"Das Ding an sich", the thing-in-itself, and then "das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet", the thing regarded as it is in itself, as it would be itself, if it were, said Kant, to describe his philosophy
that things in themselves are unknowable. The noumenon then the phenomenon, la différance and a strange circle of knowing not knowing, where some would ask what is a number and what is a cause?
On one side, some would answer that numbers appear to be abstract objects, yet everything depends on place and surroundings, as well knowledge that is casual must be quantified. Sometimes too for causes,
it may not be easy to tell, lying down, pitchfork in hand, how much one should also be afraid of falling. To the things themselves, therefore, as much as knowledge would be for mere accident, and the world can be strange. A surprise as much as the funny
farm, where beyond the appearances, there may be feelings on occasion and depth that may be difficult to express.
For example, in some rural parts of France, there is still
the account, or rather the belief, that before an old woman dies the Devil will appear to her as a wiry little old man with a broom and saucepan on his head. Le petit vieillard ridicule, he makes sudden loud and banging noises, adumbrations with obscure pronouncements;
then when he is ready to sweep her out, that is when she goes. Yet about such things and the fate of mankind in the cosmos who really knows?
can tell what is beyond everything that surrounds us? Who can tell how profound the mystery of the invisible is that we cannot fathom with our senses in this world of strangeness and light, darkness and
noise, where one can be certain of nothing. If the Devil can introduce temptation in any book or philosophy of nature, perhaps it is only an irony of criticism then, to be sure of nothing but the uncertain,
and mistrust nothing but the certainties, and find nothing obscure but the obvious, where in the mind there follows an invisible thread -- a question of some synthetic doubt in phenomenology perhaps, where the analyst
would begin to express the opinion that the knowable order of the world, even topology, for example, like the riddle of the Seven Bridges of Konigsberg, would depend solely upon the cognitive activity of the subject rather than on the things in themselves.-1
Since human reason is limited to an awareness and understanding of its own subjective products, it may seem that rational experience has no plane or purpose other than "to prescribe its own formal rules for
the extension of its empirical employment." Hume himself observed earlier that there is no perfect idea of anything, but only of perception; and that "a substance is entirely different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance."
A fundamental question about human reason, as perception, therefore, is the relationship to reality; and if it were only the idea, it would also be why. Thus in determining reality for the Kantian outlook
too, there is a radical departure in the continuation that happens, in which the intellect of the subject's sense impressions conforms objects to structures inherent in the mind, rather than the external objects of actuality conforming the sense impressions
of a reasonable mind to themselves. For the imaginative philosopher, therefore, there would be nothing better or more convenient to give assurance of the truth than the intellective conception and merely thinking it. Yet that way at times the most important
fact about human reason may become that is clueless about reality.
Of course, nature as an object of knowledge and analysis
is a phenomenon arising from a synthesis of sensations and judgment. However, within the stream of modernist transcendental criticism, what gives those sensations is called unknowable beyond the mere concepts themselves, which already would contain, or be
contained within, structures inherent in the mind. Pure concepts, therefore, may be described as ideas and categories of the understanding, and that way may be said to be wholly independent of experience. With Kant, modern philosophy would continue to
accomplish a fundamental and peculiar inversion of the order of perception and right judgment, such that objects must follow the ways that people engage in opinion making and thinking, if they are that smart or hyper-rationalist for categories, rather than
Thus the key to Kant's theory became the epistemological reversal, almost a mere game at will, which he also called his "Copernican revolution," for it may seem true at times
that what we can know after all is only what appears to be also in the mind, and what remains in itself is intrinsically unknowable.-2 Even for the unmistakable pains of contradiction, the most simple things can never be known to us beyond the appearances;
and the world is a place where things sometimes can change as fast as Bian Lian 變臉, the baffling Chinese art of face changing at the opera.
more, as strong and common a force in nature as the wind, for example, that can knock people down and tear the roofs off buildings, uproot trees, raise the sea into mountains of water, destroy cliffs and cast great ships onto the breakers, is not seen. The
wind whistles, sighs, roars, and rattles the wires without being seen in itself by the naked eye, yet it exists for all that.
Therefore, if what we see is merely the hundred thousandth part of what exists, it still would not be enough for certain knowledge and understanding, since everything changes anyway. As much as the South moves North, the North moves South, and time
marches on, time marches on, et cetera. "The only thing that stays the same is everything changes".
The old man Kant would even go
so far as to insist that "space and time are a framework provided by our thinking, rather than properties of the objective world,"(3) which, however, is not credible for decent argument, since even irrational animals recognize the same circumstances of time
and place. Certain realities are so openly available that everyone alive can appreciate them, and who should be so blind to the simplest facts because of their obviousness that they should be surprised
when somebody calls attention to what everybody ought to know? Llamas and goats in the mountains, as much as men, recognize the edge, and the other animals of creation preserve the simple belief
in external objects in all their natural thoughts, instincts, designs, and actions.(333)
That he saw his change of perspective
as a "Copernican turn", as he called it, was telling. He almost said it all, when he said that with his school of thought he would accomplish a "second Copernican revolution". Like the way of Copernicus before, in the circulation of astronomy, and later with
Kantian metaphysics, the modernist instruction would instill an epistemological reversal in the poor noggin as to the natural order of things. For this Kant has been thought by many to be the greatest philosopher who ever lived; and Newton's so-called laws
of motion were the collective paradigm from which he would develop his worldview.
"Kant's system is like Newton's idea of gravity", and "it is close to how we still see the world."-4 If reckoned
as the Master of Modernity in philosophy, the Master Blaster of Disaster, the mightiest thinker of the thinkers who established themselves along the way of ideas(5), his favorite book of science was the "Principia", which is almost impossible to read and make
sense to retell. Yet as much as Newton, it would appear that the old man took a residual leap of faith in the wrong direction, and fell out of one of Porphyry's trees.
The aim of science as well as philosophy is ultimately to arrive at the words which give a true representation of the world, and it is of primary importance, therefore, to get things right in themselves, because merely
saying it so does not also make it so. "Gratis asseritur gratis negatur", that which is asserted gratuitously may be rejected with equal freedom; and philosophy should never be distinguished unfairly from common sense knowledge or experience, for there is
nothing in it which could not be said in everyday language.-6 After all, "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things".-7
Even if not always by direct impression, "the world divides into facts, as the facts in logical space are the world", and things are usually known in the way that they are
perceived and experienced. The way things are is also the way that they tend to remain, and Copernicanism has a natural tendency to make an embarrassment out of common sense everywhere. To say that it cannot be judged with simple cognitive awareness on any
given day whether the Earth moves is like saying no one can really know the "thing-in-itself", even if it was something so simple as whether the Earth is rolling along like a bowling ball at midday of any given golf tournament. Yet for the trouble involved,
when a scorecard is signed, nothing else is so difficult.
"Since the dogmatic solution is not only uncertain but impossible",
a philosopher would have a way to tell an astronomer or tournament caddy that he cannot know what day it is or the score more than by phenomena of lingering appearances. Therefore, he cannot know what is essential to motion between any golf ball and the surface
of the Earth either, at least not as much as das Ding an sich. The appearances of quality, quantity, relation, modality, concentration, and space may be obvious in a limited sense, but not terribly useful in terms of epistemology, since the conclusion is already
contained in the subject, as much as it would only be true by analytic definition and tautology, like an oak tree is a tree, for example.
"Limited to knowledge of phenomena that it itself has
constructed according to its own design, reason cannot know anything outside of itself." Thus one cannot with certainty follow the succession of seasons by the stars either, understanding the passing of weeks, months, and years, as one would put together a
calendar, because logic can have no empirical part; and time is logical, of course, yet the calendar is a foggy burden of empiricism, and all data-based phenomena, ipso facto, and so forth, et cetera. There
are the problems of stellar aberration and retrogression, for example, and the problems of perigee and apogee, especially of the Moon, and then parallax and people who are late; and these natural phenomena cannot be continuous like logic, except where it is
to know more and more about less and less.
Yet even if the field of synthetic inquiry and equation is narrow, where is reliable proof of the minor, and what is reality that a just society would
be capable of understanding? What are the rules and whose what is a lost golf ball, in fact? Whose is whose, and where is the cognitive certainty and confidence of justification in the what-how of existence, that people should recognize beyond mere schools
of opinion? What is the sensible custom of observation and analysis at the corner or the parking lot, ignotum per ignotius, and obscurum per obscurius?
"We are unkown, we knowers, ourselves to ourselves. We men of knowledge remain of necessity strangers to ourselves. We understand ourselves not. In ourselves we are bound to be mistaken. As far as ourselves are concerned we are not
knowers"(8), wrote Nietzsche. The curiosity and vanity of things fail, for example, and it is much too difficult to make anything outlast final doom. Even with all good service and examination of species and names, "we are surrounded by mystery and cannot
understand the common things of life. Nature speaks with a thousand tongues, and each tongue voices an unknown language."-9
"I know nothing"! Sgt. Schultz from the Wehrmacht of "Hogan's Heroes" in TV Land used to say. After all, "ease of intelligibility is suicide for philosophy".
Sometimes he would stomp his boot or the rifle. "Nichts zoviel", nothing too much, nothing in excess. "For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life," for example, and especially
for the secret agreement to avoid the Russian front.
"Le monde est si doux pour les mourants", and if all the strangeness and
blind digression of the human race were fixed in the eyes and expression of one man, an overweight sergeant, a prison guard from the Wehrmacht, perhaps he would say "I know nothing, and no one will remember me or these terms anyway." And so modern philosophy
of existentialism and its phenomenology would say the same about what is behind the camp or city walls. Inquiring minds, therefore, overrun the subject with an absurdity of emphasis, to imagine that it would be knowable at all, even if someone did escape.
For instance, the thing-in-itself, an abstract paper of dissertation about which channel or what drill, as it would be recognizable beyond the passing absurdities of life in the land of the
lost, or which way the Moon goes, or what day it is, and whether the Earth rotates, if understood as perceived, it only comes again from a world of appearances. Like poetry of leaky buckets, at beach city, and then
"THE apparition of these faces in the crowd;
Petals on a wet, black bough."
Et cetera. "De gustibus, non est
disputandum," yet even when a man is deceived or sees illusions, he understands what it is to see; and if he only dreams, he still knows what it is like to be awake. Whether for love or hate, if such an academic reference weight as Kant would say that
reality, and finding one's way to a train station of the metropolis, is rather mind-dependent being, not mind-independent being, one can see how the art of solipsism -- besides that of heliocentrism and Judeo-Masonic deception -- could have become modernity's
distinctive intellectual physiognomy.-10
For things to be at all what they seem or how they appear was only a naive expectation and generality of life from long ago. "The world is a common
world", yet who from today, for example, would expect that "doubt must be no more than vigilance otherwise it can become dangerous"?-10
Nitimini perseverare, endeavor to persevere, if the inevitable must be accepted, since so many things tie together, even from past and present. The thing or image that is being seen by the eye must exist in some virtue of itself too, for
whatever it is is in some combination of case, that even if only for an illusion of mood and understanding must include the way that it is.
Unum quoque dissolutur eo modo quo colligatur. Everything
is dissovled by the same means it is constituted.
Nihil tam conveniens est naturali aequetati quam unum quoque dissolvi eo ligamene quo ligatum
est. Nothing is so consonant to natural equity as that every whatever-and-so-forth should be dissolved by the same means that rendered it binding.
Nature does not ask permission and "the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective were no practical results to follow".-11 As much as people
passing along the wheel of life are bound to construe things like the weather, the calendar, and the world of experience by the most reasonable way of construction, it is certain that the human mind
did not create the first simple attributes of being. Ultimate comparisons in the ones like more or less, greater than or less than, equal to or not equal to, this way or that way, always have the
same relation and already were.
"Our presence bestows not being on it; our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent
beings who perceive or contemplate it."(333) The human mind did not create pepper, for instance, and this much or that much. And if people ask, "which came first, the chicken or the egg?" they may also ask, "which came first, pepper or the cook?"
