"Das Ding an sich", the thing-in-itself, and then "das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet", the thing regarded as it is in itself, as it would be itself, if it were, said Kant, to describe his philosophy
that things in themselves are unknowable. The noumenon then the phenomenon, et la différance, and a strange circle of knowing not knowing, where some would ask what is a number and what is a cause?
In accounting, they say assets equal liabilities plus owner's equity, and on one side, some would answer that numbers appear to be abstract objects, yet everything depends on place and surroundings. As well
as that, knowledge that is casual must be quantified. Sometimes too for causes, it may not be easy to tell, lying down, pitchfork in hand, how much one should also be afraid of falling. To the things themselves, therefore, and the derivatives, as much
as knowledge would be for mere accident, and the world can be strange. A surprise as much as the funny farm, where beyond the appearances there may be feelings on occasion and depth that may be difficult to express.
For example, in some rural parts of France there is still the account, or rather the belief, that before an old woman dies the Devil will appear to her as a wiry
little old man with a broom and saucepan on his head. Le petit vieillard ridicule, he makes sudden loud and banging noises, and adumbrations with obscure pronouncements. Then he complains about nutshells, and when he is ready to sweep her out, that is when
she goes. Yet about such things and the fate of mankind in the cosmos who really knows?
Who can tell what is beyond everything
that surrounds us? Who can tell how profound the mystery of the invisible may be, that we cannot fathom with our senses in this world of strangeness and light, darkness and noise, where one can be certain
of nothing. If the Devil can introduce temptations in any book or philosophy of nature, perhaps it is only an irony of criticism then, to be sure of nothing but the uncertain, and mistrust nothing but
the certainties, and find nothing obscure but the obvious, where in the mind there follows an invisible thread -- a question of some synthetic doubt in phenomenology perhaps, where the analyst would
begin to express the opinion that the knowable order of the world, even topology, for example, like the riddle of the Seven Bridges of Konigsberg, would depend solely upon the cognitive activity of the subject rather than on the things in themselves.-1
Since human reason is limited to an awareness and understanding of its own subjective products, it may seem that rational experience has no plane or purpose other than "to prescribe its own formal rules for
the extension of its empirical employment." Hume himself observed earlier that there is no perfect idea of anything, but only of perception; and that "a substance is entirely different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance."
A fundamental question about human reason, also as perception, therefore, is the relationship to reality; and if it were only the idea, it would also be why. Thus in determining reality, for the Kantian outlook,
there is a radical departure in the continuation that happens, in which the intellect of the subject's sense impressions conforms objects to structures inherent in the mind, rather than the external objects of actuality conforming the sense impressions of
a reasonable mind to themselves. For the imaginative philosopher, therefore, there would be nothing better or more convenient to give assurance of the truth than the intellective conception and merely thinking it. Yet that way at times the most important fact
about human reason may become that is clueless about reality.
Of course, nature as an object of knowledge and analysis
is a phenomenon arising from a synthesis of sensations and judgment. However, within the stream of modernist transcendental criticism, what gives those sensations is called unknowable beyond the mere concepts themselves, which already would contain, or be
contained within, structures inherent in the mind. Pure concepts, therefore, may be described as ideas and categories of the understanding, and that way may be said to be wholly independent of experience. With Kant, modern philosophy would continue to
accomplish a fundamental and peculiar inversion of the order of perception and right judgment, such that objects must follow the ways that people engage in thinking about them, and opinion making, if they are that smart or hyper-rationalist for categories,
rather than vice versa.
Thus the key to Kant's theory became the epistemological reversal, almost a mere game at will, which he also called his "Copernican revolution," for it may seem
true at times that what we can know after all is only what appears to be also in the mind, and what remains in itself is intrinsically unknowable.-2 Even for the unmistakable pains of contradiction, the most simple things can never be known to us beyond the
appearances; and the world is a place where things sometimes can change as fast as Bian Lian 變臉, the baffling art of face changing at the Chinese opera.
more, as strong and common a force in nature as the wind, for example, that can knock people down and tear the roofs off buildings, uproot trees, raise the sea into mountains of water, destroy cliffs and cast great ships onto the breakers, is not seen. The
wind whistles, sighs, roars, and rattles the wires without being seen in itself by the naked eye, yet it exists for all that.
Therefore, if what we see is merely the hundred thousandth part of what exists, it still would not be enough for certain knowledge as such, and understanding, since everything changes anyway. As much as the South moves North, the North moves South,
and time marches on, time marches on, et cetera. "The only thing that stays the same is everything changes".
The little old man Kant
would even go so far as to insist that "space and time are a framework provided by our thinking, rather than properties of the objective world,"(3) which, however, is not credible for decent argument, since even irrational animals recognize the same circumstances
of time and place. Certain realities are so openly available that everyone alive can appreciate them, and who should be so blind to the simplest facts, because of their obviousness, that they should be
surprised when somebody calls attention to what everybody ought to know? Llamas and goats in the mountains, as much as men, recognize the edge, and the other animals of creation preserve the simple
belief in external objects in all their natural thoughts, instincts, designs, and actions.(333)
That he saw his change of perspective
as a "Copernican turn", as he called it, was telling. He almost said it all when he said that with his school of thought he would accomplish a "second Copernican revolution". Like the way of Copernicus before, in the circulation of astronomy, and later with
Kantian metaphysics, the modernist instruction would instill an epistemological reversal in the poor noggin as to the natural order of things. For this Kant has been thought by many to be the greatest philosopher who ever lived; and Newton's so-called laws
of motion were the collective paradigm from which he would develop his worldview.
"Kant's system is like Newton's idea of gravity", and "it is close to how we still see the world."-4 If reckoned
as the Master of Modernity in philosophy, therefore, the Master Blaster of Disaster, the mightiest thinker of the thinkers who established themselves along the way of ideas(5), his favorite book of science was the "Principia", which is almost impossible to
read and make sense to retell. Yet as much as Newton, it would appear that the old man took a residual leap of faith in the wrong direction, and fell out of one of Porphyry's trees.
The aim of science as well as philosophy is ultimately to arrive at the words which give a true representation of the world, and it is of primary importance, therefore, to get things right in themselves,
because merely saying it so does not also make it so. "Gratis asseritur gratis negatur", that which is asserted gratuitously may be rejected with equal freedom; and philosophy should never be distinguished unfairly from common sense knowledge or experience,
for there is nothing in it which could not be said in everyday language.-6 After all, "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things".-7
Even if not always by direct impression, "the world divides into facts, as the facts in logical space are the world", and things are usually known
in the way that they are perceived and experienced. The way things are is also the way that they tend to remain, and Copernicanism has a natural tendency to make an embarrassment out of common sense everywhere. To say that it cannot be judged with simple cognitive
awareness on any given day whether the Earth moves is like saying no one can really know the "thing-in-itself", even if it was something so simple as whether the Earth is rolling along like a bowling ball at midday of any given golf tournament. Yet for the
trouble involved, when a scorecard is signed, nothing else is so difficult.
"Since the dogmatic solution is not only uncertain
but impossible", a philosopher would have a way to tell an astronomer or tournament caddy that he cannot know what day it is or the score more than by phenomena of lingering appearances. Therefore, he cannot know what is essential to motion between any golf
ball and the surface of the Earth either, at least not as much as das Ding an sich. The appearances of quality, quantity, relation, modality, space, and concentration may be obvious in a limited sense, but not terribly useful in terms of wider epistemology,
since the conclusion is already contained in the subject, as much as it would only be true by analytic terms of definition and tautology, like an oak tree is a tree, for example.
"Limited to knowledge
of phenomena that it itself has constructed according to its own design, reason cannot know anything outside of itself." Thus one cannot follow with certainty the succession of seasons by the stars either, for example, understanding the passing of weeks, months,
and years, as one would put together a calendar, because logic can have no empirical part; and time is logical, of course, yet the calendar is a foggy burden of empiricism, and all data-based phenomena, ipso facto, leap years and so forth, et cetera. There are the problems of stellar aberration and retrogression, and the difficulties of perigee and apogee, especially of the Moon, and then parallax and people who are late; and these natural phenomena cannot be
continuous like logic, except where it is to know more and more about less and less.
Yet even if the field of synthetic inquiry and equation is narrow, where is reliable proof of the minor, and
what is reality that a just society would be capable of understanding? What are the rules and whose the what is a lost golf ball, in fact? Whose is whose, and where is the cognitive certainty and confidence of common justification in the what-how of existence,
that people should recognize beyond mere schools of opinion? What is the sensible custom of observation and analysis, at the corner or the parking lot, ignotum per ignotius, and obscurum per obscurius?
Et cetera, Nietzsche thought, as he expressed it, that "we are unkown, we knowers, ourselves to ourselves. We men of knowledge remain of necessity strangers to ourselves. We understand ourselves not. In ourselves
we are bound to be mistaken. As far as ourselves are concerned we are not knowers".-8 The curiosity and vanity of things fail, for example, and it is much too difficult to make anything outlast final doom. Even with all good service and examination of conscience
in species and names, "we are surrounded by mystery and cannot understand the common things of life. Nature speaks with a thousand tongues, and each tongue voices an unknown language."-9
"I know nothing"! Sgt. Schultz from the Wehrmacht of "Hogan's Heroes" in TV Land used to say. After all, "ease of
intelligibility is suicide for philosophy". Sometimes he would stomp his boot or the rifle. "Nichts zoviel", nothing too much, nothing in excess. "For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness
of human life," and especially at times for any awkwardness or embarrassment of the secret agreement to avoid the Russian front.
monde est si doux pour les mourants", and if all the strangeness and blind digression of the human race were fixed in the eyes of one man, the expression of an overweight sergeant, a prison guard from the Wehrmacht, perhaps he would say "I know nothing. And
no one will remember me or these terms of discussion anyway."
As so per as much, modern philosophy of existentialism and its phenomenology would say the same about what is behind the camp or city
walls. Inquiring minds, therefore, overrun the subject with absurdity of emphasis, to imagine that it would be knowable at all, even if someone did escape.
So politely, for instance, the thing-in-itself,
as what it would be as an abstract dissertation about "if", and which channel or what drill, as what it would be would be recognizable beyond the passing absurdities of life, in the land of the lost, or which way the Moon goes, or what day it is, and
whether the Earth rotates. If understood as perceived, it only comes again from a world of appearances. Like poetry of leaky buckets at beach city in the afternoon, in its ironic way of confusion, heliocentrism becomes only another "nominalist" school, where
truth exists in theory and name only, not the buckets, the water, or the confusion, and then
"THE apparition of these faces in the crowd;
on a wet, black bough."
Richard Dreyfuss hates Bill Murray ever since, "What About Bob?" and it does not really matter why. In an atrocious second, desire can attain the darkest dread, perplexed,
and so irritated, et cetera.
"De gustibus, non est disputandum," yet even when a man is deceived or sees illusions, he understands what it is to see; and if he only dreams, he still
knows what it is like to be awake. Whether for love or hate, if such an academic reference weight as Kant would say that reality, and finding one's way to a train station of the metropolis, is rather mind-dependent being, not mind-independent being, one can
see how the art of solipsism -- besides that of heliocentrism and Judeo-Masonic deception -- could have become modernity's distinctive intellectual physiognomy.-10
For things to be at all
what they seem or how they would appear was only a naive expectation and generality of life from long ago. "The world is a common world" yet who from today, for example, would expect that "doubt must be no more than vigilance otherwise it can become dangerous"?-10
Nitimini perseverare, endeavor to persevere, if the inevitable must be accepted. Since so many things tie together, from past, future,
and present, the thing or image that is being seen by the eye must exist in some virtue of itself too. For whatever it is is in some combination of case, a process that even if only for an illusion of mood and understanding must include the way that it is.
Unum quoque dissolutur eo modo quo colligatur. Everything is dissovled by the same means that it is constituted.
Nihil tam conveniens est naturali aequetati quam unum quoque dissolvi eo ligamene quo ligatum est. Nothing is so consonant to natural equity as that every whatever-and-so-forth should be dissolved by the same means that rendered it
Nature does not ask permission and "the study
and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective were no practical results to follow".-11 As much as people passing along the wheel of life are bound to construe things like the weather, the calendar, and the world of experience by the most
reasonable way of construction, it is certain that the human mind did not create the first simple attributes of being. Ultimate comparisons in the ones like more or less, greater than or less than, equal to or not equal to, this way or that way, in any instance always have the same relation and already were.
"Our presence bestows
not being on it; our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings who perceive or contemplate it."-333 The human mind did not create pepper, for instance, and this much or
that much. And if people ask, "which came first, the chicken or the egg?" they may also ask, "which came first, pepper or the cook?"
