"Das Ding an sich", the thing-in-itself and then "das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet", the thing regarded as it is in itself, as it would be itself if it were, said Kant, to describe his philosophy that
things in themselves are unknowable.
For all the indifference of many worlds, and a strange place to nowhere, there is the noumenon then the phenomenon, with a nexus of analysis and synthesis to collect in judgments, with a priori
and a posteriori descriptions, among contingencies and necessities, and so forth, and a law of contradiction to provide some semblance of certainty among statements. All to say that in the thing that is thought, there is the way of coummunication, of course, that involves knowldege, interior sense, and expression, that also becomes the experience and quotient
in occurrence. Yet if it is said that definitions are merely "analytic", and not informative about the world or its state of affairs, at times, through the fog of appearance, something like amnesia
may persist, as well la différance, where a strange circle of knowing not knowing could introduce some to ask what is a number and what is a cause?
In accounting, they say assets equal liabilities plus owner's equity, and bigger numbers are always present to smaller ones, as smaller ones are to them, as more is present to less and less is also to more. On one side of the question, therefore,
some would answer that numbers appear to be abstract objects. Yet everything depends on place as much as the quality of surroundings. As well as that, knowledge that is casual must be quantified. Sometimes too for causes it may not be easy to tell, lying down,
pitchfork in hand, how much one should also be afraid of falling. To the things themselves, therefore, and the derivatives, as much as knowledge would be for mere accident. The world indeed can be strange: a surprise unknown almost as much as the funny
farm, where beyond the appearances there may be feelings on occasion and depth that may be difficult to express.
example, in some rural parts of France there is still the account, or rather the belief, that before an old woman dies the Devil will appear to her as a wiry little old man with a broom and saucepan on his head. Le petit vieillard ridicule, he makes sudden
loud and banging noises, and adumbrations with obscure pronouncements; then he often complains about nutshells, his failing health, and when he is ready to sweep her out, that is when she goes. Yet
about such things and the fate of mankind in the cosmos who really knows?
Who can tell what is beyond everything that surrounds us? Who can tell how profound the mystery of the invisible
may be, that we cannot fathom with our senses in this world of strangeness and light, darkness and noise, and mortal misery, where one can be certain of nothing. If the Devil can introduce temptations
in any scene or a book, or undermine any situation of philosophy, perhaps it is only an irony of criticism then, to be sure of nothing but the uncertain, and mistrust nothing but the certainties, and
find nothing obscure but the obvious, where in the mind sometimes there follows an invisible thread -- a question of some synthetic doubt in phenomenology perhaps, where the analyst would begin to
express the opinion that the knowable order of the world, even topology, for example, like the riddle of the Seven Bridges of Konigsberg, would depend solely upon the cognitive activity of the subject rather than on the things in themselves.-1
Since human reason is limited to an awareness and understanding of its own subjective products, it may seem that rational experience has no plane or purpose other than "to prescribe its own formal rules for
the extension of its empirical employment." Hume himself observed earlier that there is no perfect idea of anything, but only of perception; and that "a substance is entirely different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance."
A fundamental question about human reason then, also as perception and continuation, is the relationship to reality; and if it were only the idea, it would also be why. Thus in determining reality, for the
Kantian outlook, there is a radical departure that happens, in which the intellect of the subject's sense impressions conforms objects to structures inherent in the mind, rather than the external objects of actuality conforming the sense impressions of a reasonable
mind to themselves. For the imaginative philosopher, therefore, there would be nothing better or more convenient to give assurance of the truth than the intellective conception and merely thinking it. Yet that way at times the most important fact about human
reason may become that is clueless about reality.
Of course, nature as an object of knowledge and analysis is a phenomenon
arising from a synthesis of sensations and judgment. However, within the stream of modernist transcendental criticism, what gives those sensations is called unknowable beyond the mere concepts themselves, which already would contain, or be contained within,
structures inherent in the mind. Pure concepts, therefore, may be described as ideas and categories of the understanding, inherently abstract, and that way may be said to be wholly independent of experience. With
Kant, modern philosophy would continue to accomplish a fundamental and peculiar inversion of the order of perception and right judgment, such that objects must follow the ways that people engage in thinking about them, as appearances touch questions of opinion
making, if they are that smart or hyper-rationalist for categories, rather than vice versa.
Thus the key to Kant's theory became the epistemological reversal, which
he also called his "Copernican revolution," in which nothing is easily understood by experience. Of course, if the intellect
is only vanity, and cogitation a mere game at will, to toy in realities which cannot be perceived by human senses, it may seem true at times that what we can know, after all, is only what appears to be also in the mind, and what remains in itself is intrinsically
unknowable.-2 Even for the unmistakable pains of contradiction, the most simple things can never be known to us beyond the appearances; and the world is a place where things sometimes can change as fast
as Bian Lian 變臉, the baffling art of face changing at the Chinese opera.
Even more, as strong and common a force in nature as the wind, that can knock people down and tear the roofs off buildings,
uproot trees, raise the sea into mountains of water, destroy cliffs and cast great ships onto the breakers, is not seen. The wind whistles, sighs, roars, and rattles the wires without being seen in itself by the naked eye, yet it exists and subsists, to appear
and disappear, in whatever form for all that.
Therefore, since everything changes anyway, if what we see is merely the hundred thousandth part of what exists, it still would not be enough for any certain knowledge or established comprehension. As much as the South moves North, the North moves South, and time
marches on like any passing convention; and the direct answer to a question remains nothing more than a trope among probabilities, as such and such, since '"the
only thing that stays the same is everything changes".
The little old man Kant would even go so far as to insist that "space and time are a framework provided by our thinking, rather than properties
of the objective world,"(3) which, however, is not credible for decent argument, since even irrational animals recognize the same circumstances of time and place. Certain realities are so openly available
that everyone alive can appreciate them, and who should be so blind to the simplest facts, because of their obviousness, that they should be surprised when somebody calls attention to what everybody ought to know? Llamas and goats in the mountains, for example, as much as men, recognize the edge, and the other animals of creation preserve the simple belief in external objects in all their natural thoughts, instincts, designs, and actions.(333)
If common sense implies physics, should physics refute common sense, and to what end should things like philosophy be resolved? That he
saw his change of perspective, however, as a "Copernican turn" as he called it, was telling. He almost said it all when he said that with his school of thought he would accomplish a "second Copernican revolution".