However they look at the question of immanence, as always, or as something to which all knowledge is prepared, the simplest attribution of being comes in and of itself, and already was, before the natural
sense opinion or whatever human synthesis of it came around. The pre-existence of pepper as pepper to tastes and opinions, as such as it is, is difficult to deny. From the contradistinction, like the day of the week, being the one before tomorrow, das Ding
an sich all day long, and being the only one that it is, the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself.
From the top of the mountain to the bottom of the sea, the table of measures and motions is totally for percentages; and with such a subsequent mix for content as the human mind in tow, would it be fair to say that any certain and unadulterated truth can be known naturally by the intellect
of any poor taxpayer in this life? If to introduce a synthetic measure of things, the mind of a taxpayer still exists to be known, for sure, as much as his income and his business, if not the other way around.
"Pink Floyd" wondered whether it was wise to trust the government, and it seems a philosopher may know when he does not know either, as much as a mystified tax collector in pursuit of Willie Nelon, even if he or the other would only count
on fingers to see how much it is.
There is a satellite dish with signals coming in, too many channels to count, and even midget wrestling from Mexico, to ask, "where is all the knowledge that
we lost with so much information"?-13 For instance, out of all the accumulation, with so many channels for content, and whatever it is, wherever it may go on parade, for parallel or parallax, ten has been considered to be the most illuminating and simple crux
among numbers -- versed so well and like no other for division and order among things, so many things.
So much so that Osiander himself also wrote that if hypotheses "provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough." And ten is the unit of the decimal system: "the perfect term of the numbers
derived from the monad"(14), and whatever das Ding-an-sich may be, it must have a number as much as a channel, for nothing exists without a number, or some content, some way that it must be. So too in the information age of mass merchandising, one sees that
philosophy is not taught as much as engineered, and sold, and, therefore, also present for content.
An important aspect of a program is whether it accomplishes the intention of its user, and "if
Aristotle were alive today, he would have a talk show."-12 Just look at the TV a priori to a posteriori. "No ideas but in things, and so much depends upon a red wheel barrow glazed
with rain water beside the white chickens."
For a universal wheelbarrow, in a classroom example formalized ad infinitum, as much as the number ten and poetry of the TV, the substance of number
could be applied to anything within a circle, and everything can fit in a circle. The first four numbers, in fact, provide exemplars that have been thought to contain the whole nature of mathematics, since 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10; and when configured together with
little dots in a neato triangle, they make a radical little pyramid, the lesser tetractys, that appears like a root element in Sierpinski gaskets, and the way things are.
For "the laws of
mathematics are not merely human inventions or creations. They simply 'are'; they exist quite independently of the human intellect."-15
Thus, with the way the decade works in math, such a thing is not only a matter of opinion from appearance. Chance cannot account for the unique meaning and importance of the number ten, for example, since "what
happens always and in all cases is not the result of chance but is in the nature of things."-16 Simple as one, two, three, and four, every instance of the first ten numbers provides a role model of simplification and necessary truths, with which all empirical
evidence must ultimately agree, and which cannot be changed by a surface of illusion.
The number ten is essential and referred by symbolic tradition to things of outstanding excellence, and
beginnings brought to perfection. If anything is brought to perfection, it could be signed over with a ten, since sign relations are ontological, and "of all the numbers from the monad and up, ten is the most perfect."-17 Plato's nephew Speusippis reckoned
the decade "to be the most natural and most creative basis for all things, being, as it were, in itself a sort of model for the things which constituted the universe".-18
Ten is forever fixed at
the base of the numbers, since it is produced by adding 1, 2, 3, and 4 and comprises even and odd, square and cube, prime and composite, linear and plane. It provides the beginning and resolution of all mathematical extension, containing all the hundreds and
thousands and millions and tens of millions within it, et cetera, and also all the decimals as well. According to Hughes of St. Victor, ten also represents straightness in faith, the right way to go; and it is the number from which all things come and to which
they must return.
Someone in an old casino comedy routine once asked a friend for change, requesting two tens for a five. "Can
I get two tens for a five" he said and without thinking about it the friend, who was high on a roll, gave it to him out of a handful of cash he had just won. He suddenly realized the miscalculation of generosity when he received one five for two tens and remembered
that two fives make ten, not the other way around. "Wait a second", he said, "two tens are twenty, not five. You owe me fifteen dollars", but the friend with two tens was in a rush and had already gone.
So it goes, and "time may consume the speculation of men but it confirms nature".-19 As the way that birds fly, for instance, using their wings, proceeds by two's, so the way that humans see and understand
is the same. The power of nature has given man two eyes and five senses for the same reasons that birds have two wings and fine feathers to fly. Natural motion proceeds by two's, duo duo faciles, an easy method two by two; and human intelligence also works
by a special method of division in virtue of comparison. Experience "turns you from one feeling to another and teaches by means of opposites so that you will have two wings to fly, not one”.-20
process of sense and perception, cognitive awareness in the human species is wired to operate along a line of intelligence that goes by noticing "this is" and "these are", and "that is" and "those are", duo duo, et cetera for sensitivities. Rivers know
there is no hurry, and roll on. "Aequum memento enim rebus in arduis servare mentem". Burn on big river, burn on, and to save the mind from troubles, remember equanimity first, as much as things, in arduous matters.
Who has not ever noticed, with a view to avoiding confusion, that the way of intellectual distinctions always functions, since it is conducive to knowledge to distinguish one attribute and its property from another? Exceeding with meekness
like Moses, counting goats in the desert, "for Moses was a man unpretentious above all men that dwelt upon the Earth"(21), the number ten would also symbolize first principles, the wheel of fortune, the tree of life, and the overall power of division in perception,
et cetera for sensitivity. And, as to the certitude of first principles, "the terms of self-evident principles are so identical that it is evident that one necessarily includes the other".-22
overabundant tautologies of self-adherence, rooted in the richness of first principles, abound of themselves, of course, it goes without saying; and the power of repetition by analysis in math and nature corroborates many things. "It is not once or twice but times without number that the same ideas make their appearance in the world"(23); and if not for the redundancies of assimilation and contrast, veritas vincit omnia vi divisione, truth conquers all
by a power of division.
It cannot be an accident, therefore, that the best number that fits to divide well the greatest total number and confluence of all things would be ten, and that mankind
would also have ten fingers of fifty-four intricate bones on two hands. Three to the third power for a hand in twenty-seven is like a little exponential trinity, pro manibus; and ten in two hands of five, with some subtle dexterity and intelligence, is at
times a little sign of perfection or perhaps magic.
Would everything like that and the nature of the world then only be a matter
of appearance, "unknowable in itself", and are appearances always deceiving? Does the human cogitator's capacity lack the power to penetrate the veil of appearance, and grasp the inner nature of reality? Does the octave exist in music with a root, and the
calendar as well, or not, if anybody has an ear or knows what day it is? If they do, would it not be more reasonable to reject the call for despair, and the extreme academic skepticism of some philosophers, by
certitude of first principles, and
b) experimental knowledge
c) also with knowledge of our own acts, and
d) certitude of sense knowledge?
Is there too much confidence in common sense knowledge for fools,
when one would say that he knows well enough what the thing is, in itself, for example, when he also has a dental appointment on Tuesday at 11:30 am? Is there no abscess of truth among mankind, no consensu gentium in communis, even for the suffering in a bad
tooth and the nerve? And what day of the week would it be when the Earth would spin because of Newtonian gravity, to orbit the Sun, and nobody would notice, between him and the dentist's drill?
there any truth among general notions and specific days of the week? What is reality that anyone should care? Why are some things so difficult to face, and does truth even exist, das Ding an sich? If
not, what is the best interpretation of the great silence in all the deception? Even birds know the tropics of the Sun and the seasons, as much as animal intuition guides a feather, and the measure used to measure allows them as species in their limit.
In fact, it should be recognized that a natural order exists among
general notions, such that one thing can be known from another: for instance, the notion of "being" and the notion of "true". Being, qua qua to be, is the major and more extensive, as "being is of stronger adherence". The reason for this is that simple entity
is primary and something absolute, as much as it is potentially everywhere, whereas truth implies a relation to an exemplar.-24 It comes from experience that a thing can be known as an entity, even though its truth value may not be clear and perhaps would
remain as yet unknown. From this it follows that the thing which is true can be known before its truth value is also known.
The way the mind functions, we know that many aspects of things can be
grasped by a simple act of understanding, and many times a day. In such cases, when the things involved are true, they are also known. But the truth value itself of some circumstances at times may be somewhat hidden and reserved, obscure for a while, and recognized
only later by an act of judgment. "Simple understanding, however, precedes an act of judgment."-25
Knowledge of things gleaned from the senses is both of a general and particular nature, and in
virtue of such knowledge people judge the truth of things and any occurrence. Nature does not ask permission, of course, and it is hardly fitting that any nature should exist without its proper activity. The more perfect the nature in question the less
fitting that it should lack such an operation, and the proper operation of the intellect is to know the thing which is true. Then it is hardly fitting that nature should not endow the intellect with the appropriate faculties of sense, perception, and reason
for such an operation that fits it, namely one such as understanding and recognizing the natural world around it, and the day of the week, for example.
A simple case of a first principle could be that one cannot have boiling water and ice from the same water at the same time. If a quibbler dropped ice cubes into
boiling water, the water that boils is not the water that is frozen. The water that is frozen is never boiling at the same time that it is frozen.
From the very fact that it grasps these things,
the intellect perceives and unites these terms in a logical and universal proposition of truth. By the elemental condition of water, the mind itself has present before it the necessary and evident cause of the conformity of this proposition with the simple
terms that compose it. Such an instance of conformity, where the intellect perceives the evident cause in the terms, cannot help but be known in itself, as the thing that it is, das Ding an sich, and the element water, hot or cold. There is nowhere else for
such an ontological and physical basis of experience, as boiling water or frozen ice, to go except where it is, and by such terms of nature and temperature it always will be the same.
is like that, boiling or frozen, when hot or cold, is a universal way everywhere. The intellect could not apprehend these terms and unite them so well in an effective proposition, effective for all times and places of experience, without having the conformity
of relationship arise ipso facto between the proposition and the terms. Therefore, it always must be so, as much as two similar objects could not exist without some relationship of sameness between them.
is impossible to perceive all this, as the necessary way that it is, ita est, without perceiving the water in itself. Since such simple terms cannot be combined in a judgment without being true, it is
precisely such conformity of a proposition to the terms that constitute it that makes accurate the truth of a judgment. So it is that one cannot perceive this proposition and its terms without also perceiving the conformity of the proposition to the terms;
and one is, therefore, also perceiving the truth of the element water as it is the thing-in-itself, as much as the oceans and the seas.
Once there is certitude of first principles, like water and
the number ten, for example, it becomes clear how one can be certain of the conclusions drawn from such principles, since the perfect syllogism is evident from logic and many things in themselves. The accuracy of such judgments depends solely upon the certitude
of the principles involved and the evidence of the inference.
As for b), what is known by experience, even though a person does not experience every single individual case, but only a great many,
nor does he experience them at all times but only frequently, still he knows infallibly that it always goes such and such a way and holds for all instances of such a thing -- as boiling water, for example, or ice cubes -- as nature would be what it is in itself.
He knows this in virtue of comparison that "whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not free is the natural effect of that cause". The intellect knows this proposition even if the terms would be derived from erring senses, "because a cause
that does not act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that is the very opposite of what it is ordained by its form to produce".-26
The chance cause, however, in contrast, is ordained
either to produce or not produce the opposite of the chance effect at random. But everything does not happen by chance, of course. That would be absurd and worse than a motorcycle sidecar that keeps falling off in a movie; and if something occurs frequently
enough, it is reasonable to know that it is not coming about by chance; and its cause, therefore, will be a naturally determined cause if it is not a free agent.