However they look at the question of immanence, as always or
as something to which all knowledge is prepared, the simplest attribution of being comes in and of itself first, and already was, before the natural sense opinion or whatever human synthesis of it came around. The pre-existence of pepper as pepper as such
as it is to tastes and opinions is difficult to deny. From the contradistinction of place, like the day of the week, being the one before tomorrow, das Ding an sich all day long, and being the only one that it is, the measure used to measure remains perfectly
equal to itself.
From the top of the mountain to the bottom of the sea, the table of measures and motions is totally for percentages; and
with such a subsequent mix for content as the human mind in tow, would it be fair to say that any certain and unadulterated truth can be known naturally by the intellect of any poor taxpayer in this life? If to introduce a synthetic measure of things,
the mind of a taxpayer still exists to be known, for sure, as much as his income and his business, if not the other way around.
"Pink Floyd" wondered whether it was wise to trust the government,
and it seems a philosopher may know when he does not know either. As much as a mystified tax collector in pursuit of Willie Nelson, even if he or the other would count on fingers only to see how much it is, "somehwere there is a score being kept".
There is a satellite dish, in fact, with signals coming in, an old farmer's almanac and too many channels to count, and even midget wrestling from Mexico, to ask, "where is all the knowledge that we
lost with so much information"?-13 For instance, out of all the accumulation, with so many channels for content, and whatever it is, wherever it may go on parade, for parallel or parallax, ten has been considered to be the most illuminating and simple crux
among numbers -- versed so well and like no other, for division and order among things, so many things.
So much so that Osiander himself wrote that if hypotheses "provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough." And ten is the unit of the decimal system: "the perfect term of the numbers
derived from the monad"(14), and whatever das Ding-an-sich may be, it must have a number as much as a channel, for nothing exists without a number, or some content, some way that it must be. So too that in the information age of mass merchandising, one sees
that philosophy is not taught as much as engineered, like an algorithm, and sold, and, therefore, also present for content.
An important aspect of a program is whether it accomplishes the intention
of its user, and "if Aristotle were alive today, he would have a talk show."-12 Just look at the TV, a priori to a posteriori. "No ideas but in things, and so much depends upon a red wheel barrow
glazed with rain water beside the white chickens."
For a universal wheelbarrow, formalized ad infinitum in a classroom example, as much as the number ten and poetry of the TV, the substance
of number could be applied to anything within a circle: and everything can fit in a circle. The first four numbers, in fact, provide exemplars that have been thought to contain the whole nature of mathematics, since 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10; and when configured
together, with little neato dots in a neato triangle, they make a radical little pyramid, the lesser tetractys, that appears like a root element in Sierpinski gaskets, and the way things are.
"the laws of mathematics are not merely human inventions or creations. They simply 'are'; they exist quite independently of the human intellect."-15
Thus, with the way the decade works in math, such a thing is not only a matter of opinion from appearance. Chance cannot account for the unique meaning and importance of the number ten, since "what happens
always and in all cases is not the result of chance but is in the nature of things."-16 Simple as one, two, three, and four, every instance of the first ten numbers provides a model of simplification and necessary truths, with which all empirical evidence
must ultimately agree, and which cannot be changed by a surface of illusion.
The number ten is essential and referred by symbolic tradition to things of outstanding excellence, and beginnings
brought to perfection. If anything is brought to perfection, it could be signed over with a ten, since sign relations are ontological, and "of all the numbers from the monad and up, ten is the most perfect."-17 Plato's nephew Speusippis reckoned the decade
"to be the most natural and most creative basis for all things, being, as it were, in itself a sort of model for the things which constituted the universe".-18
Forever fixed at the base of numbers,
the amount of ten produced by adding 1, 2, 3, and 4 comprises the even and odd, square and cube, prime and composite, linear and plane. The decade provides the beginning and resolution of all mathematical extension, and exegesis of material, containing all
the hundreds and thousands and millions and tens of millions within it, et cetera, and all the decimals as well. According to Hughes of St. Victor, ten also represents straightness in faith, the right way to go; and it is the number from which all things come
and to which they must return.
Someone in an old casino comedy routine once asked a friend for change, requesting two tens
for a five. The power of the number hidden in the suggestion is so hypnotic that he said, "can I get two tens for a five", and without thinking about it the friend, who was high on a roll, gave it to him out of a handful of cash he had just won. He suddenly
realized the miscalculation of generosity when he received one five for two tens and remembered that two fives make ten, not the other way around. "Wait a second", he said, "two tens are twenty, not five. You owe me fifteen dollars", but the friend with two
tens was in a rush and had already gone.
So it goes, and "time may consume the speculation of men but it confirms nature".-19
As the way that birds fly, for instance, using their wings, proceeds by two's, so the way that humans see and understand is the same. The power of nature has given man two eyes and five senses for the same reasons that birds have two wings and fine feathers
to fly. Natural motion proceeds by two's, an easy method two-by-two, duo duo faciles; and human intelligence also works by a special method of division in virtue of comparison. Experience "turns you from one feeling to another and teaches by means of opposites
so that you will have two wings to fly, not one”.-20
A simple process of sense and perception, cognitive awareness and duality in the human species is wired to operate along a
line of intelligence, that goes along by noticing "this is" and "these are", and "that is" and "those are", et cetera, duo duo for sensitivities. Rivers know there is no hurry and roll on. Like time, "aequum memento enim rebus in arduis servare mentem",
to save the mind from troubles, remember equanimity first, as much as the things, in arduous matters.
Burn on big river, burn on, and who has not ever noticed, with a view to avoiding confusion, that the way of intellectual distinctions always functions, since it is conducive to knowledge to distinguish one attribute and its property from another?
Exceeding with meekness like Moses, counting goats in the desert, "for Moses was a man unpretentious above all men that dwelt upon the Earth"(21), the number ten would also symbolize first principles, the wheel of fortune, the tree of life, and the overall
power of division in perception, et cetera for sensitivity. And, as to the certitude of first principles, "the terms of self-evident principles are so identical that it is evident that one necessarily includes the other".-22
The overabundant tautologies of self-adherence rooted in the richness of first principles, abound of themselves, of course, it goes without saying; and the power of repetition by analysis in math and nature corroborates many things. "It is not once or twice but times without number that the same ideas make their appearance in the world"(23); and if not for the redundancies of assimilation and contrast, veritas vincit omnia vi divisione,
truth conquers all by a power of division.
It cannot be an accident, therefore, that the best number that fits to divide well the greatest total number and confluence of all things would be ten,
and that mankind would also have ten fingers of fifty-four intricate bones on two hands. Three to the third power for a hand in twenty-seven is like a little exponential trinity, pro manibus; and ten in two hands of five, with some subtle dexterity and intelligence,
is at times like a little sign of perfection or perhaps magic.
Would everything like that and the nature of the world then
only be a matter of appearance, "unknowable in itself", and are appearances always deceiving? Does the human cogitator's capacity lack the power to penetrate the veil of appearance, and grasp the inner nature of reality? Does the octave exist in music with
a root, and the calendar as well, within a sphere or not, if anybody has an ear or knows what day it is? If they do, would it not be more reasonable to reject the intellectual call for despair, and the extreme academic skepticism of some philosophers, by
a) certitude of first principles, and
b) experimental knowledge
c) also with
knowledge of our own acts, and
d) certitude of sense knowledge?
there too much confidence in common sense knowledge among fools, when one would say that he knows well enough what the thing is, in itself, for example, when he also has a dental appointment on Tuesday at 11:30 am? Is there no abscess of truth among mankind,
no consensu gentium in communis, even for the suffering in a bad tooth and the nerve? And what day of the week would it be when the Earth would spin because of Newtonian gravity, to orbit the Sun, and nobody would notice, between lidocaine in the shots and
the dentist's drill?
Is there any truth among general notions, anesthetics, and specific days of the week? What is reality that anyone should
care? Why are some things so difficult to face, and does truth even exist, das Ding an sich? If not, what is the best interpretation of the great silence in all the deception? Even birds know the tropics of the Sun and the seasons, as much as animal intuition
guides a feather, as the measure used to measure allows them as a species in their limit.
In fact, it should be recognized that a natural order exists among general notions, such that one thing can be known from another: for instance, the notion of "being" and the notion of "true". Being, qua qua to be, is the major and
more extensive, as "being is of stronger adherence". The reason for this is that simple entity is primary and something absolute, as much as acutally it is potentially everywhere, whereas truth implies a relation to an exemplar.-24 It follows from experience
that a thing can be known as an entity, even though its truth value may not be clear and perhaps would remain as yet unknown. From this it follows that the thing which is true can be known before its truth value is also known, sometimes by degrees.
The way the mind functions we know that many aspects of things can be grasped by a simple act of understanding and many times a day. In such cases, when the things involved are true, they are also known.
But the truth value itself of some circumstances at times may be somewhat hidden and still reserved, obscure for a while, and recognized only later by an act of judgment. "Simple understanding, however, precedes an act of judgment."-25
Since knowledge of things gleaned from the senses is both of a general and particular nature, in virtue of such knowledge people may judge the truth of things and any occurrence. Nature does not ask permission,
of course, and it is hardly fitting that any nature should exist without its proper activity. The more perfect the nature in question the less fitting that it should lack such an operation, and the proper operation of the intellect is to know the thing which
is true. Then it is hardly fitting that nature should not endow the intellect with the appropriate means and faculties of sense, perception, and reason for such an operation that fits it, namely one such as understanding and recognizing the actual world around
it, and the activity of the day of the week.
case of a first principle, for example, could be that one cannot have boiling water and ice from the same water at the same time. If a quibbler dropped ice cubes into boiling water, the water that boils is not the water that is frozen. The water that is frozen
is never boiling at the same time that it is frozen.
From the very fact that it grasps these things, the intellect perceives and unites the terms in a logical and universal proposition of truth.
By the elemental condition of water, the mind itself has present before it the necessary and evident cause of the conformity of this proposition with the simple terms that compose it. Such an instance of conformity, where the intellect perceives the evident
cause in the terms, cannot help but be known in itself, as the thing that it is, das Ding an sich, and the element water, hot or cold. There is nowhere else for such an ontological and physical basis of experience, as boiling water or frozen ice, to go except
where it is, and by such terms of nature and temperature it always will be the same.
Where it is like that, boiling or frozen, when hot or cold, is a universal way of experience everywhere. The
intellect could not apprehend these terms and unite them so well, in an effective proposition, effective for all times and places of experience, without having the conformity of relationship arise ipso facto between the proposition and the terms. Therefore,
it always must be so, as much as two similar objects could not exist without some relationship of sameness between them.
It is impossible to perceive all this, as the necessary way that it is,
ita est, without perceiving the water in itself. Since such simple terms cannot be combined in a judgment without being true, it is precisely such conformity of a proposition to the terms that constitute
it that makes accurate the truth of natural judgment. So it is that one cannot perceive this proposition and its terms without also perceiving the conformity of the proposition to the terms; and one is, therefore, also perceiving the truth of the element water
as it is the thing-in-itself, as much as the oceans and the seas.
Once there is certitude of first principles, like water and the number ten, for example, it becomes clear how one can be certain
of the conclusions drawn from such principles, since the perfect syllogism is evident from logic and many things in themselves. The accuracy of such judgments depends solely upon the certitude of the principles involved and the evidence of the inference.
As for b), what is known by experience, even though a person does not experience every single individual case, but only a great many, nor does he experience them at all times, but only frequently, still he
knows infallibly that it always goes such and such, and such a way, and holds for all instances of such a thing -- as boiling water, for example, or ice cubes -- as nature would be what it is in itself and whatever the occurrence. He knows this in virtue of
comparison that "whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not free is the natural effect of that cause". The intellect knows this proposition even if the terms would be derived from erring senses, "because a cause that does not act freely
cannot in most instances produce an effect that is the very opposite of what it is ordained by its form to produce".-26
The chance cause in contrast, however, is ordained either to produce or not
produce the opposite of the chance effect at random. But everything does not happen by chance, of course. That would be absurd and worse than a motorcycle sidecar that keeps falling off in a bad spy movie; and if something occurs frequently enough, it is reasonable
to know that it is not coming about by chance; and its cause, therefore, will be a naturally determined cause if it is not a free agent.
Facts gathered from experience -- and their causes and effects
-- are so frequent and numerous that once we find a given nature associated at one time with this accident, and then at another with that, "we have discovered that despite the accidental differences, such an effect invariably follows from this nature."-27
With bears and honey or salmon in the stream, for example, such effects are not the result of what is merely incidental to such a nature, or accidental in the world at large, but are rather the effects of this nature as it is essential in itself.