Like the way of Copernicus before, in the circulation of astronomy, and later with Kantian metaphysics, the modernist instruction would instill in the poor noggin an epistemological reversal as to the natural order of things. A doctrine would
be maintained almost to make it seem as though the longest distance betwen two points is a straight line, and for this Kant has been thought by many to be the greatest philosopher who ever lived. Some have even said that "to be a philosospher one must have
been first a Kantian", and Newton's so-called laws of motion were the collective paradigm from which he would develop his worldview.
poverty of geometry and ordinary everyday experience, in the line of relation, "Kant's system is like Newton's idea of gravity", and "it is close to how we still see the world."-4 If he is reckoned, therefore, as the Master of Modernity in philosophy,
another Master Blaster of Disaster, and the mightiest thinker of the thinkers who established themselves along the way of ideas(5), his favorite book of science was the "Principia", which is almost impossible to read and make sense to retell. Yet as much as
Newton, it would seem that the old man took a residual leap of faith in the wrong direction, and fell out of one of Porphyry's trees.
aim of science as well as philosophy ultimately is to arrive at the words which give a true representation of the world; and it is of primary importance, therefore, to get things right in themselves, because merely saying it so does not also make it so. "Gratis
asseritur gratis negatur", that which is asserted gratuitously may be rejected with equal freedom; and philosophy should never be distinguished unfairly from common sense knowledge or experience, for there is nothing in it which could not be said in everyday
language.-6 After all, "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things".-7
Even if not always by direct impression, "the world divides into facts, as the facts in logical space are the world". With the wealth of ordinary evidence, therefore, things and results are usually known in the way that
they are perceived and experienced, and the way things are is also the way that they tend to remain.
As much as change can be difficult, good judgement about it could be as commonplace as any
virtue in nature, yet Copernicanism has a tendency to make an embarrassment out of common sense everywhere. To say that it cannot be judged with simple cognitive awareness on any given day whether the Earth moves is like saying no one can really know the "thing-in-itself",
even if it was something so simple as whether the Earth is rolling along like a bowling ball at midday of any given golf tournament.
"Since", according to Kant and others, "the dogmatic solution is not only uncertain but impossible", a philosopher would have a way to tell an astronomer or tournament caddy that he cannot know what day it is or the
score more than by phenomena of lingering appearances. Therefore, he cannot know what is essential to motion between any golf ball and the surface of the Earth either, at least not so long as Das Ding an Sich would not be that much less than any other available
confusion, so that something would become obvious. Conditional contexts can be opaque, and for the trouble involved, when a scorecard is signed,
it may seem nothing else is so difficult to repeat as the correct administration of a straight line.
As simplicity is less, and confusion more, the greater should reign,
of course. The appearances of quality and quantity, as relation and modality, and the space and concentration between things may be obvious in a limited sense, but not terribly useful in terms of
wider epistemology, since, when certain, the conclusion is already contained in the subject. As much as something would be true in analytic terms, like an oak tree is a tree, for example, by definition
and tautology, of course, it still would be as useless as metaphysics and likewise redundant to know.
"Limited to knowledge of phenomena
that it itself has constructed according to its own design, reason cannot know anything outside of itself." Thus, even between an almanac and the window of a yard, one cannot follow with certainty
the succession of seasons by the stars either, because logic can have no empirical part. Not so reliably anyway.
To say that one understands the passing of weeks, months, and years, as one would put together a calendar is merely conventional by definition, and time is more logical than that, of course. The calendar in comparison is a foggy
burden of empiricism, all data-based phenomena, with arbitrary names, ipso facto, and leap years and so forth. There are the problems of stellar aberration and retrogression, and the difficulties
of perigee and apogee, especially of the Moon, and then parallax and people who are late; and these natural phenomena cannot be continuous like logic, except where it is to know more and more about less and less.
Yet even if the field of synthetic inquiry and equation would be narrow, where there would be reliable proof of the measure in the minor, what is reality after all that a just society would be capable of understanding? In the face of the
most abiding skepticism, what are the rules and whose the what is a lost golf ball, in fact? Pars pro toto, whose is whose, and where is the confidence of cognitive certainty in common justification, in the what-how of existence, that people should recognize
beyond mere schools of opinion? What is the sensible custom of observation and analysis, at the corner or the parking lot, ignotum per ignotius, and obscurum per obscurius?
Even if things seem to happen to people as much as fate and people happen to them, that all should wish to be happy, in any case, is a certitude for
anyone who can think. The enjoyment of mere appearances is better than nothing; and, as well as the most miserable and lowly, Nietzsche on a bad day would have expressed it himself, with a simple
apodeictic howl of grief; but too much honesty can be difficult, even among the totally forgotten, even if "we are unkown, we knowers, ourselves to ourselves."
"We men of knowledge remain of necessity strangers to ourselves", he said. "We understand ourselves not. In ourselves we are bound to be mistaken. As far as ourselves are concerned we are not knowers".-8 The curiosity and vanity of
things fail, for example, and it is much too difficult to make anything outlast final doom. Even with all good service and thorough examination of conscience in species and names, "we are surrounded by mystery and cannot understand the common things of life.
Nature speaks with a thousand tongues, and each tongue voices an unknown language."-9
know nothing"! Sgt. Schultz from the Wehrmacht of "Hogan's Heroes" in TV Land reruns used to say. He could not be corrected in the matter. After all, "ease of intelligibility is suicide for philosophy".
Sometimes he would stomp his boot or the rifle. "Nichts zoviel", nothing too much, nothing in excess, and like him we know nothing of what things existing outside us given as objects of the senses may be in themselves.