Facts gathered from experience
-- and their causes and effects -- are so frequent and numerous that once we find a given nature associated at one time with this accident, and then at another with that, "we have discovered that despite the accidental differences, such an effect invariably
follows from this nature."-27 With bears and honey or salmon in the stream, for example, such effects are not the result of what is merely incidental to such a nature or accidental in the world at large, but are rather the effects of this nature as it is essential
At times, we may experience the truth of an experimental conclusion, such as "the moon is frequently eclipsed", and granting the validity of the conclusion, because it is a fact, we
then proceed by a method of division to discover the reason. A person may also arrive at self-evident principles after beginning with such a conclusion from experience. In such cases, the conclusion, which at first was known only by experience, now is known
by reason of such a principle with even greater clarity, namely that of a primary kind of knowledge, for it has been deduced from a self-evident principle. Thus it is self-evident that when an opaque body is placed between a visible object and the source of
light, the transmission of light to such an object is prevented by the interference. Such things and first principles known from experience are appreciated most certainly by a demonstration of the reasoned facts.
As for c), people are as sure of many of their own acts as they are of the self-evident first principles and propositions of philosophy. "There are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized until personal experience, generally
of a painful kind, has brought it home and made it a reality."-28
And it is impossible that something contingent should follow from a necessary cause, and people know well enough when they have
a broken leg, like a comminuted compound fracture, or have fallen into a pit, or must have an abscessed tooth pulled, and that what is in occurrence in those cases is something more than a mere possibility. Human intelligence may discover that what was
a contingency outcome before is not any more, and that way also apprehend das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet.
There is an order among contingencies anyway, and some proposition is first and
immediate, like the one who would have knowledge of his own acts; otherwise there would be an infinte regress, or something contingent would follow from a necessary cause, both of which are impossible.
As for d), certitude of sense knowledge, "the mind is not merely a vessel to be filled but a fire to be kindled",(29) and if the candle and cradle of the senses burn, how can a philosopher be sure that
what he knows is not less than spent wax and wisps of smoke, if everything he knows is only an appearance? As he may say himself, he knows "nothing", and if knowledge is only apparent, appearing in the mind by the bridge of mutable and fallible senses, and
life itself disappears, like an apparition subject to change and final mortality, what can one say he really knows except chance and illusion, and that he merely dreams as much as nothing?
asked, "of what can I be certain"? "Cogito ergo sum" was his apparent answer, but if the world is continually changing, we can have no certitude about it by any kind of light. For there can be no certitude when an object is known in some way other than the
way in which it is, as it is impossible to know that which has no way to be even if it would not change. It is difficult, therefore, to say that there is real knowledge among mankind at all, "if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding;
for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there
will always be no knowledge, and ... there will be no one to know and nothing to be known".-30
Even if it could have been this way, it could have been that way, perhaps. Therefore, how things look
is only a matter of probability in outcomes. The mind judges about first things and other things too, and the probability of this and that, these and those, and which is which, or would be, and many times it could be either, going this way or that, or only
one chance of many for only an appearance. "Only the lonely" and "the Motels", therefore, and what people would say they know of the truth of things is only an ironic line of probability, derived from the numerousness of mutabilities, and they always could
be wrong. In fact, in many cases they are, even for their own acts; and, for all the trouble of getting everything right, the assertion of truth yet remains within the resident power of the mind, even in the case of something necessary which would occasion
an act of judgment.-31
"Ecce, maris magna claudit nos obice pontus. Deest iam terra fugae".-32 Behold, the great sea encloses us with the wall of the deep. There is no more place for flight.
So the logical impasse between mind-dependent and mind-independent being, set forth by Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", would be so difficult, even for opinionated people in the philosophy department, as
to not give ground even for the birds, even if the way they fly and the way humans see and understand is the same, duo duo.
an ornithologist thinks he can overcome the rigors of philosophical skepticism, because he recognizes the difference between a flock of ducks and the murmurations of starlings, he is naive, since he does not realize it only is another appearance that he is
judging. An innocent fool, he still does not know the thing-in-itself from what it is inside his head; and he might as well tell NASA and the Bank of England that the Sun orbits the Earth, the Earth is not moving, obviously, and as well the full Moon goes
from East to West, when viewed from above the North pole, if he would say that he knows the difference between a duck and a starling. After all, what he knows is not outside of his mind. What he knows is inside his mind, of course, since he only knows the
knowledge as knowledge. The data cannot be handled any other way.
However, even if "the mind has never anything present to
it but the perceptions"(334), it does not follow that just because an object is mutable, therefore the knowledge produced may not represent anything under an immutable aspect. For it is not precisely the mutability of the object that causes the knowledge;
rather it is the nature of the mutable object in question that does so, and this nature is immutable.
"Hence, the knowledge produced by it represents the nature itself. And if it is the nature,
this nature may have an immutable relation to something, and then both this nature and the other thing to which it is related, each by its own exemplar, are represented as immutably united."-33 And so by means of two perceived terms of experience, like a starling
and a duck, produced by two mutable creatures subject to probabilities, it is possible that a bird watcher may have knowledge of some immutable relations among things in virtue of their natures.
and the facts cannot be avoided, and the essence of relation in mathematics itself is represented to the intellect as something immutable. If there is an exemplar, there must be an example, and if there is an example, there must be an exemplar. In so far as
they are natures, one can tell the difference between a starling and a duck mathematically, and see from the individuals that these birds will not fly the same by themselves or in flocks. Ducks do not cause murmurations, certainly, and they are not as agile
as starlings. By the method of division in virtue of comparison, between these two species, and with all the certitude of sense knowledge, an ornithologist can reasonably say to the philosopher that he knows some immutable principles of relation in virtue
of natural motion: and that he knows the thing-in-itself qua qua for the birds.
Otherwise philosophy would end by making even
simple things false. And no one of good sense would prefer to put himself, or the education of his mind, under the power of an instruction which condemns him to an unhealthy state of unreality. Some equations are false and some are true; and "virtue grows
when the soul keeps the understanding according to nature. It is according to nature when it remains as it was made. Now it was made beautiful and perfectly straight. For the straightness of the soul consists in the mind's being according to nature, as it
was made; as, on the other hand, the soul is said to be evil when it bends and gets twisted away from what is according to nature."-34
Philosophy would not fairly serve a purpose that it would
undermine virtue, and that common knowledge should be made so stupid that people cannot know some basic things about birds. "Usually the philosopher philosophizes in order to resign himself to life, or to seek some finality in it, or to distract himself and
forget his griefs, or for pastime and amusement"(35), yet not to be made dumb. Nature has been so wise, after all, in the balance, that she has not been content with dividing men into happy and unhappy, wise and foolish, she also gives to the wise the spirit
of wisdom, and to the foolish the spirit of nonsense, e.g., 1 + 2 + 3 ... = -1/12, as reckoned for an "infinite sum identity" at Cambridge.
Therefore, if it is true that a mutable object, even in so far as it is mutable, would yet signify something immutable, how is it that its relation to another thing is immutable? The relation is immutable in the sense that the opposite relation
could not exist between the extremes, and neither could the relation be non-existent, given these extremes. If one or both of the extremes would be destroyed, then the relation in them is also destroyed, yet the formal relation is destroyed only in the things,
not in itself, since quantity has no contrary and entity is simple and absolute: and every relationship should have some attribute of number and also of being, qua qua, qua qua.
of the measure cannot exist in thought without possessing the necessary identity in question, more or less; and they may always exist as such, as such and such, as much as the mind itself would be an object of knowledge and invovlement in physics and the truth,
and a vehicle for intelligent investigation of the real world. If the identity did not exist, Das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet, then the quanta and the way of it would not exist either. If the
number property of a number, as much as any number, did not exist, at least from the first, then nothing would exist, since the first property of being is as numerical as a number in itself, that namely could be called the number "1", and the primary one before
Knowledge and understanding, not ony wisdom, are matters of experience and taste; and division by one from the beginning is the most simple way for things to be perceived the way that they
are. It works in everything, for all continuations, more than gravity or the speed of light. It should become evident with enough time that even a trifle among trifles can be represented under an immutable aspect, even as it is mutable in itself, and the thing-in-itself
can be known in both cases.
Knowing things and their relations by division, like the geometry of a golf ball, for instance, the logical essence of existence may be represented to the intellect
as something immutable by something radically changeable and perishable, like any golf ball itself. People know that geometry and algebra have not been lost, cast out of the cosmos and uprooted by cruel fate, when a golf ball disappears, going out-of-bounds
or landing in the lake.
If a golfer has three sleeves of golf balls and one loose extra in his bag, he knows the thing-in-itself and the number ten with the certitude of sense knowledge as much
as philosophy. And wherever it goes, a golf ball always lands between one place and another. That is the only way that it can be. The arrow of direction in flight cannot go in two different or opposite paths at the same time. From a principle as old as the
hills, when one has seen one side of where the shot lands, one also has seen the other from which it came. As sure as Janus and timeless geometry, when one has seen one side or face of the shot, he has seen the other that was in the circle, and that way also
the link that was in the face of the club.
If a right-handed player tees off, and hits a curving shot that goes off to the right and almost lands in the lake, he hit some sort of a slice. If a
left-handed players tees off next, and hits a similar curving shot that almost lands in the lake too, near the first shot, he hit some sort of a hook. Between right-handed and left-handed players, and all the shots and sides of the game, there are self-adhering
and immutable principles of essential relation in physics and geometry that do not go away. There is something more to it than mere coincidence or a series of accidents.
Even if a golfer has lost
all his golf balls and thrown his clubs into the lake, the formal qualities of mathematics, and surface area and volume, remain definitive, covering all sides; and without the proper delineation of quantitative attributions provided by geometry, mathematics
itself would become just a heap and nonsense. Atomic theory at its worst still requires figures on paper, and without the geometry of space, no score card and its math would make any sense. Even average golfers know that about the game and the thing-in-itself,
even if they just call it life.
With the Kantian style of rationalism in phenomenology, however, "perceptions come only from the senses where there is no grasp of necessity, but only of conjunctions
and associations of phenomenon"(36), et cetera. But the scientific necessity realized when a player's ball has gone to the bottom of the lake is common to everyone who sees it, and is not a matter of what is only inside somebody's head. Phenomenal play cannot
continue from the bottom of the lake. He must take a penalty drop, and in taking the penalty, he can also recognize again that "gravity" is not a lateral force. Thus the necessities encountered in an honest score card are not only from the mind, even if they
say golf is mental, but they also procede from nature itself, das Ding an sich.
"Knowledge of a principle is immutable in the sense that it cannot change from truth to falsity".-37 An intelligible species of the truth (the natural what-how that instantiates it) may perish or disappear, as a golfer may die or quit
the game, or lose all his golf balls; but the true facts of a slice or a hook, or whatever kind of shot, continue and remain unable to change from a true to a false representation. As a result, fundamental principles of nature are able to conform knowledge
to themselves, and cause knowledge of truth by being what they are, for "true entity, unable to become something false, virtually contains true knowledge immutably".-38 That which is necessarily and immutably true also causes evident knowledge of itself in
the mind, and such truth is not subject to the mind, so that it could appear true or false in the way of some probability or opinion.
The truth itself cannot be made false, even if clouded by knots
and confusion of appearance. Not all men are liars, and the Cretans have not conquered the world. In many cases liars and Cretans still know and remember the truth, and that true entity at the root is unable to become something false. That way true knowledge
is contained virtually in many things, in the ways they actually are; and even when people see illusions and mere after-images, there is still certainity that they see.