At times, we may experience the truth of an experimental conclusion, such as "the moon is frequently eclipsed", and granting the validity of the conclusion, because it is a fact, we then proceed by a method
of division to discover the reason. A person may also arrive at self-evident principles after beginning with such a conclusion from experience. In such cases, the conclusion, which at first was known only by experience, now is known by reason of such a principle
with even greater clarity, namely that of a primary kind of knowledge, for it has been deduced from a self-evident principle. Thus it is self-evident that when an opaque body is placed between a visible object and the source of light, the transmission of light
to such an object is prevented by the interference. Such things and first principles known from experience are appreciated most certainly by a demonstration of the reasoned facts.
As for c), people
are as sure of many of their own acts as they are of the self-evident first principles and propositions of philosophy. "There are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized until personal experience, generally of a painful kind, has brought it
home and made it a reality."-28
And it is impossible that something contingent should follow from a necessary cause, and people know well enough when they have a broken leg, like a comminuted compound
fracture, or have fallen into a pit, or must have an abscessed tooth pulled, and that what is in occurrence in those cases is something more than a mere possibility. Human intelligence may discover that what was once a contingency outcome before is not
any more, and that way also apprehend das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet.
There is an order among contingencies anyway, and some proposition is first and immediate, like the one who would
have knowledge of his own acts; otherwise there would be an infinte regress, or something contingent would follow from a necessary cause, both of which are impossible.
As for d), certitude of sense knowledge, "the mind is not merely a vessel to be filled but a fire to be kindled",(29) yet if the candle and cradle of the senses burn, how can a philosopher be sure that what he knows
is not less than spent wax, wisps of smoke, if everything he knows is only an appearance? As he may say himself, he knows "nothing", and if knowledge is only apparent, appearing in the mind by the bridge of mutable and fallible senses, and life itself disappears,
like an apparition subject to change and final mortality, what can one say he really knows except chance and illusion, and that he merely dreams as much as nothing?
Descartes asked, "of what can
I be certain"? "Cogito ergo sum" was his apparent answer, but if the world is continually changing, we can have no certitude about it by any kind of light. For there can be no certitude when an object is known in some way other than the way in which it is,
and it is as impossible to know that which has no way to be even if it would not change. It is difficult, therefore, to say that there is real knowledge among mankind at all, "if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding. For knowledge
too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always be
no knowledge, and ... there will be no one to know and nothing to be known".-30
Even if it could have been this way, it could have been that way, perhaps. Therefore, how things look is only a matter
of probabilities in outcomes. The mind judges about first things and other things too, and the probability of this or that, these or those, and which is which, or would be, could have would have been, and many times it could be either, still going this way
or that, or only one chance of many for only an appearance.
"Only the lonely" and "the Motels", therefore, and what people would say they know of the truth of things is only an ironic line of probability.
And derived from the numerousness of mutabilities, they always could be wrong. In fact, in many cases they are, even for their own acts; and for all the trouble of getting everything right, the assertion of truth yet remains within the resident power of the
mind, even in the case of something necessary which would occasion an act of judgment.-31
"Ecce, maris magna claudit nos obice pontus. Deest iam terra fugae".-32 Behold, the great sea encloses
us with the wall of the deep. There is no more place for flight.
So the logical impasse between mind-dependent and mind-independent being, set forth by Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", would
be so difficult, even for opinionated elevations in the philosophy department, as to not give ground even for the birds, even if the way they fly and the way that humans see and understand is the same, duo duo.
If an ornithologist thinks he can overcome the rigors of philosophical skepticism, because he recognizes the difference between a flock of ducks and the murmurations of
starlings, he is naive, since he does not realize it only is another appearance that he is judging. An innocent fool, he still does not know the thing-in-itself from what it is inside his head; and he might as well tell NASA and the Bank of England that the
Sun orbits the Earth, the Earth is not moving, obviously, and as well the full Moon goes from East to West, when viewed from above the North pole, if he would say that he knows the difference between a duck and a starling. After all, what he knows is not outside
of his mind. What he knows is inside his mind, of course, since he only knows the knowledge as knowledge. The data cannot be handled any other way.
However, even if "the mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions"(334), it does not follow that just because an object is mutable, therefore the knowledge produced may not represent anything under an immutable aspect.
For it is not precisely the mutability of the object that causes the knowledge; rather it is the nature of the mutable object in question that does so, and this nature is immutable.
knowledge produced by it represents the nature itself. And if it is the nature, this nature may have an immutable relation to something, and then both this nature and the other thing to which it is related, each by its own exemplar, are represented as immutably
united."-33 And so by means of two perceived terms of experience, like a starling and a duck, produced by two mutable creatures subject to probabilities, it is possible that a bird watcher may have knowledge of some immutable relations among things in virtue
of their natures.
Numbers and the facts cannot be avoided, and the essence of relation in mathematics itself is represented to the intellect as something immutable. If there is an exemplar, there
must be an example, and if there is an example, there must be an exemplar. In so far as they are natures, one can tell the difference between a starling and a duck mathematically, and see from the individuals that these birds will not fly the same by themselves
or in flocks. Ducks do not cause murmurations, certainly, and they are not as agile as starlings. By the method of division in virtue of comparison, between these two species, and with all the certitude of sense knowledge, an ornithologist can reasonably
say to a philosopher that he knows some immutable principles of relation in virtue of natural motion: and that he knows the thing-in-itself qua qua for the birds.
Otherwise philosophy would end by making even simple things false. And no one of good sense would prefer to put himself, or the education of his mind, under the power of an instruction which condemns him to an unhealthy state of unreality.
For instance, some equations are false and some are true. If somebody wrote that the end of this sentence, as much as the other side of
the card, is true, and when one looked at the end, as the other side, the end said that the other end was false, and that it was true -- or vice versa, if somebody wrote that the end of this sentence is false, as much as the other side of the card, and when
one looked at the end, as the other side, that end said that the other end was true, that it was indeed false, it must be for the non-excluded middle to make any sense of the confusion for which is which.
all, equity abhors forfeiture, and sees that as done what ought to be done, and "virtue grows when the soul keeps the understanding according to nature. It is according to nature when it remains as it was made. Now it was made beautiful and perfectly straight.
For the straightness of the soul consists in the mind's being according to nature, as it was made; as, on the other hand, the soul is said to be evil when it bends and gets twisted away from what is according to nature."-34
Philosophy would not fairly serve a purpose that it would undermine virtue, and that common knowledge should be made so stupid that people cannot know some basic things about birds. "Usually the philosopher philosophizes in order to
resign himself to life, or to seek some finality in it, or to distract himself and forget his griefs, or for pastime and amusement"(35), yet not to be made dumb. Nature in the balance has been so wise, after all, that she has not been content with dividing
men into happy and unhappy, wise and foolish, but she also gives to the wise the spirit of wisdom, and to the foolish the spirit of nonsense, e.g. 1 + 2 + 3 ... = -1/12, as reckoned for an "infinite sum identity" at Cambridge.
Therefore, if it is true that a mutable object, even in so far as it is mutable, would yet signify something immutable, how is it that its relation to another thing
is immutable? The relation is immutable in the sense that the opposite relation could not exist between the extremes, and neither could the relation be non-existent, given the extremes. If one or both of the extremes would be destroyed, then the relation in
them is also destroyed, yet the formal quality of the relation is destroyed only in the things, not in itself, since quantity has no contrary and entity is simple and absolute: and every relationship should have some attribute of number and also of being,
qua qua, the way they fly, and so forth.
"Knowledge is the wing wherewith we fly to Heaven," and the extremes of the measure cannot exist in thought without possessing the necessary identity
in question, more or less. They may always exist as such, as such and such, as much as the mind itself would be an object of knowledge and invovlement in the world of physics and the truth, and a vehicle for intelligent investigation. If the identity did not
exist, Das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet, then the quanta and the way of it would not exist either, of course. If the number property of a number, as much as any number, did not exist, at least
from the first of it, then nothing would exist, since the first property of being is as ordinal as a number in itself, that namely could be called the number "1", and the primary one before many.
and understanding, not ony wisdom, are matters of experience and taste; and division by one from the beginning is the most simple way for things to be perceived the way that they are. It works in everything, for all continuations, more than gravity or the
speed of light. It should become evident with enough time that even a trifle among trifles can be represented under an immutable aspect, even as it is mutable in itself, and the thing-in-itself can be known in both cases.
Knowing things and their relations by division, like the geometry of a golf ball, for instance, the logical essence of existence may be represented to the intellect as something immutable, by something radically changeable and perishable,
like any golf ball itself. People know that geometry and algebra have not been lost, cast out of the cosmos and uprooted by cruel fate, when a golf ball disappears, going out-of-bounds or landing in the lake.
If a golfer has three sleeves of golf balls, and one loose extra in his bag, he knows the thing-in-itself and the number ten in the amount with the certitude of sense knowledge as much as philosophy. And wherever it goes, a golf ball always
lands between one place and another. That is the only way that it can be. The arrow of direction in flight cannot go in two different or opposite paths at the same time. From a principle as old as the hills, when one has seen one side of where the shot lands,
one also has seen the other from which it came. As sure as Janus and timeless geometry, when one has seen one side or face of the shot, he has seen the other that was in the circle, and that way also the link that was in the face of the club.
If a right-handed player tees off, and hits a curving shot that goes off to the right and almost lands in the lake, he hit some sort of a slice. If a left-handed players tees off, and hits a similar curving shot that
almost lands in the lake, near the first shot, he hit some sort of a hook. Between right-handed and left-handed players, and all the shots and sides of the game, there are self-adhering and immutable principles of relation that are essential in physics and
geometry, that do not go away. There is something more to it than mere coincidence or a series of accidents.
Even if a golfer has lost all his golf balls and thrown his clubs into the lake, the
formal qualities of mathematics, of surface area and volume, remain definitive, covering all sides; and without the proper delineation of quantitative attributions provided by geometry, mathematics itself would become just a heap and nonsense. Atomic theory
at its worst still requires figures on paper, and without the geometry of space, no score card and its math would make any sense. Even average golfers know that about the game and the thing-in-itself, even if they just call it life.
With the Kantian style of rationalism in phenomenology, however, "perceptions come only from the senses where there is no grasp of necessity, but only of conjunctions and associations of phenomenon"(36), et cetera. But the scientific
necessity realized when a player's ball has gone to the bottom of the lake is common to everyone who sees it, and is not a matter of what is only inside somebody's head. Phenomenal play cannot continue from the bottom of the lake. He must take a penalty drop,
and in taking the penalty, he can also recognize again that "gravity" is not a lateral force. Thus the necessities encountered in an honest score card are not only from the mind, even if they say golf is mental, but they also procede from nature itself, das
Ding an sich.
"Knowledge of a principle is immutable
in the sense that it cannot change from truth to falsity".-37 An intelligible species of the truth (the natural what-how that instantiates it) may perish or disappear, as a golfer may die or quit the game, or lose all his golf balls; but the true facts of
a slice or a hook, or whatever kind of shot, continue and remain unable to change from a true to a false representation. As a result, fundamental principles of nature are able to conform knowledge to themselves, and cause knowledge of truth by being what they
are, for "true entity, unable to become something false, virtually contains true knowledge immutably".-38 That which is necessarily and immutably true may also cause evident knowledge of itself in the mind, and such truth is not subject to the mind, so that
it could appear true or false in some way of probability or opinion.
The truth itself cannot be made false, even if clouded by knots and confusion of appearance. Not all men are liars, and the
Cretans have not conquered the world. In many cases liars and Cretans still know and remember the truth, and that true entity at the root is unable to become something false. That way true knowledge is contained virtually in many things, even the tongues of
liars, and in the ways they actually are; and even when people see illusions and mere after-images, there is still certainity that they see.
"Ce qu'on appelle une raison de vivre est en même
temps une excellente raison de mourir.” If one has found a reason to live, it also may be an excellent reason to die. And if someone dies without completing a project, and it appears that the knowledge involved is lost, others may rediscover the same
ideas from the same principles on their own, and accomplish more, since the results that would follow the practice and skill of any art in whatever things are inherent by nature.
are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them. In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting;
and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all."-39
Gene Sarazen, who invented the sand wedge from the wing of an airplane, said "the more I practice, the luckier I get", and the principles themselves are not extinguished with the death of an individual. Because they operate at a formal level of sameness, they will always be the same for whomever he would be who would discover them later, and the same knowledge again, in whatever different circumstances. Amicus est tanquam alter idem, and since
"everything has been said"(40), "it is hardly to be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of the past".-41
If a philosopher does
not meet the standards of a reasonable man, but instead is a quibbler, there is no reason for the innocent to suffer his trifles and doubts, or the absurdity of his pain. "By the dog of Egypt, are the good not wise?" asked Socrates, and an equitable court
does not have to suffer the argumentative testimony of fools that facts are not obvious. Rather, the determination of a reasonable man "is not merely a matter of speculative curiosity; it may be of the most important service to the science of man and of the
social system. It ought necessarily to precede every other inquiry into social physics, since it is, as it were, the basis."-42 And as well "it is indeed a great gift of God to possess right, plain common sense".-43
One way that people can be confident of certitude by sense knowledge is understanding that "either the same things appear opposite to different senses or they do not appear so but rather all the senses knowing such an object judge the same
about it".-44 If the latter be the case, then there is natural certainty, perceived by the senses, in virtue of the principle that "what occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural effect of this or that thing."-45
For instance, if the same change or result occurs repeatedly in the majority of cases of any objective sequence, it follows that the transformation and image produced is the natural effect and paradigm of such and such a cause.