"For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life," especially at times when any awkwardness or embarrassment over a secret agreement to avoid the Russian front would
come near the surface. Knowing only the appearance and direction of such a country, and its policy, is quite enough, certainly, for actual sensibility, since such representations in discussion do affect the senses from without, though it remains quite unknown
as to what such things are and would be in themselves when one is really there. If and when would be retractable ... therefore, without detriment to the actual existence of external locations, conditions,
feelings, considerations, and peculiar states like Russia, let the predicate in question belong only to the appearance and have no proper existence outside the map.
"Le monde est si doux pour les mourants", and "all the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong merely to its appearance", and Russia, therefore, need not exist more than the mind or the
map, of course. If all the strangeness and blind digression of the human race were fixed in the eyes of one man, for example, the expression of an overweight sergeant, a WW II prison guard from the Wehrmacht, perhaps he could say "let me be ideal at this too.
As an exercise, I would enjoy peace as much as fate, and insist that I know nothing. And no one will remember me or these terms of discussion anyway."
As so per as much, modern philosophy of existentialism
and its phenomenology would say the same about what is behind the camp or city walls. Inquiring minds, therefore, overrun the subject with an absurdity of emphasis, to imagine that it would be knowable at all, whatever it was, even if someone did escape.
So politely, for instance, the thing-in-itself, as what it would be, would that it were, as an abstract dissertation about "if", and which channel or what drill, as a frame of reference would become
recognizable beyond the passing absurdities of life,in the land of the lost, or which way the Moon goes, for instance, or what day it is, and whether the Earth rotates. If understood as perceived, it only comes again from a world of appearances. Like poetic
intuition of leaky buckets at beach city in the afternoon, in the ironic way of confusion, heliocentrism becomes only another nominalist school, idealized in vain, where truth exists in theory and name only, not the buckets, the water, or the confusion, and
"THE apparition of these faces in the crowd;
Petals on a wet, black bough."
Dreyfuss hates Bill Murray ever since, "What About Bob?" and it does not really matter what about clouds or why. In an atrocious second, desire can attain the darkest dread, perplexed, and so irritated, et cetera.
"De gustibus, non est disputandum," yet even when a man is deceived or sees illusions, he understands what it is to see; and if he only dreams, he still knows what it is like to be awake. Whether for love or malice, if such an
academic reference weight as Kant would say that reality, and finding one's way to a train station of the metropolis, is much rather mind-dependent being than mind-independent being, one can see how the art of solipsism -- besides that of heliocentrism and
Judeo-Masonic deception -- could have become modernity's distinctive intellectual physiognomy.-10
For things to be at all what they seem or how they would appear was only a naive expectation
and generality of life from long ago. "The world is a common world", yet who from today, for example, would expect that "doubt must be no more than vigilance otherwise it can become dangerous"?-10
Nitimini perseverare, endeavor to persevere, if the inevitable must be accepted. Since so many things tie together as entity from past, future, and present, the thing or image that is being seen by the eye
must yet exist in some virtue of itself too. For whatever it is is in some combination of case, perhaps even mood almost as much as process, that even if only for an illusion of understanding must include the way that it is.
Unum quoque dissolutur eo modo quo colligatur. Everything is dissovled by the same means that it is constituted.
tam conveniens est naturali aequetati quam unum quoque dissolvi eo ligamene quo ligatum est. Nothing is so consonant to natural equity as that every whatever-it-is-and-so-forth should be dissolved by the same means that rendered it binding.
As much as the law of the excluded middle and the light of any full Moon contradict all
the nonsense about light years, nature does not ask permission, and "the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective were no practical results to follow".-11 As much as people passing along the wheel of life are bound
to construe things like the weather, the calendar, and the world of experience by the most reasonable way of construction, it is certain that the human mind did not create the first and most simple
attributes of being. Ultimate comparisons in the ones like more or less, greater than or less than, equal to or not equal to, this way or that way, in any instance always have the same relation and
"Our presence bestows not being on it; our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings who perceive
or contemplate it."-333 The human mind did not create pepper, for instance, or two out of three, and this much or that much. And if people ask, "which came first, the chicken or the egg?" they may also ask, "which came first, pepper or the cook?"
However they look at the question of immanence, as always, or as something to which all knowledge is prepared, the simplest attribution of being comes first, and already was in and of itself before the natural sense opinion of whatever human synthesis of it came around. The pre-existence of pepper, as such as it is, as pepper to tastes and opinions is difficult to deny, since pepper could not be known
by taste unles it first existed. As the Deacon of Hippo observed, "iste sapor nobis notus esse non posset, nisi primus esset".
From the contradistinction of place in the quality, therefore, even
like the day of the week, being the one before tomorrow, das Ding an sich all day long, and the only one after yesterday, the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself. From the top
of the mountain to the bottom of the sea, the table of measures and motions is totally for percentages; and with such a subsequent mix for content as the human mind in tow, would it be fair to say
that any certain and unadulterated truth can be known naturally by the intellect of any poor taxpayer in this life?
If only to introduce a synthetic measure of things, the mind and senses of a
taxpayer still exist to be known, for sure, and analysed, as much as his income and his business, if not the other way around. "Pink Floyd" too wondered whether it was wise to trust the government,
and it seems a philosopher may know when he does not know either, even as he may feel it wise and a patriotic duty to cooperate with the IRS in all things. As well and good not to go to jail, however
things prevail, the common concern can be certain of at least a little.
To think about it as much as a mystified tax collector, in pursuit of Willie
Nelson, it is a good bet that somewhere higher up another better score is being kept, even if he or the other would count on fingers
only to see how much it is. Where it leads, in fact, there is a satellite dish with signals coming in, too many channels to count and an old farmer's alamanac: ten cigarette butts in beach sand of
an old coffee can, and even midget wrestling from Mexico, to ask, "where is all the knowledge that we lost with so much information"?-13
of all the accumulation, with so many channels for content, whatever it is, wherever it may go on parade, ten, for instance, has been considered to be the most illuminating and simple crux among numbers -- versed so well for all parallel and parallax. Like
no other for division and order among things, the preexistence of simplicity in the number ten is as difficult to deny as it is to hide many other obvious facts. Just
look at the TV, or all the cash and one hundred dollar bills somebody can fit in a shoe box, a priori to a posteriori.