"Ce qu'on appelle une raison
de vivre est en même temps une excellente raison de mourir.” If one has found a reason to live, it also may be an excellent reason to die. And if someone dies without completing a project, and it appears that the knowledge to be accomplished is
lost, others may rediscover the same ideas from the same principles on their own, since the results that would follow the practice and skill of any art in whatever things are inherent by nature.
also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them. In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process
of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all."-39
Gene Sarazen, who invented the sand wedge from the wing of an airplane, said "the more I practice, the luckier I get", and the principles themselves are not extinguished with the death of an individual, because they operate
at a formal level of sameness, and will always be the same for whomever he would be who would discover them later and the same knowledge again, in whatever different circumstances. Since "everything has been said"(40), "it is hardly to be expected that we
should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of the past".-41
If a philosopher does not meet the standards of a reasonable man, but instead is a quibbler,
there is no reason for the innocent to suffer his doubts of absurdity or his pain. "By the dog of Egypt, are the good not wise?" asked Socrates, and an equitable court does not have to suffer the argumentative testimony of fools that facts are not obvious.
Rather, the determination of a reasonable man "is not merely a matter of speculative curiosity; it may be of the most important service to the science of man and of the social system. It ought necessarily to precede every other inquiry into social physics,
since it is, as it were, the basis."-42 And "it is indeed a great gift of God to possess right, plain common sense".-43
One way that people can be confident of certitude by sense knowledge is the
understanding that "either the same things appear opposite to different senses or they do not appear so but rather all the senses knowing such an object judge the same about it".-44 If the latter be the case, then there is natural certainty perceived by the
senses in virtue of the principle that "what occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural effect of this or that thing."-45 For instance, if the same change occurs repeatedly in the majority of cases of any objective
sequence, it follows that the transformation and image produced is the natural effect and paradigm of such and such a cause.
As a paradeigma, παραδειγμα,
for a short trip to the country, if the engine of a car is run without coolant for the radiator, and it blows out on the road, and sits smoking by the way, the external thing that is known will be such as it naturally appears to be, according
to the image in sequence that is so frequently produced by the power of cause and effect, etc.
People have a natural
sense of the measure that obtains in things, and there is even some general agreement about the nature of justice. As Socrates described it, justice is a penetrating power which passes through all things. It is the subtlest of principles, the great measure
of measures, and a power which none can keep out. It is the element which superintends over all things, and some would even say that there is at times a great mystery about it, as it remains the chief das Ding an sich selbst betratchtet, and perhaps the hidden
cause of the world.
If the judgment of different senses differs in regard to what is seen outside, people may still be certain
of what is true and in common, and know which sense is in error. For more certain than any sense judgment, there also is an intuitive circle of logic, immanent within a reasonable mind, that is there to set the intellect aright, when one of its senses may
err in a given instance. This faculty within the mind ferrets out species, generalities, and categorical facts and enthymemes for the intellect*, to capture and isolate which acts of the senses are true and those which are false. The senses themselves do not
cause but merely occasion this faculty of the mind to operate in view of the intellect.
For instance, if sight says that a golf club that is partly in water and partly in air is broken, or that
the Sun and Moon are smaller than they really are, in all such instances we are still certain of what is true and may know which sense is in error. In the case of the golf club, the intellect naturally retains the proof that "the harder object is not broken
by the touch of something soft which gives way before it". This proposition is so simple and evident that upon analysis of its terms no reasonable mind could call it in doubt, even if the terms were derived from erroneous senses. Indeed, the opposite of this
proposition includes a contradiction that makes it impossible.
Now the sight, touch, and sense of every man attest that a golf club is harder than water, and that water gives way before it. That
way the common intellect judges without difficulty that the golf club is not broken from simply being in the water. So it goes with other cases, where the terms may be derived from erring senses, the intellect yet knows that the measure used to measure remains
perfectly equal to itself, and so it goes in all things. An element of simple logic stays within the rational mind to revisit the intellect more surely than the testimony of the senses, in cases where an illusion would linger too long.
If sight says the Sun and Moon and all objects in the distance are smaller than they really are, the common understanding is still certain of what is true and knows which sense is in error. Without trouble, the
intellect knows that the identical measure can be applied by the sense of sight as well as touch to a nearby object of vision as well as to any distant object. Therefore, the actual size of an object is equally the same whether seen from up close or far away.
Sight errs, consequently, when it says that ships, planes, and cars shrink as they go away into the distance.
So let each man have the wit to go his own way, and from any corner under a cloud
of light to the Sun, the same feet that are present and near are not greater in size than when they have wandered far away, and are a hundred or two hundred yards distant, "since reason can and must give a full account of its own procedure".-46
To be vomited de phénoménologie out of the belly of a peculiar fish, therefore, and close a little chapter on Kant, with fair reason, one must conclude that when the intellect determines
that the senses err, it does so in virtue of two appropriate ways of knowing and discerning the thing-in-itself. These two operations could be called the imaginative and the ordinary, which correspond well enough to both human ideas and impressions.
The first is an imaginative and rational kind of knowledge reposing within the lens of the mind, which requires the sense only as an occasion and not as a cause. This imaginative faculty also represents a
level of objective awareness among ideas and an area of definition in which the intellect could not be deceived, even if all the senses were deceived. There should be no doubt, that as long as simple logic and justice to the subject have not been undermined,
and as long as they remain the universal measure in all things, that self-evident principles and the perception of their attendant images offer repeated testimony and common inference of the truth, and das Ding an sich.
The second way of impression, "qui in duo equa dividitur", proceeds by estimation and appreciation from an ordinary frequency of concurrence in knowledge, that is acquired by the oft-repeated testimony of the senses, which things are
known to be true and reliable by the simple proposition that, "whatever occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural effect and indeed the occurrence of such and like things", etc.-47
* the interpretation here is that the intellect is the memory and understanding, the mind is more the will
Partially successful except for set theory ... "logic does not appear to assert the existence of objects."
University of Chicago
For place and time are counted among all the things that have been created. Locus siquidem et tempus inter omnia quae creata sunt computantur. Periphyseon I.468c
"We're off to Scotland," said Tom clandestinely.
"That way, the desire for knowledge, like the thirst for riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it."-48
"I used to be a paratrooper,” he explained, and "if looked at closely enough,
with sufficient thought, there is only one thing to do about everything". So go ahead, and no one with the strength of common sense can accept the claim from a philosopher that he cannot know something as readily simple and common as the divisible present. After all "presence is always divided", and it does not have to be profound.
For instance, the bubble of French intellectuals, and before communism in
Paris there was "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs"; and there are about four mintures for any degree of arc of the ecliptic. Such knowledge functions also for a sign of relation, to understand and appreciate things, for all the world not just the stars; and
the minutes at times, in this or that turn, may be as simple as an interpretation of the lines at the post office or traffic of the road.
moment rules over everything", and Tolstoy regarded the present with utmost importance, since he presumed that it is the only time when we have any power: and if anything is known for sure and certain, it is the power and reality of division by one, since
it touches all things singly and together. The mind, therefore, "which is good for anything follows the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them."-48 Since knowing and understanding, "may be regarded as a kind of conclusion",
and implies "the progression of the mind in company with the nature of things,"(49) the right way is as important as anything that would be better, and the what-how and now that exists wherever anyone opens his eyes is not too difficult to see.
There is a pulse, in fact, and twitter even in the optic nerve that registers what is seen in the visual pathway about as fast as the "speed of light". If knowledge like that is like magic,
and seeing is believing, without some acuity of vision and intelligence of perception, who would propose to recognize, measure, or discuss the speed of light anyway?
From the peanut galleries of
the internet, there once was an anonymous voice who said that Socrates said, "the beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms". Although this text is impossible to find, for terms the divisible
present in its larger sphere can be as simple as finding the way to Scotland from the Hebrides, or Edinburgh, or St. Andrew's.
was not Scota but Cleopatra who cried deep in denial, "do not let me drown in Egypt"; and as much as they say in deconstruction, "Il n'y a pas de hors-texte", there is nothing in existence without its relation to the here and now, and nothing without the present.
Without the present, there is no past or future, and without these there is not much time, "si nous pouvons dire", which even God would transcend.
If he can, an omnipotent being may transcend
"the countless series of years and flight of ages", and monuments "more lasting than bronze", but not nothing, since it does not make sense to say that a Supreme Being transcends nothing. Without the present now, quod adhuc est, time itself obviously would
become like nothing, if it were possible. But that is impossible, for something that God transcends to become nothing, since even God cannot transcend nothing, even for a little while. See the inspection, and that any parallel of transcendence, for any instance of one of the least among many little one's, like simplest this to that, that would also involve God, that could be such as
would be for any elevation, even if only in a small way, always is and must be.
"Life is a reality to be experienced" indeed, and some sort of creative circle attends everything. If the sea
encloses the land with the wall of the deep, and there is nowhere else to flee, in an impasse of impossibility, it becomes evident that hidden in the present is a form of ontological necessity. Therefore, with reason and the fullness of geometry, and geography,
science must say that a bridge is a bridge is a bridge, as much as the lack of a way out or across is not, and the Firth of Forth is the Firth of Forth and not the Dardanelles, et cetera.
one location, one hour is never another, and for one town it never is two days of the week at the same time. As much as the day is always changing its place from midnight around the Earth, space is the place for all the days of the year, of course, and time
functions in a circular pattern of identity like waves. "One must always try to see the truth of a situation. It makes things universal,"(51) and one of the mysterious things about now is that whenever it is, it always is local as much as it is more than
"Whenever he thought of the past, it brought back so many memories, that sometimes he could not let it go".-50 He was
only a clown, but if the here and now are the thing-in-itself, hic et nunc, everyone should know it as much as the day of the week, that follows in sequence, the succession going 1,2,3, under the cope of heaven. For it is impossible that the same
thing be and not be, or that the same thing be all red and all green all over. Therefore, the divisible present and fairness in observation of right judgment are not only a question of time but also of place, "hic et ubique", and the "now" of them is
It may be impossible to get rid of, even if meaningless or absurd, since there still comes the sentence that
is meaningless or absurd, which yet would try to express something to be heard. Therefore, if all things known to mankind by experience and self-talk, were withdrawn from the cosmos, and all the world was made perfectly deaf, it would still be impossible to
ever withdraw those properties which are strictly attributive to substance, and "now" is such a case of connection.
Since substance is ultimate, and not to be strange, it may even become like
the representation of a corporate body. And suppose then, in the manner of an empirical idea of a body or a vehicle like a car, that science successively removed all its empirical constituents, such as color, passability
or impassibility, consistency, weight, monthly payments and so forth, then science shall find it still impossible to remove as well the space that it occupied.-52
Like the fox and the
crow, if ever there is a strange feeling from obviousness, "un sentiment etrange de l'evidence", it may be well to remember that "tout flatteur vit aux
dépens de celui qui l’écoute". All flattery lives at the expense of pleasure, and space itself may as well remain indifferent to such things, since space may provision objects,
but objects do not provision space.
Therefore, glimpse or discern the riddle, if it is, that "hoy es siempre todavia".
Today is still always.
"Adivina adivinanza, entre el vivir y el soñar, hay una tercera cosa. Adivínala".-53 Between living and dreaming is a third part. Guess it, and the continuation,
if there is one.
By all means of experience and logic then, if it is somebody's turn to move in a game, it is that way now
for the entire game at the table and also in concurrence for everywhere else, since entity is absolute and quantity has no contrary. "Numbers must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit
be added or subtracted, and so of any other number."-54
Like second sight, which the Scottish call intuition, or any world of fondness from reflections,
so it goes that the science of numbers "can have a foundational status lacking in any other form of knowledge,"(55) including when it is somebody's turn. For the most mysterious substance of whatever
place in space too, "mathematics consists of necessary truths which cannot be changed by empirical evidence"(56), and it would not really make fair sense for science to count numbers and numbers and crunch them over people's heads, without including
the principles and proofs of geometry for background analysis.
Of course, by some ontological necessity then, mathematics would even seem connected to theology, and the theory of the sphere, where
there is the direction called "up", where people look on high, or "above", to see if anything good may come from higher realms. For if empirical knowledge would be regarded as fallible, mathematics would yet remain infallible. So the infallibility of mathematics
could be regarded as having a source beyond the human, even as it includes simple arrangements around a counter or at a table.