As a paradeigma, παραδειγμα, of a short trip to the country, if the engine of a car is run without coolant for the radiator, and it blows out on the road,
and sits smoking by the way, the external thing that is known and experienced will be such as it is and naturally appears to be, according to the image in sequence so frequently produced by the power of that cause and effect, etc.
People pasing by the way also have a natural sense of the measure that obtains in things. There is even some general agreement about the nature
of justice. As Socrates described it, justice is a penetrating power which passes through all things. The subtlest of principles, the great measure of measures, it is a power which nobody and no survey can keep out. It is the element which superintends over
all things, and some would even say that there is at times a great mystery about it, as it remains the chief das Ding an sich selbst betratchtet, and perhaps the hidden cause of the world.
If the judgment of different senses differs in regard to what is seen outside, people may still be certain of what is true and in common, and know which sense is in error. For more certain than any sense
judgment, there also is an intuitive circle of logic, immanent within a reasonable mind, that is there to set the intellect aright, when one of its senses may err in a given instance. This faculty within the mind ferrets out specifics, species, generalities,
and categorical facts and enthymemes for the intellect*, to capture and isolate which acts of the senses are true and those which are false. The senses themselves do not cause but merely occasion this faculty of the mind to operate in view of the intellect.
For instance, if sight says that a golf club that is partly in water and partly in air is broken, or that the Sun and Moon are smaller than they really are, in all such instances we are still certain of what
is true and may know which sense is in error. In the case of the golf club, the intellect naturally retains the proof that "the harder object is not broken by the touch of something soft which gives way before it". This proposition is so simple and evident
that upon analysis of its terms no reasonable mind could call it in doubt, even if the terms were derived from erroneous senses. Indeed, the opposite of this proposition includes a contradiction that makes it impossible.
Now the sight, touch, and sense of every man attest that a golf club is harder than water, and that water gives way before it. That way the common intellect judges without difficulty that the golf club is not broken from simply being
in the water. So it goes with other cases, where the terms may be derived from erring senses, the intellect yet knows that the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself, and so it goes in all things. An element of simple logic stays within
the rational mind to revisit the intellect more surely than the testimony of the senses, in cases where an illusion would linger too long.
If sight says that the Sun and Moon and all objects
in the distance are smaller than they really are, the common understanding is still certain of what is true and knows which sense is in error. Without trouble the intellect knows that the identical measure can be applied to a nearby object of vision
as well as to any distant object. Therefore, the actual size of an object is equally the same whether seen from up close or far away. Sight errs, consequently, when it says that ships, planes, and cars shrink as they go away into the distance.
So let each man have the wit to go his own way, and from any corner under a cloud of light to the Sun, the same feet that are present and near are not greater in size than when they have wandered far away,
and are a hundred or two hundred yards distant, "since reason can and must give a full account of its own procedure".-46
To be vomited de phénoménologie out of the belly of a peculiar
fish and close a little chapter on Kant, with fair reason, therefore, one must conclude that when the intellect determines that the senses err, it does so in virtue of two appropriate ways of knowing, recognizing, and discerning the thing-in-itself. These
two operations could be called the imaginative and the ordinary, which correspond well enough to both human ideas and cognitive impressions.
The first is an imaginative and rational kind of knowledge
reposing within the lens of the mind, which requires the sense only as an occasion and not as a cause. This imaginative faculty also represents an authentic level of objective awareness among ideas, and an area of definition in which the intellect could not
be deceived, even if all the senses were deceived. There should be no doubt that as long as simple logic and justice to the subject prevail, and have not been undermined, and as long as they remain the universal measure in all things, that self-evident
principles and the perception of their attendant images offer repeated testimony for common inference of the truth, and das Ding an sich.
The second way of ordinary cognitive impression, "qui in
duo equa dividitur", proceeds by estimation and appreciation from an ordinary frequency of concurrence in knowledge, that is acquired by the oft-repeated testimony of the senses, which things are known to be true and reliable by the simple proposition that,
"whatever occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural effect and indeed the occurrence of such and like things", etc.-47
* the interpretation here is that the intellect is the memory and understanding, the mind is more the will
Partially successful except for set theory ... "logic does not appear to assert the existence of objects."
Professor Pluentes, University of Chicago
For place and time are counted among all the things that have been created. Locus siquidem et tempus inter omnia quae creata sunt computantur. Periphyseon I.468c
"We're off to Scotland," said Tom clandestinely. "That way, the desire for knowledge,
like the thirst for riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it."-48
"I used to be a paratrooper,” he explained, and "if looked at closely enough, with sufficient thought, there is
only one thing to do about everything". So go ahead, and no one with the strength of common sense can accept the claim from a philosopher that he cannot know something as readily simple and common as the divisible present. After all "presence is always divided", and it does not have to be profound.
For instance, the bubble of French intellectuals, and before communism in Paris there was "Snow
White and the Seven Dwarfs"; and there are about four mintures for any degree of arc of the ecliptic. Such knowledge functions also for a sign of relation, to understand and appreciate things, for all the world not just the stars; and the minutes at times,
in this or that turn, may be as simple as an interpretation of the lines at the post office, or bricolage and traffic of the road.
moment rules over everything", and Tolstoy, for one, regarded the present with utmost importance, since he presumed that it is the only time when we have any power: and if anything is known for sure and certain, it is the power and reality of division by one,
since it touches all things singly and together. The mind, therefore, "which is good for anything follows the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them."-48 Since knowing and understanding, "may be regarded as a kind of conclusion",
and implies "the progression of the mind in company with the nature of things,"(49) the right way is as important as anything that would be better, and the what-how and now that exists wherever anyone opens his eyes is not too difficult to see.
There is a pulse, in fact, and twitter, even in the optic nerve, that registers what is seen in the visual pathway about as fast as the "speed of light". If knowledge like that is like magic,
and seeing is believing, without some acuity of vision and intelligence of perception who would propose to recognize, measure, or discuss the speed of light anyway?
From the peanut galleries of
the internet, an anonymous voice said that Socrates said, "the beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms". Although this text today is impossible to find, Antisthenes said that "the investigation
of the meaning of words is the beginning of education"; and for terms, the divisible present in its larger sphere can be as simple as Scrabble, or finding the way to Scotland from the Hebrides, or Edinburgh, or St. Andrew's.
It was not Scota but Cleopatra who cried deep in denial, "do not let me drown in Egypt". And as much as they say, in deconstruction, "Il n'y a pas de hors-texte",
there is nothing in existence without its relation to the here and now, and nothing without the present. Without the present, there is no past or future, and without these there is not much time, "si nous pouvons dire", which even God would transcend, "si nous nous souvenons d'un peu".
If he can, an omnipotent being may transcend "the countless series of years and flight of ages", and monuments
"more lasting than bronze", but not nothing, since it does not make any sense to say that a Supreme Being transcends nothing. However, without the present now, quod adhuc est, time itself obviously would become like nothing, if it were possible. But that is
impossible, for something that God transcends to become nothing, since even God cannot transcend nothing, even for a little while.
See the inspection, at the library or the parade, that any parallel
of transcendence, for any instance of even one of the least among many little one's, like simplest this to that, for even a little while, that
also would involve God in any way, that could be such as would be for any elevation, even if only in a small way, always is and must be. Some sort of creative circle attends everything, and
life indeed is a reality to be experienced. If the sea encloses the land with the wall of the deep, and there is nowhere else to flee, in an impasse of impossibility, it becomes evident that hidden in the present is a universal form of ontological necessity.
Therefore, with reason and the fullness of geometry, and geography, science must say that a bridge is a bridge is a bridge, as much as the lack of a way out or across is not, and the Firth of Forth is the Firth of Forth and not the Dardanelles, et cetera.
From one location, one hour is never another, and for one town it never is two days of the week at the same time. As much as the day is always changing its place from midnight around the Earth, space is the
place for all the days of the year, of course, and time functions in a circular pattern of identity like waves. "One must always try to see the truth of a situation. It makes things universal,"(51) and one of the mysterious things about now is that whenever
it is, it always is local as much as it is more than that.
"Whenever he thought of the past, it brought back so many memories,
that sometimes he could not let it go".-50 He was only a clown, but if the here and now are the thing-in-itself, hic et nunc, everyone should know it as much as the day of the week, that follows in sequence, the succession going 1,2,3, under the
cope of heaven. For it is impossible that the same thing be and not be, or that the same thing be all red and all green all over. Therefore, the divisible present and fairness in observation of right judgment are not only a question of time but also of
place, "hic et ubique", and the "now" of them is also everywhere.
It may be impossible to get rid of, even if meaningless or
absurd, since there still comes the sentence that is meaningless or absurd, yet that would try to express something to be heard. Therefore, if all things known to mankind by experience and self-talk, were withdrawn from the cosmos, and all the world was made
perfectly deaf, it would still be impossible to ever withdraw those properties which are strictly attributive to substance, and "now" is such a case of connection.
Since substance is ultimate,
and not to be strange, it may even become like the representation of a corporate body. And suppose then, in the manner of an empirical idea of a body, or a vehicle like a car, that science successively removed all its empirical constituents, such as color,
passability or impassibility, consistency, weight, monthly payments, and so forth, then science shall find it still impossible to remove as well the space that it occupied.-52
Like Fontaine's parable of the fox and the crow, if ever there is a strange feeling from obviousness, "un sentiment etrange de l'evidence", it may be well to remember that "tout
flatteur vit aux dépens de celui qui l’écoute". All flattery lives at the expense of pleasure, and space itself may as
well remain indifferent to such things, since space may provision objects, but objects do not provision space.
glimpse or discern the riddle, if it is, that "hoy es siempre todavia". Today is still always. It always is today.
"Adivina adivinanza, entre el vivir y el soñar, hay una tercera cosa.
Adivínala".-53 Between living and dreaming is a third part. Guess it, guessing it as the continuation, if there is one.
all means of experience and logic then, if it is somebody's turn to move in a game, it is that way now for the entire game at the board and also in concurrence for everywhere else. Since entity is absolute and quantity has no contrary, "numbers must be just
what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number."-54
So it goes that the science of numbers
"can have a foundational status lacking in any other form of knowledge,"(55) including when it is somebody's turn. For the most mysterious substance constitutive of whatever place in space too, "mathematics
consists of necessary truths which cannot be changed by empirical evidence".-56 And it would not really make fair sense for science to count numbers and numbers and crunch them over so many people's heads without including the principles and proofs of geometry
for background analysis.
Of course, by some ontological necessity then, as much as any world of fondness from reflections, mathematics would even seem connected to theology, or at least second
sight, which the Scottish call intuition, and the theory of the sphere also, where there is the direction called "up", where people look on high, or "up above", to see if anything good may come from higher realms, et cetera. For if empirical knowledge would
be regarded as fallible, mathematics would yet remain infallible. So the infallibility of mathematics could be regarded as having a source beyond the human, even as it includes simple arrangements around a counter or at a table.
Then the fundamental characteristic that sensible people should know in common about das-Ding-an-sich-selbst-betrachtet is that, like "now", and other windows and doors, or somebody's turn at a game, it is divisible, even if it would
be everywhere and here at the same time. After all, Satan, for his part, assumes that "all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them" are his. He said further that he would sift poor St. Peter like
wheat, and the cognitive impression of divisibility that comes from human experience is unmistakable, and everybody knows it as well as dust in the wind.
"Pulvis et umbra sumus", we are
but dust and shadow, sometimes sifted in a handful of worry.
"All dust is the same dust.