So many things that Osiander himself wrote that if hypotheses "provide
a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough." Ten, of course, is the unit of the decimal system: "the perfect term of
the numbers derived from the monad"(14), and whatever das Ding-an-sich may be, it must have a number as much as a channel, for nothing exists without a number, or some content, some way that it must be.
too that in the information age of mass merchandising, one sees that philosophy is not taught as much as engineered, like an algorithm or a channel, and sold, and, therefore, also market pressed for content. "If
Aristotle were alive today, he would have a talk show," and he would have to agree that an important aspect of any program is whether it accomplishes the intention of its user.
"No ideas but in things, and so much depends upon a red wheel barrow glazed with rain water beside the white chickens."
For a universal
wheelbarrow, therefore, formalized ad infinitum in a classroom example, the substance of number could be applied to anything within its circle, as much as the number ten and poetics of the TV: and
everything can fit in a circle. The first four numbers, in fact, provide exemplars that have been thought to contain the whole nature of mathematics, since 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10; and when configured together, with little neato dots in a neato triangle, they make
a radical little pyramid, the lesser tetractys, that appears like a root element in Sierpinski gaskets, and the way things are.
For "the laws of mathematics are not merely human inventions
or creations. They simply 'are'; they exist quite independently of the human intellect."-15
Thus, with the way the decade works in math, such a thing is not only a matter of opinion from appearance. Chance cannot account for the unique meaning and importance of the number ten, since "what happens always and in all cases is
not the result of chance but is in the nature of things."-16 Simple as one, two, three, and four, every instance of the first ten numbers provides a model of simplification and necessary truths, with which all empirical evidence must ultimately agree, and which
cannot be changed by a surface of illusion.
The number ten is essential and referred by symbolic tradition to things of outstanding excellence and beginnings brought to perfection. If anything
is brought to perfection, it could be signed over with a ten, since sign relations are ontological, and "of all the numbers from the monad and up, ten is the most perfect."-17 Plato's nephew Speusippis reckoned the decade "to be the most natural and most creative
basis for all things, being, as it were, in itself a sort of model for the things which constituted the universe".-18
Forever fixed at the base of numbers, the amount of ten produced by adding
1, 2, 3, and 4 comprises the even and odd, square and cube, prime and composite, linear and plane. The decade provides the beginning and resolution of all mathematical exegesis, containing all the hundreds and thousands and millions and tens of millions within
it, et cetera, and all the decimals as well. According to Hughes of St. Victor, ten also represents straightness in faith, the right way to go; and it is the number from which all things come and to which they must return.
Someone in an old casino comedy routine once asked a friend for change, requesting two tens for a five. Knowing the power of the number hidden in the suggestion
can be a touch hypnotic, he said, "can I get two tens for a five", and without thinking about it the friend, who was high on a roll, gave it to him out of a handful of cash he had just won. He suddenly realized the miscalculation of generosity when he received
one five for two tens and remembered that two fives make ten, not the other way around. "Wait a second", he said, "two tens are twenty, not five. You owe me fifteen dollars", but the friend with two tens was in a rush and had already gone.
So it goes, and "time may consume the speculation of men but it confirms nature".-19 As the way that birds fly, for instance, using their wings,
proceeds by two's, so the way that humans see and understand is the same. The power of nature has given man two eyes and five senses for the same reasons that birds have two wings and fine feathers to fly. Natural motion proceeds by two's, an easy method two-by-two,
duo duo faciles; and human intelligence also works by a special method of division in virtue of comparison. Experience "turns you from one feeling to another and teaches by means of opposites so that you will have two wings to fly, not one”.-20
A simple process of sense and perception, cognitive awareness in the human species is wired to operate along a line of duality and intelligence, that goes along by noticing, "this is" and "these are",
and "that is" and "those are", et cetera, duo duo for thoughts and sensitivities. Rivers and gods know there is no hurry, none greater than principles, and roll on like time. Therefore, to save the
mind from troubles, remember equanimity first, as much as the things themselves even in arduous matters. "Aequum memento enim rebus in arduis servare mentem", as Horace said it.
Burn on big river, burn on, and who has not ever noticed, with a view to avoiding confusion, that the way of intellectual distinctions always functions,
since it is conducive to knowledge to distinguish one attribute and its property from another? Exceeding with meekness like Moses, counting goats in the desert, "for Moses was a man unpretentious above all men that dwelt upon the Earth"(21), the number ten
would also symbolize first principles, the wheel of fortune, the tree of life, and the overall power of division in perception, et cetera for sensitivity. And, as to the certitude of first principles, "the terms of self-evident principles are so identical
that it is evident that one necessarily includes the other".-22
First principles abound of themselves, of course. It goes without saying that the
power and richness of repetition corroborates many things -- rooted in the overabundant tautologies of self-adherence. By analysis of math and nature, we see that "it is not once or twice but times without number that the same ideas make their appearance in the world"-23.
If not for the redundancies of assimilation and contrast,
veritas vincit omnia vi divisione, truth conquers all by a power of division. It cannot be an accident, therefore, that the best number that fits to divide well the greatest total number and confluence
of all things would be ten, and that mankind would also have ten fingers of fifty-four intricate bones on two hands.
Three to the third power for a hand in twenty-seven is like a little exponential
trinity, pro manibus; and ten in two hands of five, with some subtle dexterity and intelligence, at times, could be like a little sign of perfection or perhaps magic.
Would everything like that and the nature of the world then only be a matter of appearance, "unknowable in itself", and are appearances always deceiving? Does the human cogitator's capacity lack the power to penetrate
the veil of appearance, and grasp the inner nature of reality? Does the octave exist in music with any essential property, and the calendar as well within any sphere, or not, if anybody has an ear or knows what day it is? If they do, would it not be more reasonable
to reject the call for despair, and the extreme intellectual skepticism of some philosophers, by
a) certitude of first principles, and
c) also with knowledge of our own acts, and
d) certitude of sense knowledge?
Is there too much confidence in common sense knowledge among fools, when one would say that he knows well enough what the thing is, even in itself, when he has a
dental appointment on Tuesday at 11:30 am? Such is the power of the known in evidence that to know also means to act accordingly. As a matter of course, then, is there no abscess of truth among mankind, no consensu gentium in communis, even for the suffering
in a bad tooth and the nerve?