Then the fundamental characteristic that sensible people should know
in common about das-Ding-an-sich-selbst-betrachtet is that, like "now", and other windows and doors, or somebody's turn at a game, it is divisible, even if it would be everywhere and here at the same time. Satan,
for his part, assumes that "all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them" are his. He said further that he would sift poor St. Peter like wheat, and the cognitive impression of divisibility that comes from human experience is unmistakable, and
everybody knows it as well as dust in the wind.
"Pulvis et umbra sumus", we are but dust and shadow, sometimes sifted in a handful of worry.
dust is the same dust.
To go peacefully
the eternal nap."-57
Where thought is unopposed to ordinary notions, even if wormwood and gall, compassed within the domain
of reason, the sphere of now is as comprehensible as any bookstore receipt, and everywhere too, "ubique". Since the divisible present abides comprehensively, one thing leads to another by nature, whether by contact or succession; and even little trivial things,
for example, if people take note of them, have a way of becoming connected.
Like the old philosophical contention of the one and the many, now always adds up. If "all that is transitory is but
a metaphor",(58) the divisibility of transition at least must be something real too, a knowable thing-in-itself, otherwise mankind would not know the breath of despair, and the way of living in denial as well as he does. Escapism and the passage of existential
doom, quo vadis, and a turning descent with age and pain, is like a ritual impossible for many if not all to avoid.
"Desire is poison at lunch and wormwood at dinner; your bed is a stone, friendship
is hateful and your fancy is always fixed on one thing."
.. facilis descensus Averno
noctes atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis.
The gates of hell are open night and day
Smooth the descent, and easy is the way
"with every increase in the degree of consciousness, in proportion to that increase, the intensity of despair increases: the more consciousness the more intense the despair".-59
the metaphor of oblivion would not exist without the extremes, and the extremes must exist beyond the veil and curtain of appearance, because there is no other simple way, and the simple way is best, and the best is always good enough, since things must also
be in themselves as well as others. If a pain or not, besser ist besset, und das beste ist gut genug. Like putting one's toe in the water, one knows the water and one knows the pool. Without having to put one's toe in every single part, that sort of knowledge
should not be a problem for a philosopher to comprehend das Ding-an-sich, and that the Earth does not rotate or orbit the Sun. The caverns of hell may be smoky lakes of fire, yet
.. to return,
and view the cheerful skies,
In this the task and mighty labor lies.
If there is any faith in the earth, "nothing is more active
than thought, for it travels over the universe, and nothing is stronger than necessity for all must submit to it." Therefore, simplicity of intention is common to beatitude, for it constitutes the happy form of peace, and "to be happy is necessarily the wish
of every finite rational being."-60
"We seek happiness by our very nature and man's happiness consists in understanding,"(61) since the intellective form, in fact, is proper to man.
For example, there was a clown at the UN who admitted to the audience that he was driven by an interest in entertainment and popularity. He confessed that he would "collect moments", as he called it, as he
went riding his highwheeled bicycle by the Rockefeller Compound of the UN.
"This operation, in fact, in which such felicity of intention consists is in me too, formally, and is part of the act",
A jolly man of bells, balls, and whistles, to all the social theory of the central banking system 2018, and to heliocentrism as well, etc., he liked to toot his horn for contracts
and wave to the innocent children. He was a splash in his colorful costume and make-up, and would carry tunes all of a sudden. It was a little strange, kind of funny, but "sunshine almost always makes me high", he used to sing at favorite moments, when
he would do funny pratfalls and slapstick routine by the Judeo-Masonic Foucault pendulum, which he knew was one of the most absurd hoaxes in all humanity. For the history of the world is stranger than an octopus: driven damped, and tuned.
"Sunshine on the water looks so loverly", and the angels who sing know that between any extremes there is always something there.
"We have a little
commotion", he said for proof, tapping his over-sized old leather shoe, "and a wave of sweetness shoots through me from top to toe when the sun shines. Esse quam videri", he declared, "for a clown. So it goes a long way, if all the world were a birthday
cake, and you should take a piece, but not too much."
"The difference between a philosopher and an actor", he said one time, when he took a dangerous spill from his highwheel bike, "is that an
actor knows what he's doing, and he can feel it more" he added.
"Drinking as thinking is no good, if you don't feel it," cried an unknown man from the crowd.
"Almost all absurdity of conduct arises from the imitation of those whom we cannot resemble"(62), the clown replied. He dusted himself off as needed, and should it be that the idea that there is no fair explanation for comportment,
as such-and-such in common, would be accepted?
For some it may become an apodeictical reflection of apperceptive apprehension, if not a matter of direct intelligence, that the shortest distance
between two points is forever a straight line. After all, there are two sides to everything, and "he that keepeth justice shall get the understanding thereof".-63
Yet "there is no understanding where there is bitterness, and the heart of a fool is like a broken vessel, and no wisdom at all shall it hold."-64 Even that way, an inattentive clown with schizo-affective disorder, lost among bicycles
and volkswagens, may fall into the accidental subsistence of nothingness one day. "We can regard our life as a uselessly disturbing episode in the blissful repose of nothingness"(65), said one, yet memory makes a mirror, sine qua non, that dwells as much
as it informs.
If it could have happened anywhere, therefore, some occurrence of authenticity, and a little circle of intelligence, it could have happened in pure space perhaps, yet as much as
the hand writing was on the wall at Belshazzar's feast -- mene, mene, tekel, upharsin -- and not at the North pole, locality has some definite scale of importance, and time is easily fixed by events. Certain places and events have an atmosphere all their own,
like words, names, and memes, and at times there comes an affective rapport, even for what could be called a sort of universal fame and declination by the stars.
For some the occasion of place
may create a special sense of awareness, viz. das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet. In its own way then, between mind, cloud, and tower, the sense of verbal awareness and etymology of location may become of the greatest importance for reflection and access to
meaning. As much as a castle and its drawbridge, "without knowing the force of words, it is impossible to know more."66
the question is how do we rightly know about the world then, and that the Earth does not orbit the Sun, for example, and what is possible for the human mind to know beyond that, it may be an equivalent status question, not unlike a game of Scrabble. "The world
is the totality of facts, not of things", and there are games in life, and Charades, and a holy mountain with clouds on top, where the gods look down to see what nations and contracts will do. "For our God is a gallant foe that playeth behind the veil," yet
language can copy reality precisely and completely, wherefore Scrabble may be an interesting way for a circle of intelligence to develop, as much as there are governments, entertainment, and money.
And as much as Charades, "where the lightnings meet", at times the best outcome may prove difficult to win. Without the right letters, words may become difficult or impossible to spell. The circle of
perception and the bag of tiles are like a well for the intellect, in view of the mind; but if one does not draw the right letters, and the well runs dry, he may be left "naked as a blade"; and he will have to exchange, which could cripple his standing and
Most Scrabble players prefer to place small, low-scoring words that get rid of one or more of the letters they do not like, instead of executing the swap maneuver. If the situation
arrives that one simply cannot place a word on the board at all, then he can swap out the letters that he does not want, and choose from the remaining pile of unused tiles, as he would when replacing letters he has already successfully put in the game. "The
supreme accomplishment", said Arnold J. Toynbee, "is to blur the line between work and play", and learning rare word lists may help a professional obtain higher scores, and win a little money. Q, V, J, X, and Z are difficult letters, for example, but sometimes
may allow placement of a winning combination, and so forth.
Just as sounds and letters go in the right place, in words there are natural relationships of veriloquium hidden between different meanings
and the ways of saying how things are. Some are as obvious as the similarity of divisibilty and visibility, for instance, which show right away that the powers of division and vision go together. "Omnia Gallia in tres partes divisa est", just as the
one who wrote it could also see it, like "visa", of course.
There are TV commercials, passports, countries, and credit cards, and people almost everywhere who, like Billy Pilgrim,
can see the visible since it is divisible, and see that every Visa account starts with a 4, but the indivisible is invisible. Hidden from natural sight, the indivisible and invisible invincible home of the immortal gods is far away it seems, even from airplanes,
and difficult to find.
Without some special magic, to cross the Rubicon with a legion was one thing for Caesar, yet it would be another for a fellow to catch a strange and mysterious bull like
Jupiter by the tail. Even for a moment, however, some things impossible to take back may be worth the danger, if not the horns, and the Spanish verb "divisa, divisar", which means to see from afar, shows the same intuitive sense of things: that to see and
grasp with understanding in natural terms is also to divide. Like the Latin verbs dividere and videre, the experience is what counts.
It is aesthetically pleasing and a blessing of nature, of course,
to see that humans have two eyes, which also parallels the way affection produces knowledge and understanding. What the eye sees also depends on what is sought, with a little preference, a poco a poco, and people develop a dominant eye as much as they develop
a dominant interest or taste. And one must admit that if he likes something in itself, or even merely the appearance, even if it is only a word that he wants to spell, he should also know what it is as much as it would come close to the apple of the eye. For
what is in the apple of the eye touches the soul, and the soul is the principle of life, "the ordering and containing principle of all things".68
In Scrabble, like life, every player gets his turn. It may be interesting to note that when people correct the spelling of a word, they say "now that is correct", like it is understood already that there is always something more correct
about "now" itself, which not only is a matter of time but also of place, of course. "There is a place for everything, everything in its place",(70) and if there is a when, there is always a where.
the hours and minutes of the day are around the Earth at once -- yet it is still better, if it always is today, that we should hold our destiny in ourselves more than in the stars, since any natural desire like a chance to win at Scrabble or know more about
words cannot be in vain.-69
As much as the little days of the week and cosmology of the stars have theirs, confusion should not reign over places, and everybody wants his turn, and everybody
wants to be a winner, certainly. At least that much is known for sure about the divisible and visible present, and the sphere of das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet that humans inhabit.
"The whole collection of rules applies to anybody"(71), and from words about science to space and philosophy, proper spelling, pronunciation, and inner direction of meaning are no accident, any more than
the number ten or the elements. The circle of return for any feeling of certainty can only remain open, for things that would come back must continue in substance. Bellarmine and Socrates knew that the location of the Earth within the cosmos was central, and
what the difference would be between hemlock or a dental appointment instead of a round of golf or fishing trip, for instance.
"to assert that the earth revolves around the sun is as erroneous to claim that Jesus was not born of a virgin".-72 So it goes without saying, that the days of the week and months and seasons of the year fall in where they belong like circular functions.
The meaning is as natural and conventional as because and correct spelling.
It is the smallest things sometimes that
may start us seeing anew: a glimmer of light reflected in a river or mountain lake, a little circle of visibility, that owing to the three dimensions of space, would also be the center of another sphere, and some particle of a day, et cetera. Like sundrops
on cars, "one may conceive light to spread successively, by spherical waves".-73 And "without light, vision is impossible and that the inner part of the eye consists of water is easily intelligible,
water being translucent" and divisible.-74
Nothing can describe better the smallest point of division
in space than a tiny circle of light. Since there is no mote or particle that people can understand without its division and a light, which
provide some simple form of distinction, as in Scrabble so in life. For the expression of intelligence, it could be like any little consonant or vowel is always so close to the same difference.
As much as treasure maps and pirate skulls and bones -- flowers, sticks, and stones -- necessity has an excellent way of coveting influence, between words
and things, and also for the understanding, where the eye creates its own reflection. Since any primary status is formal, like division by one, and space is a prime concept, whatever exists is also inevitably part of some triangle. Since there is no math or number without its trigonometry, between that object where there is some light, and another that is close or far away, is some space of an instance;
and the places these two points represent are not infinite, because like any visibility by divisibility a simple plane in itself is not infinite, any more than one of its lines.
"... and geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province of pure a priori cognitions, without needing to ask from philosophy any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental conception
of space," etc.-75 And perhaps a mirage and the French Foreign Legion will prove something too, where all around is the open desert air and unbroken sky, for a corner of the mournful kingdom of
"O, Sunlight! the most precious gold to be found on Earth." Beyond despair, nous allons enfants de la patrie, le jour de gloire est arrivé ... marchons, marchons, liberté,
liberté, chérie des rêves, et cetera ...