To go peacefully
And enjoy the eternal nap."-57
thought that is unopposed to ordinary notions, even if wormwood and gall, as compassed within the domain of reason, recognizes that the sphere of now is as comprehensible as any bookstore receipt, and everywhere too, "ubique". Since the divisible present abides
comprehensively, one thing leads to another by nature, whether by contact or succession; and even little trivial things add up, for example, if people take note of them, and have a way of becoming connected.
the old philosophical contention of the one and the many, now always adds up. If "all that is transitory is but a metaphor",(58) the divisibility of transition at least must be something real, a knowable thing-in-itself, otherwise mankind would not know the
breath of despair, and the way of living in denial as well as he does. Escapism too, and the passages of existential doom, quo vadis, quo vadis, and a turning of descents with age and pain, are like a ritual that is impossible for many if not all to avoid.
"Desire is poison at lunch and wormwood at dinner; your bed is a stone, friendship is hateful and your fancy is always fixed on one thing."
facilis descensus Averno
noctes atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis.
The gates of hell are open night and day
Smooth the descent, and easy is the way
And "with every increase in the degree of consciousness, in proportion to that increase, the intensity of despair
increases: the more consciousness the more intense the despair".-59
Kierkegaard and the metaphor of oblivion would not exist without the extremes, and the extremes must exist beyond the veil and
curtain of appearance, because there is no other simple way. Even at the worst, the simple way is best, and the best is always good enough, since things must also be in themselves as well as others. If it seems to be a pain or not, besser ist besset,
und das beste ist gut genug.
Like putting one's toe in the water, one knows the water and one knows the pool. It should not be too difficult to understand, without having to put one's toe
in every single part, that that sort of knowledge should not be a problem for a philosopher, to comprehend das Ding-an-sich, and that the Earth does not rotate or orbit the Sun.
The caverns of
hell may be smoky lakes of fire, yet
.. to return, and view the cheerful skies,
In this the task and mighty labor lies.
If there is any faith left in the earth, "nothing is more active than thought, for it travels over the universe, and nothing is stronger than necessity for all must submit to it." Therefore, simplicity of
intention is common to beatitude, for it constitutes the happy form of peace, and "to be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being."-60
"We seek happiness by our very nature
and man's happiness consists in understanding,"(61) since the intellective form, in fact, is proper to man.
For example, as an illustration, there was a clown at the UN who admitted to the audience
that he was driven by an interest in entertainment and popularity. He confessed that he would "collect moments", as he called it, as he went riding his highwheeled bicycle by the Rockefeller Compound of the UN.
"This operation, in fact, in which such felicity of intention consists is in me too, formally, and is part of the act", he said.
A jolly man of bells, balls, and whistles,
to all the social theory of the central banking system 2018, and to heliocentrism as well, he liked to toot his horn for contracts and wave to the innocent children. He was a splash in his colorful costume and make-up, and would carry tunes all of a sudden.
It was a little strange, kind of funny, but "sunshine almost always makes me high", he would sing at favorite moments, when he would do funny pratfalls and slapstick routine by the Judeo-Masonic Foucault pendulum, which he knew was one of the most absurd hoaxes
in all humanity.
For the history of the world is stranger than an octopus: driven damped, and tuned.
"Sunshine on the water looks
so loverly", and the angels who sing know that between any extremes there is always something there.
"We have a little commotion", he said for proof, tapping his over-sized old leather shoe, "and
a wave of sweetness shoots through me from top to toe when the sun shines. Esse quam videri", he declared, "for a clown. So it goes a long way, if all the world were a birthday cake, and you should take a piece, but not too much."
"The difference between a philosopher and an actor", he said one time, when he took a dangerous spill from his highwheel bike, "is that an actor knows what he's doing, and he can feel it more" he added.
"Drinking as thinking's no good, if you don't feel it," cried an unknown man from the crowd.
"Almost all absurdity of conduct arises from the
imitation of those whom we cannot resemble"(62), the clown replied. He dusted himself off as needed, and should it be that the idea that there is no fair explanation of comportment, as such-and-such in common, would be accepted?
For some it may become an apodeictical reflection of apperceptive apprehension, if not a matter of direct intelligence, that the shortest distance between two points is forever a straight line. After all, there are two sides to everything,
and "he that keepeth justice shall get the understanding thereof".-63
Yet "there is no understanding where there is bitterness,
and the heart of a fool is like a broken vessel, and no wisdom at all shall it hold."-64 Even that way, an inattentive clown with a touch of schizo-affective disorder, lost among bicycles and volkswagens, may fall into the accidental subsistence of nothingness
one day. "We can regard our life as a uselessly disturbing episode in the blissful repose of nothingness"(65), said one, yet memory makes a mirror, sine qua non, that dwells as much as it informs.
it could have happened anywhere, therefore, some occurrence of authenticity, and a little circle of intelligence, it could have happened in pure space perhaps, yet as much as the hand writing was on the wall at Belshazzar's feast -- mene, mene, tekel, upharsin
-- and not at the North pole, locality has some definite scale of importance, and time is easily fixed by events. Certain places and events have an atmosphere all their own, like words, names, and memes; and at times there comes an affective rapport, even
for what could be called a sort of universal fame and declination by the stars.
For some the occasion of place, at times, may create a special sense of awareness, viz. das Ding an sich selbst
betrachtet. In its own way then, between mind and cloud, and tower, the sense of verbal awareness and etymology of location, as much as place, may become of the greatest importance for reflection and access to meaning. And as much as any castle and its drawbridge,
"without knowing the force of words, it is impossible to know more."66
If the question is how do we rightly know about the
world then, and that the Earth does not orbit the Sun, for example, and what is possible for the human mind to know beyond that, it may be an equivalent status question, not unlike a game of Scrabble. If one says "the world is everything that is the case",
and another says "the world is the totality of facts, not of things", can we not all still get along?
There are games in life, and Charades, and a holy mountain with clouds on top, where the gods
look down to see what nations and contracts will do. "For our God is a gallant foe that playeth behind the veil," yet language can copy reality precisely and completely. Wherefore Scrabble may be an interesting way for a circle of intelligence to develop,
as much as there are governments, entertainment, and money. And if it were like Charades, "where the lightnings meet", at times the best outcome may prove difficult to win.
Without the right letters, words may become difficult or impossible to spell. The circle of perception and the bag of tiles are like a well for the intellect, in view of the mind; but if one does not draw the right
letters, and the well runs dry, he may be left "naked as a blade"; and he will have to exchange, which could cripple his standing and his score.
Most Scrabble players prefer to place small, low-scoring
words that get rid of one or more of the letters they do not like, instead of executing the swap maneuver. If the situation arrives that one simply cannot place a word on the board at all, then he can swap out the letters that he does not want, and choose
from the remaining pile of unused tiles, as he would when replacing letters he has already successfully put in the game. "The supreme accomplishment", said Arnold J. Toynbee, "is to blur the line between work and play", and learning rare word lists may help
a professional obtain higher scores, and win a little money. Q, V, J, X, and Z are difficult letters, for example, but sometimes may allow placement of a winning combination, and so forth.
as sounds and letters go in the right place, in words, there are natural relationships of veriloquium hidden between different meanings and the ways that people have of saying how things are. Some are as obvious as the similarity of divisibilty and visibility,
for instance, as well as diversion, which show right away that the powers of division and vision go together. "Omnia Gallia in tres partes divisa est", just as the one who wrote it could also see it, like "visa", of course.
There are TV commercials, muchos colores, passaporti, countries, and credit cards, and people almost everywhere who, like Billy Pilgrim, can see the visible since it is divisible, and see that every Visa
account starts with a 4, but the indivisible is invisible. Hidden from natural sight, the indivisible and invisible, perhaps invincible, home of the immortal gods is far away it seems, even from airplanes, and difficult to find.
Without some special magic, to cross the Rubicon with a legion was one thing for Caesar, yet it would be another to catch a strange and mysterious bull like Jupiter by the tail. Even for a bucolic moment, however, some things impossible
to take back may be worth the danger, if not the horns, and the Spanish verb "divisa, divisar", which means to see from afar, shows the same intuitive sense of things: that to see and grasp with understanding in natural terms is also to divide. Like the Latin
verbs dividere and videre, the experience is what counts.
It is aesthetically pleasing and a blessing of nature, of course, to see that humans have two eyes, which also parallels the way affection
produces knowledge and understanding. What the eye sees will also depend to some degree on what is sought, with a little preference, a poco a poco, and people develop a dominant eye as much as they develop a dominant interest or taste. And one must admit that
if he likes something in itself, or even merely the appearance, even if it is only a word that he wants to spell, he should also know what it is, as much as it would come close to the apple of the eye. For what is in the apple of the eye touches the soul,
and the soul is the principle of life, "the ordering and containing principle of all things".68
In Scrabble, like life,
every player gets his turn. It may be interesting to note as well, that when people correct the spelling of a word, they say "now that is correct", like it is already understood that there is always something more correct about "now" itself, the proper sense
of which is not only is a matter of time but also of place, of course. "There is a place for everything, everything in its place", said Franklin, and if there is a when, there is always a where.
the hours and minutes of the day are around the Earth at once -- yet it is still better, if it always is today, that we should hold our destiny in ourselves, more than in the stars, since any natural desire like a chance to win at Scrabble, or know more about
words cannot be in vain.-69
As much as the little days of the week, and the cosmology of the stars have theirs, confusion should not reign over places; and everybody wants his turn, and everybody
wants to be a winner, certainly. At least that much is known for sure and certain about the divisible visible present, and the sphere of das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet that humans inhabit.
"The whole collection of rules applies to anybody"(71), and from words about science to space and philosophy, proper spelling, pronunciation, and inner direction of meaning and content are no accident, any
more than the number ten or the elements of which it may be composed. The circle of return for any feeling of certainty can only remain open, for things that would come back must continue in substance. For instance, Bellarmine and Socrates knew that the location
of the Earth within the cosmos was central, and what the difference would be between hemlock or a dental appointment, for example, instead of a round of golf or fishing trip. And "to assert that
the earth revolves around the sun is as erroneous as to claim that Jesus was not born of a virgin".-72
So it goes without saying, that the days of the week and months and seasons of the year fall
in where they belong like circular functions. The meaning is as natural and conventional as because and the correct spelling.
It is the smallest things sometimes that may start us seeing anew: a glimmer of light reflected in a river or mountain lake, a little aureole of visibility, that owing
to the three dimensions of space would also be the center of another sphere, and some particle of a day, et cetera. Like sundrops on cars, "one may conceive light to spread successively, by spherical waves".-73 And
"without light, vision is impossible and that the inner part of the eye consists of water is easily intelligible, water being translucent" and divisible.-74
Nothing can describe better the smallest point of division in space than a tiny circlet of light. Since there
is no mote or particle that can be understood without its division and a light, which provide some simple form of distinction, as in Scrabble so in life. For the expression of intelligence, therefore, it could
be like any little consonant or vowel may become important; and for the same universal sound, the circle always comes close to the same difference.
As much as treasure maps and pirate skulls and bones, necessity has an excellent way of coveting influence, like sticks and stones between words and things, and also for the flower of understanding, where the eye creates its
own reflection. Since any primary status is formal, like division by one, and space is a prime concept, whatever exists is also inevitably part of some triangle. Since there is no math or number without its
trigonometry, between that object where there is some light, and another that is close or far away, is some space of an instance; and the places these two points represent are not infinite, because,
like any visibility by divisibility, a simple plane in itself is not infinite, any more than one of its lines.
"... and geometry, nevertheless,
advances steadily and securely in the province of pure a priori cognitions, without needing to ask from philosophy any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental conception of space," etc.-75 And perhaps a mirage and the French Foreign Legion would prove something too, where all around is the open desert air and unbroken sky, for a corner of the mournful kingdoms of sand.
"O, Sunlight! the most precious gold to be found on Earth." Beyond despair, beyond the debris and debts of modernity, nous allons enfants de la patrie. Le jour de gloire est arrivé ... marchons, marchons, liberté, liberté,
chérie des rêves, et cetera ...
"Without doubt, good infantry is the sinews of an army" ... and
"How many miles to Babyland?
Anyone can tell
Up one flight, to the right
Please to ring the bell"
Merely a line or the plane of an argument is not enough, however, for everything to be all right; and in space, there is always a third separate point, that is not of the same placement or direction and radius as the first two, since everything
cannot go only one way. Therefore, it is apodeictically clear for all retro-analysis that from any first point there must always follow at least two more and a triangle. If there are so many triangles, as there would also be so many points, as much as tiny
bubbles in the wine, then there also must be so many pyramids, boxes, and spheres, and places or destinations, et cetera.
even for all the destiny in the little people, and frogs, if they added up all of the things in space and all of the time, it could not take up all of the area, qua orignis infinitum. Not more than tiny bubbles, unless it were infinity caught somewhere in
the mix of an infinitesimal. There is no summation of objects or fine points that is infinite anyway as much as there is no largest prime. Therefore, another way to consider the big picture is that infinity will never run out of room, as infinity cannot be
overcrowded or cramped for space, even in an elevator or bottle of wine.