After all, perception and the sensation of pain are not only psychological as they do not seem to involve only the ways of looking at things. And what day of the
week would it be when the Earth would spin, because of Newtonian gravity to orbit the Sun, and nobody would notice? If personal feeling is a must, or perhaps not, between lidocaine in the shots and the whirring sound of the dentist's drill, is there any other truth subsistent among general notions, anesthetics, and specific days of the week? If not, what is the
best interpretation of the great silence in all the deception?
What is reality that anyone should care? Why are some things so difficult
to face, and does truth even exist, das Ding an sich?
In the limit of a species, even birds know the tropics of the Sun and the seasons,
as much as animal intuition in the measure used to measure guides a feather. In fact, it should be recognized that a natural order exists among general notions, such that one thing can be known from
another: for instance, the notion of "being" and the notion of "true". Being, qua qua to be, is the major and more extensive, as "being is of stronger adherence". The reason for this is that simple entity is primary and something absolute, as much as the actuality
of it is potentially everywhere, as much as anything would be, whereas truth implies a relation to an exemplar.-24
"To think well and to consent
to obey someone giving good advice are the same thing," and it follows from experience that a thing can be known as an entity, even though its truth value may not be clear and perhaps would remain as yet unknown. From this it follows that the thing
which is true can be known before its truth value is also known and sometimes by degrees.
The way the mind functions we know that many aspects of things can be grasped by a simple act of understanding
and many times a day. In such cases, when the things involved are true, they are also known. But the truth value itself of some circumstances, at times, may be somewhat hidden and still reserved, obscure for a while, and recognized only later by an act of
judgment. "Simple understanding, however, precedes an act of judgment."-25
Since knowledge of things gleaned from the senses is both of a general and particular nature, in virtue of such knowledge
people may judge the truth of things and any occurrence. Nature does not ask permission for its repetition, of course, and it is hardly fitting that any nature should exist without its proper activity. The more perfect the nature in question the less
fitting that it should lack such an operation, and the proper operation of the intellect is to know the thing which is true. Then it is hardly fitting that nature should not endow the intellect with the appropriate means and faculties of sense, perception,
and reason for such an operation that fits it, namely one such as understanding and recognizing the actual world around it, and the activity of the day of the week.
A simple case of a first principle, for example, could be that one cannot have boiling water and ice from the same water at the same time. If a quibbler dropped
ice cubes into boiling water, the water that boils is not the water that is frozen, as the water that is frozen never boils at the same time that it is frozen.
From the very fact that it grasps
these things, the intellect perceives and unites the terms in a logical and universal proposition of truth. By the elemental conditions of water, the mind itself has present before it the necessary and evident cause of the conformity of this proposition with
the simple terms that compose it. Such an instance of conformity, where the intellect perceives the evident cause in the terms, cannot help but be known in itself, as the thing that it is, das Ding an sich, and the element water, hot or cold. There is nowhere
else for such an ontological basis of physical experience to go except where it is, and by such terms of nature and temperature it always will be the same as boiling water or frozen ice .
Where it is like that, boiling or frozen, when hot or cold, is a universal way of experience everywhere. The intellect could not apprehend these terms and unite them so well, in an effective proposition,
effective for all times and places, without having the conformity of relationship arise ipso facto between the proposition and the terms. Therefore, it always must be so, as much as two similar objects could not exist without some relationship of sameness
It is impossible to perceive all this, as the necessary way that it is, ita est, without perceiving the water in itself. Since such
simple terms cannot be combined in a judgment without being true, it is precisely such conformity of a proposition to the terms that constitute it that makes accurate the truth of natural judgment. So it is that one cannot perceive this proposition
and its terms without also perceiving the conformity of the proposition to the terms; and one is, therefore, also perceiving the truth of the element water, as the thing-in-itself, as much as the oceans, the seas, and the tea in China.
Once there is certitude of first principles, like water and the number ten, for example, it becomes clear how one can be certain of the conclusions drawn from such principles, since the perfect syllogism is evident
from logic and many things in themselves. The accuracy of such judgments depends solely upon the certitude of the principles involved and the evidence of the inference.
As for b), what is known
by experience, even though a person does not experience every single individual case, but only a great many, nor does he experience them at all times, but only frequently, still he knows infallibly that it always goes such and such, and such a way, and holds
for all instances of such a thing -- as boiling water, for example, or ice cubes -- as nature would be what it is in itself and whatever the occurrence. He knows this in virtue of comparison that "whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is
not free is the natural effect of that cause". The intellect knows this proposition even if the terms would be derived from erring senses, "because a cause that does not act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that is the very opposite of what
it is ordained by its form to produce".-26
In contrast the chance cause, however, is ordained either to produce or not produce the opposite of the chance effect at random. But everything does not
happen by chance, of course. That would be more absurd than a motorcycle sidecar that keeps falling off in a bad spy movie; and if something occurs frequently enough, it is reasonable to know that it is not coming about by chance; and its cause, therefore,
will be a naturally determined cause if it is not a free agent.
Facts gathered from experience -- and their causes and effects -- are so frequent and numerous that once we find a given nature associated
at one time with this accident, then at another with the same again, then at another with that, "we have discovered that despite the accidental differences, such an effect invariably follows from this nature."-27 With bears and honey or salmon in the stream,
for example, such effects are not the result of what is merely incidental or accidental in the world at large. The effects rather are of such natures as something essential in themselves.
we may experience the truth of an experimental conclusion, such as "the moon is frequently eclipsed", and granting the validity of the conclusion, because it is a fact, we then proceed by a method of division to discover the reason. A person may also arrive
at self-evident principles after beginning with such a conclusion from experience. In such cases, the conclusion, which at first was known only by experience, now is known by reason of such a principle with even greater clarity, namely that of a primary kind
of knowledge, for it has been deduced from a self-evident principle. Thus it is self-evident that when an opaque body is placed between a visible object and the source of light, the transmission of light to such an object is prevented by the interference.
Such things and first principles known from experience are appreciated most certainly by a demonstration of the reasoned facts.