"How many miles to Babyland?
Anyone can tell
Up one flight, to the right
Please to ring the bell"
Merely a line or the plane of an argument is not enough, however, for everything
and space, so there is always a third separate point, that is not of the same placement or direction and radius as the first two, since everything cannot go only one way. Therefore, it is apodeictically clear for all retro-analysis that from any first point
there always must follow at least two more and a triangle. If there are so many triangles, as there would also be so many points, as much as tiny bubbles in the wine, then there also must be so many pyramids, boxes, and spheres, and places of destination,
However, even for destiny, if they added up all of the things in space and all of the time, it could not take up
all of the area, qua orignis infinitum, more than tiny bubbles. Unless it were infinity caught somewhere in the mix of an infinitesimal, there is no summation of objects or fine points that is infinite anyway. Another way to consider the big picture, therefore,
is that infinity will never run out of room, as infinity cannot be overcrowded or cramped for space, even in an elevator or bottle of wine.
In the 5th century BC, Socrates described justice "as
that which penetrates all things"(76), including intelligence and reflection; and Kant described judgment as the faculty or power "for thinking the particular under the universal".-77. To be fair to the subject, he then went on to some length to distinguish
transcendental apperception from empirical perception. In epistemology, to summarize, apperception is the "introspective or reflective apprehension by the mind of its own inner states."-78 For philosophy then, the question whether one knows something also
becomes a question of metacognition and self-conscious percolation, which is "cognition about cognition", "thinking about thinking", or "knowing about knowing". There are generally two features of awareness involved in metacognition: namely the knowledge of
the notion, and the regulation of the cognition as it happens as well.
If it may seem elusive, mostly a resource for meta-headaches,
to investigate the best interpretation of some of the obscurities of metaphysics, that turn around metamemory and metacognition, it should become apparent one day, via studious contemplation, that
truth and right judgment concur with the realists, and that the concurrence also must be substantial. After all, if one has a vision but not the correct sort of diligence, it could be for nothing and only complications. Even for a poor way of subsistence,
the best reward for diligence is love, benevolence in reality, where "love is patient, love is kind, it always hopes and perseveres, and love never fails".-79
If at one turn a philosopher describes judgment as the faculty or power "for thinking the particular under the universal", at another point of triangulation and discussion, he could say as well that it is the faculty or power for considering
the universal under the particular: and when and there where he spies the form of a universal, he can be certain that he has also spotted the thing-in-itself, and something substantial, for in those cases there can be no other way.
To the mind of a reasonable man, therefore, it becomes apparent one day that living reality is substantial, and a composite of at least two dimensions, duo duo faciles, an easy two by two, that manifest in matter and form. As entity
is absolute, yet governed by form, ultimo ratio, it follows by logic that there are also at large an extensive set of abstract entities known as universals. Thus the world of common experience is built up in a duality of particulars and universals, as much
as a hammer is still a hammer, no matter how or from what it is made. If it works like a hammer, it is still called a hammer, and thus it is in the form of a hammer.
Hoo eee, so it goes, and with all the recluse powers, flowers, and songs of tautology all over the place in a summer's day, the divisible present abounds yet more than sunshine, and as much as theorems of
"All the heights of the high shores gleam
Red and gold at the sunset hour:
There comes the spell of a magic dream,
And the Harbour seems a lotus-flower;
A blue flower tinted at dawn with gold,
A broad flower blazing with light at noon,
Its beauty burns like a ceaseless fire,
For all mute things it would seem, aspire
catch a glimpse of the lotus-flower."(80)
Everywhere the four winds and poor suckers go, we perceive an abridgment
of substance; and it is from the relation of substance, with a recapitulation of forms that bubble on like a river, that people have their perception. Si ascenderis in altitudines ibi est, et si iacueris in antro adest adhuc. If you ascend into the heights,
it is there, and if you fall down into a cave, it is still present.-81 If there is a secret in ontology for the ages or in any good fortune, it is that "excellence resides in quality not in quantity".-82 Quality comes before quantity, qualitas refert potius
quam quantitas, and so does form come before matter.
In the simple way of a bridge, without which there is no passage or escape, the form and quality in the connection are prior to
the matter and quantity. If there is no disposition, temper, and shape to atoms in the void, there is no way across, and the way things work properly is as necessary and correct as the way they fail. The strength of things and materials is not only strength
in matter but also essence of forms, since the way things are put together is as important as what is put together. The how comes before and after the what. The spring line and the rise, the columns and keystone of an archway, for example, are in the forms
of the elements as they are in the extremes, which are consubstantial from end to end.
The wings of consubstantial similarities
and dissimilarities flutter and whisper in the breeze. Sometimes a spooky repetition plays in the wind between a churchyard and the cemetery trees: for while the elements are changed in themselves, as in an instrument the sound of the quality is changed,
yet all keep their sound innuma.-83
Space is a formal property also quantum satis. As much as the ladder of the octave goes up, then goes down, and as much as entity is absolute and essential,
space is the place for such attributions as importance and the sounds.
The same thing cannot be red and green all over, and what must be must be, and there is no situation that is totally informal,
or that is totally without something in contrast. Whether Aristotle says "substance", or Plato says "form", there is little in the question of comparison, that if elemental things would be reduced to the subject of matter and attributive quantity alone, such
radical reductions of content would only rehearse and objectify something like chaos. "Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annhilate it and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the
cause of our perceptions".(336)
Vae victis, and the way of deconstruction follows a formula that is necessary to have the undefined
faith, and "woe to him who believes in nothing."-84 He would deny everything precious of necessity.
If an absolute removal process of form and substance from the elements were possible, extinguishing
the appropriate properties in quale quid, leaving only matter qua matter, qua qua chaos and qua the blob would not even survive the terrible violence of nihilism for logic and a win, since the objects and attributions of scientifc knowledge are only as necesssary
and universal as mathematics allows. A formless heap cannot account for itself or balance a math equation, since there must be a form to numbers themselves. If there is no outline, even a poor one, there is no content; and if the thing that is unintelligible
cannot be recognized, the meaning even of the unknown is lost, as surely as it has been utterly confused or destroyed.
"Men were deceivers ever, one foot in sea and one on shore, to one thing
constant never", and once it was that way then, it apppears that it will be that way forever.
"The fraud of men was ever so,"(85) and in
the medieval past of castles, sand pebbles, and metaphysics, a divergence developed between two schools of thought, the via antiqua of the realists, and the via moderna of the nominalists. Logic it seems would still show that the via antiqua was correct, where
the via moderna was wrong. As Anthony Trollope confessed the liberal position, "life is so unlike theory"; and, years later, in its ironic way of denial and confusion as progress, heliocentrism is only another nominalist school in the via moderna, where
truth exists in name and theory only not reality. Nominalism and modernist phenomenology and the dialectical Copernicanism of scientific materialism have a strange blend, but there are still at least three simple universals to refute them:
1. the universal of resemblance
2. the unviversal of impossibility
3. the universal of the
One of the certainties about knowledge as necessity is the appreciation one feels when one sees that that is the way that it must be. As it is, the theory of forms as much as universals answers
the impossibility and impossible problem of infinite regress with a greater simplicity: that things simply are the way they are between this and that and these and those and the others. Here and there, therefore, with the greatest convenience of upper place
in the universals, a creative and mysterious circle is provided to make things make sense in finis, and for all parallel, in the function and form.
The universal projection of the elements of
relation, in the forms, proceeds from so much simplicity representing so much work that it is difficult at times to understand why "making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy"(86), if not martyrdom. As
much as an omen, seen from another angle, there is no theory of resemblance that can avoid postulating any characteristic similarity among many pairs of particular things without postulating some other resemblance about them as well. Although if all are unlike
something, even unlike each other, then all are alike in being unlike something and have something in common another way. As much as what is shared is in common, even if each would be different, to the degree that they are unlike something such as, they are
alike in another way.
Not to reverse roles of the clear and the obscure, still it is not easy, according to modern science, to say that the Earth is not moving any more than hundreds of parked
cars in a lot with emergency brakes on, and that everyone can tell. Once the scientist says that the parked cars on emergency brakes are moving, per relativity of inertial frames of reference, even though no one can tell, except for the theory -- and the emergency
brake would grind, if the car was on the road -- then so for the lot and the Earth, of course.
Without falling into the colors of some vicious infinite regress, of some strange system of denial,
even regarding the roots of trees, and all the other things at rest or that would be, admitting even one universal of resemblance among things makes it absurd to avoid others. If one would say that each resemblance among many pairs of similarities is not the
same, but unique and different from the others, so much and, therefore, there is not too much sameness in likeness at the root, to avoid the evident fact of a universal, then it still must be acknowledged "that these resemblances quite resemble each other",
by an odd distance in the modicum at least.
For as little of the difference as possible, even as much as they do not fit one exact thing, they may fit another ... "and thus at last we shall be forced to admit resemblance as a universal. The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal. And having been forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer worth while
to invent difficult and implausible theories to avoid the admission of universals", even such ones as would be merely of colors, pigments, or figures of imagination that any artist may prefer, one to the other, etc.-87
The ironies in life at times may become so rich and diverse, that for all the difference in the world, there could be as many universals of resemblance as there are ways of being in the reverse. Therefore, even if it is strange, a
universal could be hidden in the question and answer at any time, as much as in the cause and the effect.
As to the ontological medium itself, besides the universal of resemblance, there follows
the universal of impossibility, for it is impossible that any property of being should not concur with its own nature. Yet the nominalist skeptic who denies universals and their forms will even go so far as to deny as well that colors exist even in themselves.
The nature of something like a car or a tree, or the color of paint in a can, or of a cat in the neighborhood, must have a universal form,
since all these instances are examples of the unification of concurrence: and any concurrence is an actual mode of duality, at least for the material and essence involved. The existence of matter by itself can account for only one part in the sensible dynamic
of impression. Whenever the subsistence of form is ruined, dissolved, or removed from matter, the dissolution of the subtlety that was in the missing way and substance of the form becomes obvious through lack of the continuing concurrence.
The expression of sameness carries another sign of a universal, when there is no other way for something to be than the way that it is. As much
as all things are in division by one, for the same difference, the same questions and answers bring themselves around to the end, so they can bring themselves around to the beginning, and around again.
Divide all things by one and what is the result? The same difference. "The world is everything that is the case" and the cosmic isotrope. Enti ibidemiteresse additur quidvis aliqua natura. Being adds whatever to a thing's nature, quia quaelibet
natura est essentialiter ens, since however things go, being is essential to all. Entity, therely-being, as soon as that instant or place is, adds itself however to whatever hermeneutic of cause and effect.
school never went further than division by one, everybody would get A's; and everybody's report card would be the same yet different. As division by one goes through all things, so does the center, since there is a quality of sameness in all things when it
comes to divisibility by one.
One radius, one curve, like circumference over diameter, for one relation over all, and such simplicity as the system of logic that is in this phenomenon is always
there. When the quotient is the dividend, it is the same quality of sameness, and power of parallel by attribute and property, ibidemiteresse issimus, that relates itself to any perception and all
perceptions of it.
An old school motto, "virtus semper viridis", where virtue is always green, or young, the color green, for
instance, has no other way to be than the way that it is. As matter destitute of form is unaccountable to any improvements or retainer, except for materialistic deconstruction and chaos, science has no better way to go into things without form, except down,
and nothing better to become, since it is impossible that any property of being should not concur with its own nature.
Yet for a supreme genus as much as when, the universal effect of color as
a property is difficult to avoid, especially in the form of it. The greenness of cactus in the desert, for example, is more than name only. In the gramalogical property and operation of climactic dryness, the cactus stands out for being green. The resilience
of nature therely represents also an ablative of construction with ontological substance and a kind of brightness in the moonlight. The greenness, thorniness, and sheer obviousness have a form
and way to be utima ratio.
