallizes, it is unlikely that such a particular score will come again. Not like that, and not soon anyway, and the way of being, in virtue of the neccessity of space, ebbs and flows like an alphabet rhyme; yet the signs and meanings
always must fit, as much as correct spelling. A missing letter is like a missing tooth, and it is the same one problem, relatio secundum esse, for all the words.
A map maker knows he knows what
the descriptive thing is that is metacognition of place, and the validity of its universal representation: in the geometric form of intersecting lines of longitude and latitude, around a geographic sphere of location, et cetera. The rule and expression of
place prevails both in cause and effect as much as correct grammar and spelling. Materially, formally, efficiently, and eminently, the one that is real is the one that is closest to itself. Within itself and of itself through itself in loco etiam, proxissimus
suimet sibi enim in ipso est. The closest one to himself is in himself also.
The first and simplest necessity of being rests the most, and subsists as something simple. As one precedes that which
is compounded and contingent, the orb and notion of Jupiter in the cosmos is as much a question of logical consequence as anything else. Z and Zed in the line result of necessity from A and B, if it would
be impossible for Z and Zed to be false when A and B and the alphabet are true. And if science counted sheep from Earth to Jupiter, and called the distance and total number an "EJ", as a number and sign of relation it also would have no contrary.
Where it would represent simple entity qua entity (ens realissimum sed et rationis) it would also be absolute. As Aristole and Euclid
would say, the line from A to B is AB: and as Earth is to Jupiter, Jupiter is to Earth, and there is still no contact in numbers, even for a straight line, but only separation and succession. Since a number is realized as it is, like a color is a color, there
is overall unity of forms. White is in and on rice, and everything that people know and understand is also for some proportion or relation of realization.
The cause and effect are in the operation,
and one does not have to see the infinite home of the gods or catch a leprechaun to know the divisible finite thing in itself, like where Jupiter is in the sky, for example. One may see, recognize, and understand the unitary way of words and measures as forms,
in as many instances as there may be. Where there is enough room to fit them in the mind, there is also the scale.
Wise people know when a situation speaks for itself, between the coincidental,
accidental, and essential; and good sense knows the relation of the thing in itself, as much as there is any straight line from Earth to Jupiter. Sarazen's double eagle at number 15 in Augusta, 1935, and
the experienced method of division in virtue of comparison, between straight lines and circles, for instance, and Earth to Jupiter or the Sun, like any other universal dimension in space, can
be interpreted as a mirror of the golden ratio, even in a wilderness of mirrors.
Before he hit the shot, Sarazen said, "they might go in from anywhere", and the argument begun from a gnomon is
still the same as the argument from a straight line or a putter, and are the same as the argument from a circle, that nothing represents A better than A, and nothing represents B better than B, and the shape of thought is in the extremes and the means, none
of which exist without the measure or the score. Thoughts can be scanned by measuring the waves, and as much as 1 is a point and a circle, and 2 is a straight line and a pillar, all numbers are figurate and confederate quanta in the substance of direction.
If ever there was a confederacy of dunces, there always has been a confederacy of numbers. For as impossible as it is to get the white out of rice or cotton, and the right eye out of Horace, it
is as impossible to get geometry and the golden mean out of the shape of everyday life, and every day thought. Therefore, the sheep in total for the distance to Jupiter from Georgia stand like one measure for all.
Science must know that the measure of things is not only for quantity but also quality, to choose the means and avoid the extremes on either side, if it would be a wise witness for improvement;
and as much as the distance between Earth and Jupiter is the only one that it is, absolute and with no contrary, like Sarazen's score card, by convention and nature there is also no better way or place for it to go, that it should be well represented, other
than by itself, where and when it is.
Et cetera, et cetera, the chord, the chord, and a quailty for the distance. As much as there is only one way to spell "bat", there is only one series of do,
re, mi, fa, sol, la, si, do to sing an octave. And there is, at any given time, one straight line between this point and that point, that are this way and that way from each other, like the centers between Jupiter and the Earth, for example, which for a line
could be called a segment and an EJ.
When another one lands on it, it should be easy to find, and there is only one measure of the golden ratio, phi, that it represents. As a measure of simple
entity itself for distance, qua qua, qua qua an EJ, and for the birds, this is the way that space is between all the stars, and between perigee and apogee; and it is the same space from point to point around the world for all the days of the year and twinkling
Overrunning everywhere, therefore, with the simplifying measures of logic, frequency, and form, of ratio and proportion, the great space and outer space contain all the things in themselves,
hidden or revealed; and, as much as the day of the week and a tooth of megalodon, science can be sure what many of them are, as much as the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself. The
vast compass of the ocean cannot exist without the extremes, and the extremes cannot exist without the measure. If either of the extremes is destroyed, so the measure.
Therefore, it is as difficult
to remove the one singular distance that is between the Earth and Jupiter from simple entity, as it is pure quantity at any given time, as it is to remove the Earth away from itself, or any straight line from geometry, as much as geometry is in all of them.
Straight lines are universally simple, if some in particular may disappear, but "what is simple cannot be separated from itself"(95).
Simplicity in consequence cannot be separated from its existence,
"for it does not have its existence in virtue of some form other than itself",(96) and it can be gratifying ipso facto. If anybody from science would notice the Earth being removed from itself, or losing its simplicty, from where it is, he should have noticed
it spinning and turning in the first place, slip sliding away, as much as it is a simple question of where it is, and that he should recognize also which star is Jupiter when it is, and that it goes around the Earth from east to west every day, just like the
Moon and the Sun.
As letters go from A to Z, with an a,b,t, a word can go for a "bat". So all the signs and meanings of Scrabble are in the concurrence of the what-for and what-how that are expressed
from the primary place. With particular and universal virtue then, the necessity of being and the extremes of the measure, and the measure used to measure, remain equal to themselves. It is a circular function and human expression, for example, that everyone
would like to have good teeth and not be struck by bolts of lightning, "to die of thirst beside the fountain, hot as fire, shaking toot on tooth". And for everybody the concurrence of relation in the question, in the substance of direction, would have the
same overall placement, 16 over 16, and not struck by lightning, and not dying of thirst by the fountain, as much as place is for placement value and placement is for a universal.
Without some fair sense of truth then, to simply recognize that the Earth does not orbit the Sun, but that the Sun orbits the Earth, and that the distance between Earth and Jupiter is unique, for the distance involved, and also for
the places and the ends, "matter and all else that is in the physical world [would] have been reduced to [only] a shadowy symbolism". But the involvement, the life, the ontology, and the teeth,
and the place to fit in are unique for all, even if there is sameness among many things, and clockwork, and a ghost in the machine.
"With what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again",
in qua mensura mensi, fueritis metietur vobis.
As much as Jupiter is in only one sign at the end of a line at a time, and the Earth is in the same one and all the others, which cannot be without
that one that is far away going around the other in the middle, the seasons are not just seasons but feelings. The way things are edgewise, and the way the EJ is, represents a mystery in the cosmos maybe, that as many stars as there are, there could be almost
infinitely more, and as many places from the center of an umbrella, even if the when and where are always only one line of direction along all the locations.