As for c), people are as sure of many of their own acts as they are
of the self-evident first principles and propositions of philosophy. "There are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized until personal experience, generally of a painful kind, has brought it home and made it a reality."-28
And it is impossible that something contingent should follow from a necessary cause, and people know well enough when they have a broken leg, like a comminuted compound fracture, or have fallen into a pit, or must
have an abscessed tooth pulled, and that what is in occurrence in those cases is something more than a mere possibility. Human intelligence may discover that what once was a contingency outcome before is not any more, and that way also apprehend das Ding
an sich selbst betrachtet.
There is an order among contingencies anyway, and some proposition is first and immediate, like the one who would have knowledge of his own acts. Otherwise there
would be an infinte regress, or something contingent would follow from a necessary cause, both of which are impossible.
for d), certitude of sense knowledge, "the mind is not merely a vessel to be filled but a fire to be kindled,"(29) -- yet if such a plurality as the human condition that inhabits the world represents only a passing apparition, how can a philosopher be sure that what he knows is not less than spent wax and wisps of smoke? As the candle and cradle of the senses burn, if everything he knows comes
from circumstance, and the common concern is only an appearance, he may one day conclude himself that he knows "nothing". If knowledge is only apparent, appearing in the mind by the bridge of mutable and fallible senses, and life itself disappears, like an
apparition subject to change and final mortality, who can say what he knows except chance and illusion, and that he merely dreams as much as nothing?
Descartes asked, "of what can I be certain"?
"Cogito ergo sum" was an apparent answer, but if the world is continually changing, we can have no certitude about it by any kind of light. For there can be no certitude when an object is known in some way other than the way in which it is, as it is impossible
to know even the least of that which has no way to be, even if it would not change. It is difficult, therefore, to say that there is real knowledge among mankind at all, "if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding. For knowledge
too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always be
no knowledge, and ... there will be no one to know and nothing to be known".-30
Even if it could have been this way, as "every exit is an entry
somewhere else", it could have been that way perhaps. Therefore, how things look is only a matter of probabilities in temporary outcomes. The mind judges about first things and many other things too: the probability of this or that, these or those,
and which is which, or would be, and many times in a myriad it could have been either, still going this way or that, or only one surprising chance of many for only another appearance.
would say they know of the truth of things is only an ironic line of probability, therefore, derived from the numerousness of mutabilities, and they almost always still could be wrong. In fact, in many cases they are, even for their own acts; and for all the
trouble of getting everything right, the assertion of truth yet remains within the resident power of the mind, even in the case of something necessary which would occasion an act of judgment.-31
Yet Aeneas knew quite well that one could not not-be on either land or boat; and to look at it another way, if one could only find peace as nothing,
as much as nothing or next to nothing, it will remain impossible to be happy.
"Ecce, maris magna claudit nos obice pontus. Deest iam terra fugae".-32 Behold, the great sea encloses us with the
wall of the deep. There is no more place for flight.
So the logical impasse between mind-dependent and mind-independent being, set forth by Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", would be so difficult,
even for opinionated elevations in the philosophy department, as to not give ground even for the birds, even if the way that they fly and the way that humans see and understand is the same, duo duo.
If an ornithologist thinks he can overcome the rigors of philosophical skepticism, because he recognizes the difference between a flock of ducks and the murmurations of starlings, he is naive, since he does
not realize it only is another appearance that he is judging. An innocent fool, he still does not know the thing-in-itself from what it is inside his head; and he might as well tell NASA and the Bank of England that the Sun orbits the Earth, the Earth is not
moving, obviously, and as well the full Moon goes from East to West, when viewed from above the North pole. After all, what he knows is not outside of his mind. What
he knows is inside his mind, of course, since he only knows the knowledge as knowledge. The
data cannot be handled any other way than if he would say that he knows the difference between a duck and a starling.
However, even if "the mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions"(334), it does not follow that just because an object is mutable, therefore, the knowledge produced may not represent anything under an immutable aspect.
For it is not precisely the mutability of the object that causes the knowledge; rather it is the nature of the mutable object in question that does so, and this nature is immutable.
knowledge produced by it represents the nature itself. And if it is the nature, this nature may have an immutable relation to something, and then both this nature and the other thing to which it is related, each by its own exemplar, are represented as immutably
united."-33 And so by means of two perceived terms of experience, like a starling and a duck, produced by two mutable creatures subject to probabilities and change, it is possible to have knowledge of some immutable relations among things. In virtue of their
natures, bird watchers and ornotholigists may even recognize with ease a common level of certainty.
Numbers and the facts cannot be avoided, and the essence of relation in mathematics itself is
represented to the intellect as something immutable. If an exemplar provides an example, and an example is within the provisions of an exemplar, a certain close certainty prevails even among shadows.
so far as they are natures, one can tell the difference between a starling and a duck mathematically, and see from the individuals that these birds will not fly the same by themselves or in flocks. Ducks do not cause murmurations, certainly, and they are not
as agile as starlings. By the method of division in virtue of comparison, between these two species, and with all the certitude of sense knowledge, an ornithologist can reasonably say to a philosopher that he knows some immutable principles of relation
in virtue of natural motion: and that he knows the thing-in-itself qua qua for the birds.
Otherwise philosophy would end by
making even simple things false. And no one of good sense would prefer to put himself, or the education of his mind, under the power of an instruction which would condemn him to an unhealthy state of unreality.
For instance, some equations are false and some are true. If somebody wrote that the end of this sentence is true, when one looked at the end, and that end said that the other end was
false, and that it itself was true as not true, it must be for the non-excluded middle to make better sense of the confusion for which is which. Or vice versa, if somebody wrote that the end of this sentence
is false, when one looked at the end, and that end said that the other end was true, and that it was indeed false, the sense of certainty that exists from hearing contradictory testimony would not be far away.
all, equity abhors forfeiture, and sees that as done what ought to be done, and "virtue grows when the soul keeps the understanding according to nature. It is according to nature when it remains as it was made. Now it was made beautiful and perfectly straight.