In the fields and forests of the climate map, there is a quantum leap in green, that represents a universal connection among the differences and measures, since there
is also a oneness behind all things that are like so that is. The sameness for all such things is in a oneness of relation that is the parallel between, for the trope is the trope is the trope, from the tropics to the poles. As much as it is impossible for
it not to be green, where springtime vines and roots may come sprouting through the masonry, after human habitation has gone, something more than separable parts and crumbled ruins makes green green.
by nature the color cannot be separated from itself, there is discovered something secret of a universal, and that something already was green by at least a kind of temper or mood. Since it not only is an impressionable mask of atomic theory, but something
tempered with consistency, that makes green green, all the instances of green are indifferently related in terms of being green as green. Whether less or more, more or less, therefore, the simple color is evidence of another universal, and a sign of some fundamental
relation of substance in common.
If Kermit the frog used to sing about "the rainbow connection", and that it was not that easy being green, as much as green is green as green, and that way it
seems to blend in with so many ordinary things, it follows that green is indifferently related to its own material essence. The property in the attribute thus offers the embodiment of a universal even in a wavelength spectrum.
Sometimes people also notice that in terms of temperature and the breeze it could be any year by a golf course, or the library, and that way the weather that comes
back around is another sign of a universal. Besides the magic of colors, Aristotle says that "each of the units in 2 must be prior to the 2", which is true, even in the seasons.-88 And as the concurrence of matter and form is divisible to the intellect, but
the unity of the form in itself is not, the one that is first must come first.-89
If there is a typical first principle of the concurrence of quality and form with matter, that also would exist
as a knowable property in itself, it would have to be expressed in the act of seeing and knowing. To see and know for the standard of reason forms a definitive triangle in the way of being, a sign also with a note of existential clarity, as in a
universal. The acuity which follows from the intellect (dwelling in the memory and understanding) and will united in sense and perception would be a knowable property and something primary in itself. That way, where the shadow and breath of the living
is what there is of light and skill, the knowing knower would represent a third universal, the universal of the city.
Khan said, "remember that you have no companions but your shadow". And over the hills and through the trees they go, like a band of shadows, to find bright lights and big city, where the markets count forms by counting the number of substances. And so the realization of archetypes that come out of civilization transform the people who must encounter various impossibilities and crazy dreams in the course of life.
Precisely different yet exactly similar, no two poins in space can be separated by nothing, so there must be a universal form in things as much as any transcendence or balance is related to all. If the infinite exists, then also forms
as universals not only particulars must exist, because there is no better way to bridge the gap between quantity and quality in experience. For example, it is not easy to haul some things across steep mountains, and the differentials of transformation encountered
in such advenures and the course of life commonly dissemble as much as credit cards in virtue of universals.
On the other hand, at times, there are unmistakable circumstances of immanence
as well to accompany civilization in the occurence of various accidents, impossibilities, and archetypes of coincidence. If not for the joy of a ball of fat, for example, the universal of the city may also be described as something like an infantry handbook
or office of signs and numismatics.
"Relatio secundum esse", related according to the way they have being, the employee of
the month and the Mayor have their parking spaces, of course, and people on the bus see the stamp or the sticker and where. The numismatics of relation, as such and such, coined according to the way of being, is what the universals address; and they are in
the numbers and frequency of ways of processing facts, even like the question, "does the bus stop here?"
The universals are in the ones, and the ones like so, and the numbers and ways of being
must be expressed when truth is discovered. As much as a formula is coined of the one over the many, and the many everywhere around the one, without a background of universals, the depth in forms and their clues in the dualities of existence do not make
good sense. The parallel over every duality has a process, and some way or temper that at the very least should make a little sense.
Like all the other universals, the one from the city is a type
of necessity. And the necessity that exists within any expression is in the order of what is first, as in the Latin verb exprimere, and the French exprimer, from the parts (ex), from, out of, and (primo), at first, from the first: in the beginning.
If the way the number one relates to the number four is always the same, from the way a squirrel recons pecans, for example, to the way John McEnroe played tennis, then science has discovered another universal
in the hand of nature at least, duo duo, for the hand of nature is never very far from the way of things or quarters in the city.
A lapstrake ship in comparison to a carvel in a medieval harbor
would show that the workmanship and method is the same coin and stamp, and expression, in all times and places. Whoever did it, necessarily did it the same way in the result for everywhere that he built the boat that he built. Being the one way by the one
who did it in the result, for all times and places, the universal sign penetrates through all the matter. The image of the city and ship of state, therefore, are stamped like universals in the treasury and exchange, in the process of commerce -- as much
as the consonant, vowel, and breath are set in any syllable of Scrabble. The universal sign pentrates through all the matter, as much as words are things themselves, and there are no words and no cities without universals.
Yet for the reputation of officialdom and championship Scrabble, "let no rank puff up anyone; for faith and love are paramount - the greatest blessings in the world; and nothing is more precious than peace, by which all war, both in
Heaven and Earth, is brought to an end."-90
Adding to the logical justification of universals in forms, as they relate to refinement
of ultimate substance and reality, there are many illustrations of the distinction that exists between the formal and material predication in things. A strange one in particular comes from a Renaissance painting of St. Lucy by Domenico Beccafumi.
Martyred in 304 AD, she was cruelly tortured and her eyes were gouged out. In the painting, she is shown with them on a plate looking out at the audience, and she also has her normal eyes in her face. Like
St. Lucy's eyes in the painting, not only can one know das Ding-an-sich-selbst-betrachtet, without too much effort one can also recognize the universal emotion and archetype in the meaning, and the sign that is there, since the eyes are not only about themselves, but also the sign of relation.
One way to know the thing-in-itself from formality is to know that all things, as much as they are
also properties of being, should at least belong with some credit and ultimate responsibility to the probabilities of God, if not to the chances of somebody else. People know the lost-and-found, and the activity of the optic nerve, and when they have an abscessed
tooth or hear screams of torture and pain. Even not knowing is knowing, and sometimes from across the street.
Since people know when they do not know, or when they have forgotten why, as much as
when one cannot see except for total darkness and pitch black, the funny feeling of knowledge still seeps in. It is simple to know how the elements of mere appearance, even in a painting, are predicated and related in quale quid, and to know also the
reiterations of the end of a sensitive nerve to its function, as it would be known as the thing-in-itself.
For fear of dangers or any menacing phenomena along the way, the blind man knows his
blindness and his nerves better than skepticism in philosophy. The form of perception that is missing is sensible as much as an epiphany. If by chance he is robbed, he understands again that something essential has been lost, and can recognize a universal
form of things in himself and the mystery of the thief. People always know and see the form in and for itself, come whatever of the matter.
For instance, as well as a doctor, one sees that a poor
bloody eye plucked out has lost its better form and first light of color in the natural connection. As much as any circle would have lost its geometry, the removal of the form and property of vision that obtained in the thing-in-itself leaves the native sight
that was the principle faculty in the object to remain in name only.
Yet the haunted eyes of a ghost are still eyes over the matter. The name in
the object is still there, for an eye is called an eye since eyes are for seeing, and so are the eyeballs, even if one has been plucked out after a sort of cruel nominalist deconstruction.
"Los ojos por que suspiras,
los ojos en que te miras
son ojos porque te ven."
"The eyes how why you sigh
one knows it well,
the eyes that look at yourself
they are eyes because they see you" -91
The right knowledge is full of eyes, and when the essential property of the universal form has been lost, due to materialist deconstruction of
the meaning, and violent invasion of the thing-in-itself, it is agony and oblivion, pain too heavy to describe. Crushed and scattered around the broken sphere of a ruined castle, lost souls, to be less than moonlight in shards of glass, the formless void is
no cakewalk, no pleasure cruise.
No bed of roses to be damned, et cetera, and no matter how fast the race or the career, the
shadow more than keeps up for the radius and the curve. Sometimes in front, it never tires, and if an hour of darkness was a candle, "vision is the art of seeing what is invisible to others".-92
there truth", the Bishop of River-by-the-Sea asked, "and does justice from the mountain penetrate all things, even ghosts and watercolors? What is truth? Quid est veritas?"
Kant proposed that his purpose was "to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its circumference as well as in its contents," yet he only undermined the effort to be fair
by reducing the sensible world to an inaccesible place of skeptical indifferentism.-93 A Copernican and Newtonian academic, a skeptic and modernist in phenomenology, a master of dismisive terms of synthetic illusion, and another nominalist, he missed the boat
to say that it was only an appearance and a perception.
However, like tiny bubbles in the wine, transcendental numbers like Pi would reinforce metaphysical realism, and the authenticity of the
circle, and the apple of the eye, rather than nominalism, since nominalism is radically synthetic and reduces fundamental properties to attributes. Without the correct sort of formality and apple of apperceptive appreciation in the first place, to say that
one does not know Pi in itself, but only the appearance, is to say that the circle does not really exist, except as an attribute for simple-minded people, even if it is a property of the mind in the universal
equivalence of circumference over diameter.
The same thing cannot be red and green all over. It is stop
or go, and the nominalist academic would even say that colors do not exist in themselves, but in name only, only as reflections, and that they do not have entity beyond the appearance. In an ironic and repetitive way painful to reason and history, heliocentrism
and relativity are only a hyper-nominalist school of synthetic illusions, where truth exists in name only not reality.
that the Earth moves at astronomical rates to orbit the Sun is to say a lot. To say that it all happens with an unaccelerated and undetectable motion due to universal gravitation is to say even more. Yet for the dimension of practical experience, the theory
and applied science of it add up to less than zero. Less than dust in the wind, the theory is only for an appearance of opinion that plays in the mind, a sort of mental illusion, an unscientific prop even, and an escape from reality.
It is the reverse of what everybody sees, and if no one from the philosophy department, the world unknown of the unknown unknowers, can know the material content and form
of the thing-in-itself, then can one notice its complete removal, when it is taken away? Einstein abolished the aether, and Kant paved the way a century and thirty-seven years before by abolishing reality, so how did a straight line survive all the deconstruction?
Ratio and proportion are in each other all along. A tautology of nature, the Platonic n-ness of space, n-times in all theorems of geometry,
where there are no evaulations without ratios -- even in relativity one to this, one to that -- where a repetition comes back around, as if as simple as another division by one.
The division by zero, however, is as impossible as undefined, where it is as impossible to remove
Pi from the iron ball at the end of a prisoner's chain as it is to remove the center from a circle, and the straight line from inside the radius of a sphere. If an inmate could crush it with his fists, perhaps, that could be a way to stop the injustice of
things that keep making too much sense. But if people cannot know the essence of things like iron, and the ratio of Pi, when they are inside the circles of a prisoner's ball and chain, but instead know
only an appearance, how do they recgonize with such greater clarity the ratio, proportion, heavy weight, and motion of it, when they would be removed?
If a blind prisoner does not recognize the
form of sentence placed on his head, and know with an act of simple understanding and right judgment the substance of imprisonment that follows, how does he notice the removal of the punishment so
well? Since noticing the removal is to know somewhat the matter and form involved, to know even vaguely what was before and after between so many things is to grasp the vestige of a universal as much as the bonds.
They would say justice is that which penetrates all things. Solving the problem, therefore, in the mathematical sense is sufficient for all cases, as there is no prisoner of reason who cannot add up and understand a convict's ball
All numbers are not equal as division by zero remains undefined, and it represents a strange experience, with the Copernican
reversals of epistemology, if the system of relativity would say that one does not see and understand a ball and chain for what it is, and whether it spins. A stranger experience comes around, perhaps in the
nerve of an abscessed tooth, or eyes that have been gouged out, if one were to say that one does not notice any relief in the removal process of such pains.
If one cannot recognize with an act
of simple understanding and right judgment -- and the complete proof of mathematics -- that the Earth is not rotating, can one then at least recognize its removal from space? Would a modernist skeptic of phenomenology not notice if the Earth were totally removed,
as much as if it had slipped away from under his feet, one day, as much as he would notice the taking away of a ball and chain?
In the movie "Cast Away", an expressive FedEx employee named Chuck
Holland survived a commercial plane crash at sea, and became stranded on a deserted island, where he used to talk to a volley ball. To be on the deserted island was a question of survival, and he would talk to the volley ball, and it seemed that the volley
ball would talk to him.