In the 5th century BC, Socrates described justice "as that which penetrates all things"(76), including intelligence and
reflection; and Kant described judgment as the faculty or power "for thinking the particular under the universal".-77. To be fair to the subject, Kant then went on to some length to distinguish transcendental apperception from empirical perception.
In epistemology, to summarize, apperception is the "introspective or reflective apprehension by the mind of its own inner states."-78 For philosophy then, the question whether one knows something also becomes
a question of metacognition and self-conscious percolation, which is "cognition about cognition", "thinking about thinking", or "knowing about knowing". There are generally two features of awareness involved in metacognition: namely the knowledge of the notion,
and the regulation of the cognition as it happens as well.
If it may seem elusive, mostly a resource for meta-headaches, to
investigate the best interpretation of some of the obscurities of metaphysics, that turn around metamemory and metacognition, it yet should become apparent one day, via studious contemplation, that
truth and right judgment concur with the realists, and that the concurrence also must be substantial. After all, if one has a vision, but not the correct sort of diligence, it could be for nothing and only complications. Even for a poor way of subsistence,
the best reward for diligence is love. Where "love is patient, love is kind, it always hopes and perseveres, and love never fails"(79), even in austere irony, there may also be some benevolence in reality.
If at one turn a philosopher describes judgment as the faculty or power "for thinking the particular under the universal", at another point of triangulation he could say
as well that it is the faculty or power for considering the universal under the particular: and, when and there, where he spies the form of a universal, he can be certain that he has also spotted the thing-in-itself, and something substantial, for in those
cases there can be no other way.
To the mind of a reasonable man, therefore, it becomes apparent one day that living reality is substantial, and a composite of at least two dimensions, duo duo
faciles, an easy two by two, that manifest in matter and form. As entity is absolute, yet governed by form, ultimo ratio, it follows by logic that there are also at large an extensive set of abstract entities known as universals. Thus the world of common experience
is built up in a duality of particulars and universals, as much as a hammer is still a hammer, no matter how or from what it is made. If it works like a hammer, it is still called a hammer, and thus it is in the form of a hammer.
Hoo eee, so it goes, and with all the recluse powers, flowers, and songs of tautology, all over the place in a summer's day, the divisible
present abounds yet more than sunshine, and as much as theorems of geometry.
"All the heights of the high shores gleam
Red and gold at the sunset hour:
There comes the spell of a magic dream,
And the Harbour seems a lotus-flower;
A blue flower tinted at dawn with gold,
A broad flower blazing with
light at noon,
Its beauty burns like a ceaseless fire,
For all mute things it would seem, aspire
To catch a glimpse of the lotus-flower."(80)
four winds and poor suckers go, we perceive an abridgment of substance; and it is from the relation of substance, with recapitulation of forms that bubble on like a river, that people have their perception. Si ascenderis in altitudines, ibi est, et si
iacueris in antro, adest adhuc. If you ascend into the heights, it is there, and if you fall down into a cave, it is still present.-81 If there is a secret in ontology for the ages or in any good fortune, it is that "excellence resides in quality not in quantity".-82
Quality comes before quantity, qualitas refert potius quam quantitas, to create any excellence, and so does form come before matter.
In the simple way of a bridge, without which there
is no passage or escape, the form and quality in the connection are prior to the matter and quantity. If there is no disposition, temper, nessness, and shape to atoms in the void, there is no way across, and the way things work properly is as necessary and
correct as the way they fail. The strength of things and materials is not only strength in matter but also essence of forms, since the way things are put together is as important as what is put together. The how comes before and after the what. The spring
line and the rise, the columns and keystone of an archway, for example, are in the forms of the elements as they are in the extremes, which are consubstantial from end to end.
The wings of consubstantial similarities and dissimilarities flutter and whisper in the breeze. Sometimes a spooky repetition plays in the wind between a churchyard and the cemetery trees: for while
the elements are changed in themselves, as in an instrument the sound of the quality is changed, yet all keep their sound innuma.-83
Space is a formal property also, quantum satis. As much as
the ladder of the octave goes up, then goes down, space is the place for such attributions as importance of whatever and the sounds, and as much as entity is absolute and essential.
The same thing
cannot be red and green all over, and what must be must be, and there is no situation that is totally informal, or that is totally without something in contrast. Whether Aristotle says "substance", or Plato says "form", there is little in the question of universal
comparison, that if elemental things would be reduced to the subject of matter and attributive quantity alone, such radical reductions of content would only rehearse and objectify something like chaos. "Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both
primary and secondary, you in a manner annhilate it and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of our perceptions".-336
Vae victis, and to have the undefined faith, even the way of deconstruction follows a formula that is necessary, yet "woe to him who believes in nothing."-84 He would deny everything
worthwhile and his own work of necessity.
If an absolute removal process of form and substance from the elements were possible, extinguishing the appropriate properties in quale quid, leaving only
matter qua matter, qua qua chaos and qua the blob would not even survive the terrible violence of nihilism for logic and a win. Since the objects and attributions of scientifc knowledge are only as necesssary and universal as mathematics allows, a formless
heap cannot account for itself or balance a math equation. Since there must be a form to numbers themselves, if there is no outline, even a poor one, there is no content; and if the thing that is unintelligible cannot be recognized, the meaning even of the
unknown is lost, as surely as it has been utterly confused or destroyed.
"Men were deceivers ever, one foot in sea and one on shore, to one thing constant never", and once it was that way
then, it apppears that it will be that way forever.
"The fraud of men was ever so,"(85) and in the medieval past of castles, sand pebbles,
and metaphysics, a divergence developed between two schools of thought, the via antiqua of the realists and the via moderna of the nominalists. Logic it seems would still show that the via antiqua was correct where the via moderna was wrong. As Anthony
Trollope confessed the liberal position years later, "life is so unlike theory".
Life rather would be like reality, of course, even before progress and modernity. Yet where the methods of denial
involved in nominalism, modernist phenomenology, scientific materialism, and the dialectics of Copernicanism have a strange and difficult blend, even as far as fake trips to the Moon and Mars, et cetera, there are still at least three simple universals to
1. the universal of resemblance
2. the unviversal of impossibility
the universal of the city
One of the certainties about knowledge as necessity is the appreciation one feels when one sees that that is the way that it must be. As it is, the theory of forms, as
much as universals, answers the impossible problem and impossibility of infinite regress with the greatness of simplicity: that things simply are the way they are between this and that and these and those and the others. Here and there, therefore, with the
greatest convenience of place in the universals, a creative and mysterious circle is provided to make all things make sense in finis, and for all parallel, even in the function and form.
wheel of omniscience goes rolling by, it must be the Deity; and the universal projection of the elements of relation, in the forms, proceeds from so much simplicity, representing so much work, that it is difficult at times to understand why "making itself
intelligible is suicide for philosophy".-86 For some complex thinkers, if not martyrdom, after so many books, there may at least be suicide.
As much as an omen, seen from another angle, there is
no theory of resemblance that can avoid postulating any characteristic similarity among many pairs of particular things without postulating some other resemblance about them as well. Although if all are unlike something, even unlike each other, then all are
alike in being unlike something and have something in common another way. As much as what is shared is shared in common, even if each would be different, to the degree that they are unlike something such as, they are alike in another way.
Not to reverse roles of the clear and the obscure for no good reason, still it is not easy, according to modern science, to say that the Earth is not moving, not any more than hundreds of parked cars in a lot with
emergency brakes on, and that everyone can tell. Once the forewarned scientist says that the parked cars on emergency brakes are moving, per relativity of inertial frames of reference, even though no one can tell, except for the theory -- yet the emergency
brake would grind, if the car was on the road -- then so for the lot and Geico, Chevy Chase, Maryland, and the Earth, of course.
Without falling into the colors of some vicious infinite regress,
therefore, or some strange system of denial, even regarding the roots of trees, and all the other things at rest or that would be, admitting even one universal of resemblance among things makes it absurd to avoid others. If one would say that each resemblance
among many pairs of similarities is not the same, but unique and different from the others, so much so, and, therefore, for the process, that there is not too much sameness in likeness at the root, even among dodo's and unicorns, to avoid the evident fact
of a universal, then it still must be acknowledged, "that these resemblances quite resemble each other", by an odd distance in the modicum at least.
For as little of the difference as possible,
even as much as they do not fit one exact thing, they may fit another ... "and thus at last we shall be forced to admit resemblance as a universal. The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be
a true universal. And having been forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer worth while to invent difficult and implausible theories to avoid the admission of universals", even such ones as would be merely of colors, pigments, or figures
of imagination that any artist may prefer, one to the other, etc.-87
The ironies in life at times may become so rich and diverse, that for all the difference in the world, there could be as many
universals of resemblance as there are ways of being in the reverse. Therefore, even if it seems strange, a universal could be hidden in the question and answer at any time, as much as in the cause and effect.
to the ontological medium itself, and the total domination of correct grammar, besides the universal of resemblance, there follows the universal of impossibility: for it is impossible that any property of being should not concur with its own nature. Yet the
nominalist skeptic who denies universals and their forms will even go so far as well as to deny that colors exist even in themselves.
the nature of something like a car or a tree, or the color of paint in a can, or of a cat in the neighborhood, must have a universal form, since all these instances are examples of the unification of concurrence: and any concurrence is in an actual mode of
at least one duality, at least for the material and essence involved. The existence of matter by itself can account for only one part in the sensible dynamic of impression. Whenever the subsistence of form is inaccessible, dissolved, ruined, or removed from
matter, the dissolution of the subtlety that was in the missing way and substance of the form becomes obvious through lack of the continuing concurrence.
The expression of sameness carries another sign of a universal, when there is no other way for something to be than the way that it is. As much as all things are in division by one, for the same difference, the same questions and answers
bring themselves around to the end, so they can bring themselves around to the beginning, ever and anon, and around again.
Divide all things in the common round of learning by one,
and what is the result? The same difference ... "a quo est omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo; a quo est mensura, numerus, pondus."
There is a noticeable similitude in experiencing the truth
in all things as many things, like the largest prime number of Euclid, of which there is always one more. Yet if there is a similar way in division of all things as many things, it still does not touch infinity as the infinite itself remains indivisible.
"Virtually all things large and small throughout the world are proportionately equal"(114), and "the world is everything that is the case", of course. As though one idea would be expressed in however many
words and the cosmic isotrope, enti ibidemiteresse additur quidvis aliqua natura. Being adds whatever to a thing's nature, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens, since however things go, being is essential to all. Entity, therely-being, as soon as the
instant or place is, adds itself however to whatever hermeneutic of cause and effect ...
If school never went further than division by one, everybody would get A's; and everybody's report
card would be the same yet different. As division by one goes through all things, so does the center, since there is a quality of sameness in all things when it comes to divisibility by one and the relation of having or not-having. The logic that is in this
phenomenon is alway there, since all students are virtually alike when equalized by the rule of proportion -- like circumference over diameter for one radius and one curve, for one relation over all.
the quotient is the dividend, it is the same quality of sameness that comes through. The power of parallel by attribute and property, ibidemiteresse issimus, that relates itself to any perception and all perceptions of it, creates a standard in the semblance
An old school motto, "virtus semper viridis", virtue is always green, where the color green, for instance, has no
other way to be than the way that it is. As matter destitute of form is unaccountable to any improvements or retainer, except for materialistic deconstruction and chaos, science has no better way to go into things without form, except down, and nothing better
to become, since it is impossible that any property of being should not concur with its own nature.
Yet for a supreme genus as much as when, the universal effect of color as a property is difficult
to avoid, especially in the form of it. The greenness of cactus in the desert, for example, is more than name only. In the gramalogical property and operation of climactic dryness, the cactus stands out for being green. The resilience of nature therely represents also an ablative of construction, with ontological substance, and a kind of brightness in the moonlight. The greenness, thorniness, and sheer obviousness have a form and way to be utima
In the fields and forests of the climate map, there is a quantum leap in green, that represents a universal connection among the differences and the measures. Since there is also a oneness
behind all things that are like so that is, the sameness for all such things exists in a oneness of relation, in fact, that is the parallel between, for the trope is the trope is the trope, from the tropics to the poles. As much as it is impossible for it
not to be green, where springtime vines and roots may come sprouting through the masonry, after human habitation has gone, something more than separable parts and crumbled ruins makes green green.
by nature the color cannot be separated from itself, there is discovered something secret of a universal, and that something already was green by at least a kind of temper or mood. Since it not only is an impressionable mask of atomic theory, but something
tempered with consistency and form, that makes green green, all the instances of green are indifferently related in terms of being green as green. Whether less or more, more or less, therefore, the simple color is evidence of another universal, and a sign
of some fundamental relation of substance in common.