He even named it "Wilson". It seemd "Wilson" said good things, if his comments were brief, almost mute; and he seemed to have an echo of Aristotle and the good, in his
spherical sort of way. If a castaway can talk to a volley ball, any prisoner of modernist phenomenology and the philosophy department can talk to a ball and chain, as well as the Earth, or the depths of an island cave.
Like a playable word in Scrabble, stuck between friends, what any of them would say that would be logical and true would have to be the same inference among all
of them. The difference between them and what they say is the same when they say what is true. The truth is not without its place of reference among things, and universals, and it has the simplest property of sameness for transcendence and comparison. Among
as many things as there may be, through the extent and repetition, it remains the simplest second measure, and a healthier and better coconut, since what is false always involves complication.
they played Scrabble, they would have to follow the same rules of participation and verbal interaction. What goes for words from Scrabble also goes for things and actions. The word has an image that represents a thing, that is in the way that it is written
and pronounced, that represents another thing that is the concept and the object involved. It is about the meaning and sign at the table, and the rules are for the proper communication and love of the game itself, and that way they are for more than mere convention.
There is a sign in the word and a measure of nature more than the sound and the letters, which is the actual thing in itself. Actuality has the greatest potential excellence of meaning, therefore, and it is as knowable as the lime in the coconut, as much as
the one and the other are potential and divisible.
If the volley ball from "Cast Away" was named "Wilson", the iron ball and chain from the philosophy department could be "Philo", from one of the
Greek words for industry and diligence, φιλοπονία. In head to head scrabble, "Philo" and "Wilson" would prove that a placement value and unity of form obtains in things and the thing-in-itself that is also shared
in the word and the referent object. In virtue of the connectivity with reality, the mind reckons only one way to spell the one syllable word bat, for example, even if the word bat may have at least three different meanings in two or more languages. Scrabble
has the same government everywhere, and the syllable is the syllable is the syllable as much as any syllogism is a valid argument. "Everything possesses its own certitude, which is its own essence."
Unaquaeque res habet certitudinem propriam quae est eius quidditas.-94
The concrete identity of discrete individual entity, and haecceitas, among lasting and correctly spelled words, and their
things, and attributes of relation, may be something "Philo" would want to emphasize, from his own experience with heavier weights and advantages, and "Wilson" probably could not agree more about apparent density of an object.
There is a necessary tension and appropriate accomodation in things. Necesse in rebus intentio esse, or esse intentionum habere quod in rebus omnibus necesse. Being
has tension since it is necessary in all things, especially if "Wilson" played Scrabble as fast as lightning bugs and starquest volley ball, floating like a feather, stinging like a bee, and spelling better to run circles around a prison ball and chain.
"Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectur includitur in omnibus quaecumquae quis apprehendit. That which first falls under apprehension is being, which the intellect
includes in all things, whatever they may be, that it apprehends."
Necessity and the measure used to measure remain equal to themselves, and when something like a lucky word in Scrabble
crystallizes, it is unlikely that such a particular score will come again. Not soon anyway, and the way of being, in virtue of the neccessity and distinction of space, ebbs and flows like an alphabet rhyme. The signs and meanings always must fit, as much as
correct spelling and division by one. A missing letter is like a missing tooth, and it is the same one problem, relatio secundum esse, for all the words.
A map maker knows he knows what the descriptive
thing is that is metacognition of place, and the validity of its universal representation in the geometric form of intersecting lines of longitude and latitude around a geographic sphere of location, et cetera. The rule and expression of place prevail both
in cause and effect as much as correct grammar and spelling. Materially, formally, efficiently, and eminently, the one that is real is the one that is closest to itself. Within itself and of itself, through itself in loco etiam, proxissimus suimet sibi enim
in ipso est. The closest one to himself is in his own way also.
The first and simplest necessity of being rests the most, and subsists as something simple after all division. As one precedes that
which is compounded and contingent, the orb and notion of Jupiter in the cosmos is as much a question of logical consequence as anything else. Z and Zed in the line result from the same necessity of A
and B, if it would be impossible for Z and Zed to be false, when A and B and the alphabet are true. And if science counted sheep from Earth to Jupiter, and called the distance and total number an "EJ", as a number and sign of relation it also would have
For virtue and ingenuity then, divide the EJ by the EJ to get one, manent optima coelo; and divide the rest of
the cosmos by the quotient to get the same difference. Where it would represent simple entity qua entity (ens realissimum sed et rationis) it would also be absolute even for universal place.
universal placement, in fact, as Aristotle and Euclid would say, the line from A to B is AB, and there is still no contact in numbers, even for a straight line -- but only separation and succession. Therefore,
since a number is realized as it is, like a color is a color, and chiromancy is in the hands and podiatry is in the feet, so Earth to Jupiter in space is as Jupiter to Earth without contradiction. There is overall unity of forms, as white is in and on rice,
for the extent and measure, and everything that people know and understand is also for some proportion or realization of relation.
For Hume's billiards and everything else, the cause and effect
are in the operation. Five does not cause six, as numbers by themselves do not cause things; but 5 +1 = 6, as the operations in the combinations do. To know the divisiblity of things, like where Jupiter is in the sky, for example, and its relation to Earth, does not require one to follow an unreasonable argument, catch a leprechaun, or discover the infinite home of the gods. It is enough to recognize and understand the unity of words and measures as forms, in as many instances as there may be.
Where there is enough room to fit them in the mind, there is also the scale, and wise people know when a situation speaks for itself. Between
the coincidental, accidental, and essential, good sense may know the relation of the thing-in-itself, as much as there is any straight line from Earth to Jupiter or between any fairway and green. Sarazen's double eagle at number 15 in Augusta, 1935, for instance, and the experienced method of division in virtue of comparison, between straight lines and circles, could be interpreted as another mirror of the golden
ratio even in a wilderness of mirrors.
As if it were from any other universal dimension in space, before he hit the shot, Sarazen said, "they might go in from anywhere". The argument begun from
a gnomon or 4-wood is still the same as the argument from a straight line or putter, and are the same as the argument from a circle, that nothing represents A better than A, and nothing represents B better than B. The shape and temper of thought is in the
extremes and the means, none of which exist without the measure or the score. If ever there was a confederacy of dunces, there always has been a confederacy of numbers and signs, and thoughts can be scanned by measuring the waves.
As much as 1 represents a point and a circle, and 2 is a straight line and a pillar, all numbers are figurate
and confederate quanta in the substance and question of direction, et cetera. For as impossible as it is to get the white out of rice or cotton, and the right eye out of Horace, it is as impossible
to get geometry and the golden mean out of the shape of everyday life and every day thought. Therefore, the sheep in total for the distance to Jupiter from Georgia stand like one measure for all.
Science must know that the measure of things is not only for quantity but also quality, and the double eagle was the best that Sarazen could do. To choose the means and avoid the extremes on either side, if
it would be a wise witness for improvement, it must admit then that both by nature and convention there is no better way or place for Jupiter to go, that it should be so well represented, not other than by itself, than where and when it is. As much as the distance between Earth and Jupiter is the only one that it is, absolute and without contrary, therefore like Sarazen's score card, or the map cover of a book, there is a unique and excellent quality involved for the distance.
For example, Gene Sarazen may have felt there was no better way to describe 235 yards, which represents about
164 sheep, than with a 4-wood at number 15 of Augusta National; and for all the differences and sameness in the cosmos, there may be many people who would agree with him. When there is no contrary in the quantity, and no better representation, there is a unique
sign, et cetera, and the chord.
"The feeling of the world as a bounded whole is the mystical", and name that tune "Das Ding
an sich". Experience and necessity must have something to do with it. As much as there is only one way to spell "bat" or "cat", there is only one series of do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si, do to sing an octave. And there is, at any given time, one straight line
between this point and that point, that are this way and that way from each other, like the centers between Jupiter and the Earth, for example, which for a line could be called a segment and an EJ.
indeed, a quantum leap like that, and when another one lands on it, as simple as it is, it should be easy to find. Like the "a" in cat and bat, and all of the alphabet soup, there is only one measure of the golden ratio that it represents. As a measure of
simple entity in itself for distance, the way that space is between all the stars, and between perigee and apogee, it is the same space from point to point around the world for all the days of the year and twinkling stars, of course.
All the hours of the day are around the Earth at once. Therefore, overrunning everywhere with the simplifying measures of logic, frequency, and form, the great space and outer space contain all the things in themselves, hidden or revealed.
After all, without time, it does not appear that there would be enough total space.
As much as the day of the week and a monumental tooth of megalodon have ratio and proportion, science can be
sure of what many things are, as much as the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself. The vast compass of the oceans, for example, cannot exist without the extremes, and the extremes
cannot exist without the measure. If either of the extremes is destroyed, so the measure. Therefore, it is as difficult to remove the one singular distance that is between the Earth and Jupiter from simple
entity, as it is pure quantity at any given time, as it is to remove the Earth away from itself, or any straight line from geometry, as much as geometry is in all of them.
Straight lines are universally
simple, of course, if some in particular may disappear, but "what is simple cannot be separated from itself".-95 Simplicity in consequence cannot be separated from its existence, "for it does not
have its existence in virtue of some form other than itself",(96) which may be gratifying ipso facto.
If anybody from science would notice the Earth being removed from itself, or losing its simplicty,
from where it is in the means, he should have noticed it spinning and turning in the first place, slip sliding away. There is the simple question of where it is first, if an astronomer should recognize also which star is Jupiter, when it is on the horizon,
and that it goes around the Earth from east to west every day, just like the Moon and the Sun.
As letters go from A to Z, with an a,b,t, a word in Scrabble can go for a "bat". The signs and meanings
are in the concurrence of the what-for and what-how expressed from the primary place. It is with particular and universal virtue then that the necessity of being and the extremes of the measure, and the measure used to measure, remain equal to themselves.
It is a circular function and normal human expression, for example, that everyone would like to have good teeth, and not be struck by bolts of lightning, "to die of thirst beside the fountain,
hot as fire, shaking tooth on tooth". Like a universal for everybody, as much as place is for placement value and placement is a key, the concurrence of relation in the question, also in the substance
of direction, would have the same overall placement, 16 over 16, and not struck by lightning, and not dying of thirst by the fountain.
some fair sense of truth, even for teeth, and to simply recognize that the Earth does not orbit the Sun, but the Sun orbits the Earth, and that the distance between Earth and Jupiter is unique, then "matter and all else that is in the physical world [would]
have been reduced to [only] a shadowy symbolism". But the involvement, the life, the ontology, and the teeth, as well as the place to fit in are unique for all, more to question than shadows,
even if there is sameness among many things and clockwork with difference, and a ghost in the machine.
Divide all things by one to get the same difference, and "with what measure you mete, it shall
be measured to you again", in qua mensura mensi, fueritis metietur vobis.
If reason would be an excellent measure, sensible a solis ortu cardine, for it to be objective it must have contact with
reality. "In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen." It should not be too difficult to admit, therefore, that everyone can tell that the Earth is between a full Moon in Aquarius and the Sun in Leo; and that when the Moon
begins to wane in Pisces it has nothing to do with any rotation of the Earth. "Uniform experience amounts to a proof"(299), and such an observation
is another universal sign with a formal relation in the summer.
As much as Thursday is Thursday, as it always is Thursday, Jupiter is in only one sign at the end of a line at a time, and the Earth meanwhile
is in the same one and all the others, which cannot be without that one and those that are far away going around the other in the middle. The seasons, to be honest, are not just seasons but feelings; and there is a parallel of identity in things and propositions
such that the world must be of a certain kind. The way things are edgewise, therefore, including the EJ, represents a genuine and elementary mystery in the cosmos maybe, that as many stars as there are, ultima ratio, there could be almost infinitely more,
and as many places from the center of an umbrella, even if the when and where are always only one line of direct location along all the meridians.