If Kermit the frog used to sing about "the rainbow connection", and that it was not that easy being green, as much as green is green as green,
and that way it seems to blend in with so many ordinary things, it follows that green is indifferently related to its own material essence. The property in the attribute thus offers the embodiment of a universal even in a wavelength spectrum.
Sometimes people also notice that in terms of temperature and the breeze, it could be any year by a golf course, or the library, and that way the
weather that comes back around is another sign of a universal. Besides the magic of colors, Aristotle says that "each of the units in 2 must be prior to the 2", which is true, even in the seasons.-88 And as the concurrence of matter and form is divisible to
the intellect, but the unity of the form in itself is not, the one that is first must come first.-89
If there is a typical first principle in nature of the concurrence of quality and form with
matter, that also would exist as a knowable property in itself, it would have to be expressed in the act of seeing and knowing. To see and know for the standard of reason forms a definitive triangle in the way of being, a sign also with a note of
existential clarity, as in a universal. The acuity which follows from the intellect (dwelling in the memory and understanding) and will united in sense and perception would be a knowable property and something primary in itself. That way, where the shadow
and breath of the living is what there is of light and skill, the knowing knower would represent a third universal, the universal of the city.
Ghengis Khan said, "remember that you have no companions but your shadow". And over the hills and through the trees they go, like a band of shadows, to find bright lights and big city, where the markets count forms by counting the numbers
of substances. And so the realization of archetypes that come out of civilization transforms the people who must encounter various impossibilities and crazy dreams in the course of life.
Precisely different yet exactly similar, no two poins in space can be separated by nothing, so there must be a universal form in things as much as any transcendence or balance is related to
all. If the infinite exists, then also forms as universals not only particulars must exist, because there is no better way to bridge the gap between quantity and quality in experience. For example, it is not easy to haul some things across steep mountains,
and the differentials encountered in such adventures of transformation remain as they are, heavy as they may be, even as the common course of life, back home in the city, may dissemble as much as credit cards in virtue of the same universals.
On the other hand, stuck between a rock and a hard place, there are times as well, in the greatest difficulty of any situation, that are
unmistakable for the circumstances of immanence, that accompany civilization in the occurence of various accidents, impossibilities, and tales of coincidence, et cetera. If not for the joy of a ball of fat, for example, the universal of the city may also be
described as something like an infantry handbook or office of signs and numismatics.
"Relatio secundum esse", related according
to the way they have being, the employee of the month and the Mayor have their parking spaces, of course, and people on the bus see the stamp or the sticker and where. The numismatics of relation, as such and such, coined according to the way of being, is
what the universals address; and they are in the numbers and frequency of ways of processing facts, even like the question, "does the bus stop here?"
The universals are in the ones, and the ones
like so, and the numbers and ways of being must be expressed when truth is discovered. As much as a formula is coined of the one over the many, and the many everywhere around the one, without a background of universals the depth in forms and their clues
in the dualities of existence do not make good sense. The parallel over every duality has a process, and some way or temper that at the very least should make a little sense.
Like all the other
universals, the one from the city is a type of necessity. And the necessity that exists within any expression is in the order of what is first, as in the Latin verb exprimere, and the French exprimer, to express, from the parts (ex), from, out of, and (primo),
at first, from the first: in the beginning.
If the way the number one relates to the number four is always the same, from the way a squirrel recons pecans, for example, to the way John McEnroe
played tennis, then science has discovered another universal in the hands of nature at least, duo duo, for the hand of nature is never very far from the way of things or quarters in the city.
lapstrake ship in comparison to a carvel in a medieval harbor would show that the workmanship and method is the same coin and stamp, and expression, in all times and places. Whoever did it, necessarily did it the same way in the result for everywhere that
he built the boat that he built. Being the one way by the one who did it in the result, for all times and places, the universal sign penetrates through all the matter. The image of the city and ship of state, therefore, are stamped like universals in
the treasury and exchange, in the process of commerce -- as much as the consonant, vowel, and breath are set in any syllable of Scrabble. The universal sign pentrates through all the matter, pardi, as much as words are things themselves, and there are no words
and no cities without universals.
Yet for the reputations of officialdom and championship Scrabble, "let no rank puff up anyone; for faith and love are paramount - the greatest blessings in the
world; and nothing is more precious than peace, by which all war, both in Heaven and Earth, is brought to an end."-90
to the logical justification of universals in forms, as they relate to refinement of ultimate substance and reality, there are many illustrations of the distinction that exists between the formal and material predication in objects. A strange one in particular
comes from a Renaissance painting of St. Lucy by Domenico Beccafumi.
Martyred in 304 AD, she was cruelly tortured and her eyes were gouged out. In the painting, she is shown with them on a plate
looking out at the audience, and she also has her normal eyes in her face. Like St. Lucy's eyes in the painting, not only can one know das Ding-an-sich-selbst-betrachtet, without too much effort one can also recognize the universal condition and emotion in
the meaning and archetype. The sign that is there is not only in the eyes about themselves but also in the sign of relation.
to know from formality the thing-in-itself is to know that all things, as much as they are also properties of being, should at least belong with some eventual credit and ultimate responsibility to the probabilities of God, if not to the chances of somebody
else. People know the lost-and-found, church bells, and the activity of the optic nerve, and when they have an abscessed tooth or hear screams of torture and pain. Even not knowing is knowing in these cases, and sometimes from across the street.
Since people know when they do not know, or when they have forgotten why, as much as when one cannot see except for total darkness and pitch black, the funny feeling of knowledge still seeps in. It is
simple enough to know how the elements of mere appearance, even in a painting, are predicated and related one to another, in quale quid, and to know also the reiterations of the end of a sensitive nerve to its function, as it would be known per occasion as
For fear of dangers or any menacing phenomena along the way, the blind man knows his blindness and his nerves better than skepticism in philosophy. The form of perception
that is missing is sensible as much as an epiphany. If by chance he is robbed, he understands again that something essential and material has been lost, and can recognize again a universal form of things in himself and the mystery of the thief. People always
know and see the form in and for itself, come whatever of the matter.
For instance, as well as a doctor at a walk-in clinic, one sees that a poor bloody eye plucked out has lost its better form
and first light of color in the natural connection. When the construction is gone, as much as any circle would have lost its geometry, the removal of the form and property of sight that obtained in the thing-in-itself leaves the native faculty that was the
principle in the object to remain in name only.
Yet the haunted eyes of a ghost are still eyes over the matter. The name in the object is still
there, for an eye is called an eye since eyes are for seeing, and so are the eyeballs, even if one has been plucked out after a sort of cruel nominalist deconstruction.
"Los ojos por que suspiras,
los ojos en que te miras
son ojos porque te ven."
"The eyes how why you sigh
one knows it well,
the eyes that look at yourself
they are eyes because they see you" -91
The right knowledge is full of eyes, and when the essential property of the universal form has been lost, due to materialist deconstruction of
the meaning, and violent invasion of the thing-in-itself, it is agony and oblivion, pain too heavy to describe. Crushed and scattered around the broken sphere of a ruined castle, like lost souls, to be less than moonlight in shards of glass, the formless void
is no cakewalk for attributions, no pleasure cruise.
No bed of roses in nessness to be damned, et cetera. No matter how fast
the race or the career, the shadow more than keeps up for radius and the curve. Sometimes in front, it never tires, and when an hour of darkness was a candle, "vision is the art of seeing what is invisible to others".-92
"Is there truth", the almost totally ignored Bishop of River-by-the-Sea asked, "and does justice from the mountain penetrate all things, even ghosts and watercolors? What is truth? Quid est veritas?"
Kant proposed that his purpose was "to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its circumference as well as in its contents,"
yet he only undermined the effort to be fair by reducing the sensible world to an inaccesible plane of skeptical indifferentism.-93 A Copernican and Newtonian academic, a skeptic and modernist in phenomenology, a master of dismisive terms of synthetic illusion,
and another nominalist, he missed the boat to say that it was only an appearance and a perception.
However, rather than nominalism, transcendental numbers like Pi would reinforce metaphysical realism,
and the authenticity of the circle like tiny bubbles in the wine and the apple of the eye. Since nominalism is radically synthetic and reduces fundamental properties to coincidental attributes, it undermines nature and makes good things disappear. If what
is good has no lasting effect, things may as well be bad.
Without the correct sort of formality and apple of apperceptive appreciation in the first place, therefore, to say that one does not know
Pi in itself, but only the appearance, is to say that the circle does not really exist, except as an attribute of coincidence. Even if it were mere coincidence, and not a property of magnitude of the mind or a computer program, to investigate the question
of correctness in the universal equivalence of circumference over diameter, as the case may be, there is still something true or false.
As much anyone would want to think about anything, or
drive himself totally insane, the same thing cannot be red and green all over. It is stop or go, yet the nominalist academic would even say that colors do not exist in themselves, but in name only, only
as reflections, and that they do not have entity beyond the appearance. In an ironic and repetitive way, painful to reason and history, heliocentrism and relativity are only further hyper-nominalist schools of synthetic illusions, where truth exists in name
only not reality.
To say that the Earth moves at astronomical rates to orbit the Sun is to say a lot. To say that it all happens
with an unaccelerated and undetectable motion due to universal gravitation is to say even more. Yet for the dimensions of practical experience, the theory in the applied sciences part of it adds up to less than zero. Less than dust in the wind, the theory
is only for an appearance of opinion that plays in the mind, a sort of mental illusion, an unscientific prop even, and an escape from reality.
It is the reverse of what everybody sees. If no one from the philosophy department, the world unknown of the unknown unknowers, can know the material content and form of the thing-in-itself, even with a Disney Park Hopper, then can one notice its complete
removal, when it is utterly taken away? Einstein abolished the aether, and Kant paved the way a century and thirty-seven years before by abolishing reality, so how did a straight line between theme parks survive all the deconstruction?
It must be that ratio and proportion as much as direction are in each other all along. A tautology of nature, it is the Platonic n-ness of space,
n-times in all theorems of geometry, where there are no evaulations without ratios. Even in relativity it goes one to this one to that, where a repetition comes back around, as if the pain and the confusion
should at least be as simple as another division by one.
The division by zero, however, is as impossible as undefined. Where it is as impossible to remove Pi from the iron ball at the end of a prisoner's chain, as it is to remove the center from a circle, and the straight line from inside the radius of a sphere, if an inmate could crush
it with his fists, perhaps, that could be a way to stop the injustice of things that keep making too much sense. But if people cannot know the essence of things like cast iron, and the ratio of Pi, when
they are inside the circles of a prisoner's ball and chain, but instead know only an appearance, how do they recgonize with such greater clarity the ratio, proportion, heavy weight, and direction of motion of it, going away, when they would be removed?
If a blind prisoner does not recognize the form of sentence placed on his head, and know with an act of simple understanding and right judgment the substance of imprisonment that follows, how does he
notice the removal of the punishment so well? Since noticing the removal is to know somewhat the matter and form involved, to know even vaguely what was before and after between so many things is to grasp the vestige of a universal.
As much as the bonds, they would say justice is that which penetrates all things. Solving the problem, therefore, in the mathematical sense is sufficient for all cases, as there
is no prisoner of reason who cannot add up and understand a convict's ball and chain.
All numbers are not equal as division by zero remains undefined, and it represents a strange experience, within the Copernican reversals of epistemology, if the system of relativity would say that one does not see and understand a ball and chain for what it is, and whether it spins. A stranger experience comes
round, perhaps in the nerve of an abscessed tooth, or eyes that have been gouged out, if one were to say that one does not notice any relief in the removal process of such pains.
If one cannot recognize with an act of simple understanding and right judgment -- and the complete proof of mathematics -- that the Earth is not rotating, can one then at least recognize its removal from space? Would
a modernist skeptic of phenomenology not notice if the Earth were totally removed, as much as if it had slipped away from under his feet, all of it gone one day, as much as he would notice the taking away of a ball and chain?
In the movie "Cast Away", an expressive FedEx employee named Chuck Holland survived a commercial plane crash at sea, and became stranded on a deserted island, where he used to talk to a volley ball. To be on the deserted island was
a question of survival, and he would talk to the volley ball, and it seemed that the volley ball would talk to him.
He even named it "Wilson". It seemd "Wilson" said good things, if his comments
were brief, almost mute; and he seemed to have an echo of Aristotle and the good, in his spherical sort of way. If a castaway can talk to a volley ball, any prisoner of modernist phenomenology and the philosophy department can talk to a ball and chain, as
well as the Earth, or the depths of an island cave.
Like a playable word in Scrabble, stuck between strange friends perhaps,
what any of them would say that would be logical and true would have to be the same inference among all of them. The difference between them and what they say is the same when they say what is true. The truth is not without its place of reference among things,
and universals, having the simplest property of sameness for transcendence and comparison. Among as many things as there may be, through the extent and repetition, it remains the simplest second measure, and a healthier and better coconut, since what is false
always involves complication.
If they played Scrabble, they would have to follow the same rules of participation and verbal interaction. What goes for words from Scrabble also goes for things and
actions. The word has an image that represents a thing or action, and also that is in the way that it is written and pronounced, that represents another thing that is the concept and object involved in the expression. It is about the meaning and sign at the
table, and the rules are for proper communication and love of the game, and that way for more than mere convention. There is a natural sign and measure in the word more than the sound and the letters, which is the actual thing in itself. Actuality after all
has the greatest potential excellence of meaning, and it is as knowable as the lime in the coconut, as much as the one and the other are potential and divisible.
If the volley ball from "Cast Away"
was named "Wilson", the cast iron ball and chain from the philosophy department could be "Philo", from one of the Greek words for industry and diligence, φιλοπονία. In head to head scrabble, "Philo" and "Wilson"
would prove that a placement value and unity of form obtains in things and the thing-in-itself that is also shared in the word and the referent object. In virtue of the connectivity with reality, the mind reckons only one way to spell the one syllable word
bat, for example, even if the word bat may have at least three different meanings in two or more languages. Like so, Scrabble has the same government everywhere, and the syllable is the syllable is the syllable as much as any syllogism is a valid argument.
"Everything possesses its own certitude, which is its own essence." Unaquaeque res habet certitudinem propriam quae est eius quidditas.-94
concrete identity of discrete individual entity, the haecceitas, in fact, among lastingly and correctly spelled words, and their things, objects, and attributes of relation, may be something "Philo" would want to emphasize, from his own experience with heavier
weights and such advantages -- and "Wilson" probably could not agree more about the apparent density of an object.
There is a necessary tension and appropriate accomodation in things. Necesse
in rebus intentio esse, or ens intentionum habere quod in rebus omnibus necesse. Being has tension since it is necessary in all things, especially if "Wilson" played Scrabble as fast as lightning bugs and starquest volley ball, floating like a feather,
stinging like a bee, and spelling better to run circles around a prison ball and chain.
"Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectur includitur in omnibus
quaecumquae quis apprehendit. That which first falls under apprehension is being, which the intellect includes in all things, whatever they may be, that it apprehends."
and the measure used to measure remain equal to themselves, and when something like a lucky word in Scrabble crystallizes, it is unlikely that such a particular score will come again. Not soon anyway, and the way of being, in virtue of the neccessity and distinction
of space, ebbs and flows like an alphabet rhyme. The signs and meanings always must fit, as much as correct spelling and division by one. A missing letter is like a missing tooth, and it is the same one problem, relatio secundum esse, for all the words.
A map maker knows he knows what the descriptive thing is that is metacognition of place, and the validity of its universal representation in the geometric form of intersecting lines of longitude and latitude
around a geographic sphere of location, et cetera. The rule and expression of place prevail both in cause and effect as much as correct grammar and spelling. Materially, formally, efficiently, and eminently, the one that is real is the one also closest to
itself. Within itself and of itself, through itself, in loco etiam, proxissimus suimet sibi enim in ipso est. The closest one to himself is in his own way also.
The first and simplest necessity
of being is the most, and rests the most, subsisting as something simple after all division. As one precedes that which is compounded and contingent, and each one in two precedes the sum, the orb and
notion of Jupiter in the cosmos is as much a question of logical consequence as anything else. Z and Zed in the alphabet line result from the same necessity of A and B, if it would be impossible for Z and Zed to be false, when A and B and the alphabet are
true. And if science counted sheep from Earth to Jupiter, and called the distance and total number an "EJ", as a number and sign of relation it also would have no contrary.
For virtue and ingenuity then, divide the EJ by the EJ to get one, like gravity, and "manent optima coelo" they say in Scotland. Pipe in the haggis and divide the rest of the cosmos by the quotient to get the same
difference. Where it would represent simple entity qua entity (ens realissimum sed et rationis) it would also be absolute even for universal place.
For universal placement, in fact, as Aristotle
and Euclid would say, the line from A to B is AB, and there is still no contact in numbers, even for a straight line -- but only separation and succession. Therefore, since a number is realized as
it is, like a color is a color is a color, and chiromancy is in the hands and podiatry the feet, so Earth to Jupiter in space is as Jupiter to Earth without contradiction. There is overall unity of forms in any staircase of meaning, as white is in and on rice, for the extent and measure every step of the way.
Everything that people know and understand is for some proportion or realization of relation.
Like geometry and spellng, "the world is a common world," and for Hume's billiards and everything else, the cause and effect are in the operation. Five does not cause six, as numbers by themselves do not cause things; but 5 +1 = 6, as the operations in the combinations do.
know the divisiblity of things, like where Jupiter is in the sky, for example, and its relation to Earth, does not require one to follow
an unreasonable argument, catch a leprechaun, or discover the infinite home of the gods if not the abyss. It is enough to recognize and understand the unity of forms in words and measures in as many instances as there may be, and for Jupiter.
Where there is enough room to fit them in the mind, there is also the scale, and wise people know when a situation speaks for itself.
Between coincidental, accidental, and essential matters, good sense may know the relation of the thing-in-itself, as much as there is any straight line from Earth to Jupiter, or between any fairway and green. Golf
is a game for life, and Sarazen's double eagle at number 15 in Augusta, 1935, for instance, and the method of division in virtue of comparison, practiced between straight lines and circles, could be interpreted as another mirror of the golden ratio, even in a wilderness of mirrors.
As if it were from any other universal dimension in space,
before he hit the shot, Sarazen said, "they might go in from anywhere". The argument begun from a gnomon or 4-wood is still the same as the argument from a straight line or putter, and are the same as the argument from a circle, that nothing represents A better
than A, and nothing represents B better than B. Thoughts can be scanned by measuring the waves, and the shape and temper of thought is in the extremes and the means, none of which exist without the measure
or the score.
If ever there was a confederacy of dunces, there always has been a confederacy of numbers and signs; and as much as 1 represents a point and a circle, and 2 a straight line and a pillar, all numbers are figurate and confederate quanta in the round. The substance and question of direction is the closest game to the game
called life; and as impossible as it is to get the white out of rice or cotton, and the right eye out of Horace, it is as impossible to get geometry and the golden mean out of the shape of everyday
life and every day thought. Therefore, the sheep in total for the distance to Jupiter from Georgia stand like one measure for all.
know that the measure of things is not only for quantity but also quality, and the double eagle was the best that Sarazen could do. To choose the means and avoid the extremes on either side, if it would be a wise witness for improvement, science must
admit then that like Sarazen's score card there is no better way or place for Jupiter to go, that it should be so well represented by nature or convention, not other than by itself, than where and when it is. As
much as the distance between Earth and Jupiter is the only one that it is, absolute and without contrary, there is a unique and excellent quality involved for the distance as much as the map cover
of a book.
For example, Gene Sarazen may have felt there was no better way to describe 235 yards, which represents about 164 sheep, than with a 4-wood at number 15 of Augusta National; and for
all the differences and sameness in the cosmos, there may be many people who would agree. When there is no contrary in the quantity and no better representation, there is a unique sign, et cetera, and a chord, and a sphere at least even as much as the radius.
"The feeling of the world as a bounded whole is the mystical". Name that tune, therefore, "Das Ding an sich". Experience and necessity
must have something to do with it. As much as there is only one way to spell "bat" or "cat", to sing an octave there is only one series of do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si, do. And there is, at any given time, one straight line between this point and that point,
that are this way and that way from each other, like the centers between Jupiter and the Earth, for example, which for a line could be called a universal segment and an EJ.
Special indeed, a quantum
leap like that, and when another one lands on it, as simple and excellent as it is, it should be easy to find. Like the "a" in cat and bat, and all the alphabet soup, backwards or forwards, there is only one measure of the golden ratio that it represents.
As a measure of simple entity in itself for distance, the way that space is between all the stars, and between perigee and apogee, it is the same space from point to point around the world for all the days of the year and twinkling stars, of course.
Like geometry of a cosmic alphabet, from alpha to omega, all the hours of the day are around the Earth at once. Therefore, overrunning everywhere with the simplifying measures of logic, frequency, and form,
the great space and outer space contain all the things in themselves, hidden or revealed. After all, without the simple time, it does not appear that there would be enough total space.
as the day of the week, and a monumental tooth of megalodon in a reliquary, have ratio and proportion, science can be sure of what many things are, as much as the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself. The vast compass of the oceans, for example, cannot exist without the extremes, and the extremes cannot exist without the measure. If either of the extremes is destroyed, so the measure. Therefore,
it is as difficult to remove the one singular distance that is between the Earth and Jupiter from simple entity, as it is pure quantity at any given time, as it is to remove the Earth away from itself, or any straight line from geometry.
As much as the wonder of geometry is in all of them, straight lines are universally simple, of course. If some in particular may disappear, still "what is simple
cannot be separated from itself".-95 Simplicity in consequence cannot be separated from its own existence, "for it does not have its existence in virtue of some form other than itself".-96 The unification
of simplicity can be so profound too, that it may bring together even the oddest people and things at times. The occurrence may or may not be gratifying, ipso facto, but it seems true enough that even the little things can add to the total reckoning of science.
If anybody from science would notice the Earth being removed from itself, or losing its simple excellence, from where it is in the means, he should have noticed it spinning and turning in the first place,
slip sliding away. The signs and meanings are in the concurrence of the what-for and what-how expressed from the primary place. As letters go from A to Z,
a word in Scrabble can go for a "bat" or a "cat"; and, like astronomy and the game board, there is the simple question of which is where first. If an astronomer at Scrabble should recognize which star is Jupiter, when it is on the horizon, and that, just like the Moon and the Sun, it goes from east to west every day around the Earth, then he should also be able to tell when the window
frame is not moving.
Is it so hard to see then that it is with particular and universal virtue that the necessity of being and the extremes of the measure and the measure used to measure
remain equal to themselves? It is a circular function and normal human expression, for example, that everyone would like to have good teeth, and not be struck by bolts of lightning -- "to die of
thirst beside the fountain, hot as fire, shaking tooth on tooth". The concurrence of relation in the question, also in the substance of direction, would have the same overall placement, 16 over 16, and not struck
by lightning, and not dying of thirst by the fountain, et cetera. As much as place is for placement value, therefore, and placement is a key, there is another universal for everybody in such
pains or delights, as the chances in astronomy or dentistry may be.
Without some fair
sense of truth then, even for teeth, and to simply recognize that the Earth does not orbit the Sun, but the Sun orbits the Earth, and that the distance between Earth and Jupiter is unique in the same case, it would come to pass that "matter and all else that
is in the physical world [would] have been reduced to [only] a shadowy symbolism". But the involvement, the life, the ontology, and the teeth, as well as the place to fit in are unique for
all, more to question than shadows, even if there is sameness among many things, and universal clockwork with difference, and a ghost in the machine.
Since the excellence of all measures, especially
as they relate to the stars, is difficult to deny, divide all by one for the same difference. "With what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again", in qua mensura mensi, fueritis metietur vobis.
reason would be an excellent measure too, sensible a solis ortu cardine, for it to be objective it must have contact with reality. "In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen." It should not be too difficult then to admit
that everyone can tell when the Earth is between a full Moon in Aquarius and the Sun in Leo; and that when the Moon begins to wane in Pisces it has nothing to do with any rotation of the Earth. "Uniform experience amounts to a proof"(299), and such an observation is another universal sign with a formal relation in the summer.
The middle of a golf club is essential not only relative, and as much as Thursday is Thursday, as it always is Thursday, the fifth one is five. When it is the fifth day of the week, it is uncanny how Jupiter is in only one sign
at the end of a line at a time. The Earth meanwhile is in the same one and all the others, which cannot be without that one and those that are far away going around the other in the middle. By the quantity of geometry in astronomy, the Earth has the middle,
and quantity has no contrary.
If people think, and, therefore, reckon that they are, they shoud also know where they are; and the seasons, to be honest, are not just seasons but feelings. Vices
rerum, and the universality of place in space provides a parallel of identity, in things and propositions, such that the world and its providence must be of a certain kind. The way things are edgewise, therefore, including the EJ, represents a genuine
and elementary mystery in the cosmos maybe, that as many stars as there are, ultima ratio, there could be almost infinitely more, and as many places from the center of an umbrella, even if the when and where are always only one line of direct location along
all the meridians, et cetera.
In fact, the almanac must be free and will be free. Deus lo vult!