For the straightness of the soul consists in the mind's being according to nature, as it was made; as, on the other hand, the soul is said to be evil when it bends and gets twisted away from what is according to nature."-34
With so much at risk in life, philosophy would not fairly serve a purpose that it would undermine virtue, and that common knowledge should be made so stupid that people cannot know some basic things about birds. "Usually the philosopher
philosophizes in order to resign himself to life, or to seek some finality in it, or to distract himself and forget his griefs, or for pastime and amusement"(35), yet not to be made dumb. After all, nature in the balance has been so wise that she has been
content not merely with dividing men into happy and unhappy, wise and foolish, but she also gives to the wise the spirit of wisdom, and to the foolish the spirit of nonsense, e.g. 1 + 2 + 3 ... = -1/12, as reckoned for an infinite sum identity at Cambridge.
Therefore, if it is true that a mutable object, even in so far as it is mutable, would yet signify something immutable, how is it that
its relation to another thing is immutable? The relation is immutable in the sense that the opposite relation could not exist between the extremes, and neither could the relation be non-existent, given the extremes. If one or both of the extremes would be
destroyed, then the relation in them is also destroyed; yet the formal quality of the relation is destroyed only in the things, not in itself, since quantity has no contrary and entity is simple and absolute.
"Knowledge is the wing wherewith we fly to Heaven," and every relationship should have some attribute of number, also of being, qua qua the measure and the
way they fly, and so forth. The extremes of the measure cannot exist in thought without possessing the necessary identity in question, and they may always exist as such, as such more or less, as much as the mind itself would be an object of knowledge
invovled in the world of physics and the truth, and a vehicle for intelligent investigation. If the identity did not exist, Das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet, then the quanta and the way of it would
not exist either, of course. If the number property of a number did not exist as much as any, at least from the first of it, then nothing would exist, since the first property of being is as ordinal as a number in itself, that namely could be called the number
"1", and the primary one before many.
Knowledge and understanding, not ony wisdom, are matters of experience and taste, and division by one from the beginning is the most simple way for things
to be perceived the way that they are. It works in everything, for all continuations, more than gravity or the speed of light. It should become evident then that even a trifle among trifles can be represented under an immutable aspect, even as it is mutable
in itself, and the thing-in-itself can be known in both cases.
Knowing things and their relations by division, the logical essence of existence may be represented to the intellect as something
immutable by something radically changeable and perishable, for instance, the geometry of a golf ball in any circumstance of a sphere itself. People know that geometry and algebra have not been lost, uprooted
by cruel fate and cast out of the cosmos, when a golf ball disappears, going out-of-bounds or landing in the lake.
If a golfer has three sleeves of balls, and one loose extra in his
bag, he knows the thing-in-itself and the number ten in the amount with the certitude of sense knowledge as much as any philosophy. And wherever it goes, a golf ball always lands between one place and another. That is the only way that it can be. The arrow
of direction in flight cannot go in two different or opposite paths at the same time. From a principle as old as the hills, when one has seen one side where the shot lands, one also has seen the other from which it came. As sure as timeless Janus and geometry,
when one has seen one side or face of the shot, he has seen the other that was in the circle, and that way also the link that was in the face of the club.
If a right-handed player tees off, and
hits a curving shot that goes off to the right and almost lands in the lake, it was some sort of slice. If a left-handed players tees off, and hits a similar curving shot that almost lands in the lake, near the first shot, it was some sort of hook. Between
right-handed and left-handed players, and all the shots and sides of the game, there are self-adhering and immutable principles of relation that are essential in physics and geometry, that do not go away. There is something more to it than mere coincidence
or a series of accidents.
"To sum the matter up, the cause of this result is obvious, viz. that between any two movements there is a ratio", and universal proportion, "for they occupy time, and
there is a ratio between any two times."(285)
Even if a golfer has lost all his balls and thrown his clubs into the lake, the formal qualities of mathematics, of surface area and volume, remain
definitive, covering all sides; and without the proper delineation of quantitative attributions provided by geometry, mathematics itself would become just a heap of nonsense. Atomic theory at its worst still requires figures on paper, and without the geometry
of space, no score card and its math or the chemical formula would make any sense. Even average golfers know that about the game and the thing-in-itself, this here, that there, even if they just call it life.
the Kantian style of rationalism in phenomenology, however, "perceptions come only from the senses where there is no grasp of necessity, but only of conjunctions and associations of phenomenon"(36), et cetera. But the scientific necessity realized when a player's
ball has gone to the bottom of the lake is common to everyone who sees it, and is not a matter of what is only inside somebody's head. Phenomenal play cannot continue from the bottom of the lake. He must take a penalty drop, and in taking the penalty, he can
also recognize again that "gravity" is not a lateral force. Thus the necessities encountered in an honest score card are not only of the mind, or mind-dependent, even if they say golf is mental, but they also procede from nature itself, das Ding an sich.
"Knowledge of a principle is immutable in the sense that it cannot
change from truth to falsity".-37 An intelligible species or quotient of truth (the natural what-how that instantiates it) may perish or disappear, as a golfer may die or quit the game, or lose everything; but the true facts of a slice or a hook, or whatever
kind of shot continue and remain unable to change from a true to a false representation. As a result, fundamental principles of nature are able to conform knowledge to themselves, and cause knowledge of truth by being what they are, for "true entity, unable
to become something false, virtually contains true knowledge immutably".-38 Therefore, that which is necessarily and immutably true may also cause evident knowledge of itself in the mind; and such truth is not subject to the mind for simplicity's sake, so
that it could appear true or false in some way of probability or opinion.
The truth itself cannot be made false, even if clouded by knots and much confusion of appearance. Not all men are liars,
of course, and the Cretans have not conquered the world. In many cases liars and Cretans still know and remember the truth, and that true entity at the root is unable to become something false. That way true knowledge is contained virtually in many things,
even the tongues of liars, and in the ways they actually are; for even when people see illusions and mere after-images, there is still certainity that they see.
"Ce qu'on appelle une raison de
vivre est en même temps une excellente raison de mourir.” If one has found a reason to live, it also may be an excellent reason to die. And if someone dies without completing a project, and it appears that the knowledge involved is lost, others
may rediscover the same ideas from the same principles, on the same or a different basis, on their own, and accomplish more, since the results that would follow the practice and skill of any art in whatever things are inherent by nature.
"Actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them. In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument
only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all."-39
Gene Sarazen, who invented the sand
wedge from the wing of an airplane, said "the more I practice, the luckier I get", and the principles themselves are not extinguished with the death of an
individual. Because they operate at a formal level of sameness, they will always be the same for whomever he would be who would discover them later, and the same knowledge again, in whatever
"Not even the gods fight against necessity", and if a philosopher does not meet the standards of a reasonable man,
but instead is a quibbler, there is no reason for the innocent to suffer his trifles and doubts, or the absurdity of his pain. Amicus est tanquam alter idem, and an equitable court does not have to suffer the argumentative testimony of fools that facts are not obvious.
Rather, the determination of a reasonable man "is not merely a matter of speculative curiosity; it may be of the most important service to the science of man and of the social system. It ought necessarily
to precede every other inquiry into social physics, since it is, as it were, the basis."-42 As "it is indeed a great gift of God to possess right, plain common sense"(43), the good should at least be wise enough to appreciate facts. And "by the dog of
Egypt", Socrates asked, "are the good not wise"?
Since everything like that has been said,
"it is hardly to be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of the past"(41); and one way that people can be confident of certitude by sense knowledge is understanding that "either the same
things appear opposite to different senses or they do not appear so but rather all the senses knowing such an object judge the same about it".-44 If the latter be the case, then there is natural certainty, perceived by the senses, in virtue of the principle
that "what occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural effect of this or that thing."-45 For instance, if the same change or result occurs repeatedly in the majority of cases of any objective sequence, it follows
that the transformation and image produced is the natural effect and paradigm of such and such a cause.
As a paradeigma, παραδειγμα,
of a short trip to the country, if the engine of a car is run without coolant for the radiator, and it blows out on the road, and sits smoking by the way, the external thing that is known and experienced will be such as it is and naturally appears
to be, according to the image in sequence so frequently produced by the power of that cause and effect, etc.
by the way also have a natural sense of the measure that obtains in things. There is even some general agreement about the nature of justice. As Socrates described it, justice is a penetrating power which passes through all things. The subtlest of principles,
the great measure of measures, it is a power which nobody and no survey can keep out. It is the element which superintends over all things, and some would even say that there is at times a great mystery about it, as it remains the chief das Ding an sich selbst
betratchtet, and perhaps the hidden cause of the world.
If the judgment of different senses differs in regard to what is seen
outside, people may still be certain of what is true and in common, and know which sense is in error. For more certain than any sense judgment, there also is an intuitive circle of logic, immanent within a reasonable mind, that is there to set the intellect
aright, when one of its senses may err in a given instance. This faculty within the mind ferrets out specifics, species, generalities, categorical facts, and enthymemes for the intellect*, to capture and isolate which acts of the senses are true and those
which are false. The senses themselves do not cause but merely occasion this faculty of the mind to operate in view of the intellect.
For instance, if sight says that a golf club partly in water
and partly in air is broken, or that the Sun and Moon are smaller than they really are, in all such instances we are still certain of what is true and may know which sense is in error. In the case of the golf club, the intellect naturally retains the proof
that "the harder object is not broken by the touch of something soft which gives way before it". This proposition is so simple and evident that upon analysis of its terms no person of reasonable mind could call it in doubt, even if the terms were derived from
erroneous senses. Indeed, the opposite of this proposition includes a contradiction that makes it impossible.
Now the sight, touch, and sense of every man attest that a golf club is harder than
water, and that water gives way before it. That way the common intellect judges without difficulty that the golf club is not broken from simply being in the water. So it goes with other cases, where the terms may be derived from erring senses, the intellect
yet knows that the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself, and so it goes in all things. An element of simple logic stays within the rational mind to revisit the intellect more surely than the testimony of the senses, in cases where an illusion
would linger too long.
If sight says that the Sun and Moon and all objects in the distance are smaller than they really are, the common understanding is still certain of what is true, and
knows which sense is in error. Without trouble, the intellect knows that the identical measure can be applied to a nearby object of vision as well as to any distant object. Therefore, the actual size of an object is equally the same whether seen from
up close or far away. Sight errs, consequently, when it says that ships, planes, and cars shrink as they go away into the distance.
So let each man have the wit to go his own way, and from any
corner under a cloud of light to the Sun, the same feet that are present and near are not greater in size than when they have wandered far away, and are a hundred or two hundred yards distant, "since reason can and must give a full account of its own procedure".-46
To be vomited de phénoménologie out of the belly of a peculiar fish, and close a little chapter on Kant, with fair reason, therefore, one must conclude that when the intellect determines
that the senses err, it does so in virtue of two appropriate ways of knowing, recognizing, and discerning the thing-in-itself. These two operations could be called the imaginative and the ordinary, which correspond well enough to both human ideas and cognitive
impressions, et cetera.
The first is an imaginative and rational kind of knowledge reposing within the lens of the mind, which requires the sense only as an occasion and not as a cause. This imaginative
faculty also represents an authentic level of objective awareness among ideas, and an area of definition in which the intellect could not be deceived, even if all the senses were deceived. There should be no doubt that as long as simple logic and justice
to the subject prevail, and have not been undermined, and as long as they remain the universal measure in all things, that self-evident principles and the perception of their attendant images offer repeated testimony for common inference of the truth, and
das Ding an sich.
The second way of ordinary cognitive impression, "qui in duo equa dividitur", proceeds by estimation and appreciation from an ordinary frequency of concurrence in knowledge, that
is acquired by the oft-repeated testimony of the senses, which things are known to be true and reliable by the simple proposition that, "whatever occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural effect and indeed the occurrence
of such and like things", etc.-47
* the interpretation here is that the intellect is the memory and understanding, the mind
is more the will
Partially successful except for set theory ... "logic does not appear to assert the existence
Professor Pluentes, University of Chicago
For place and time are counted among all the things that
have been created. Locus siquidem et tempus inter omnia quae creata sunt computantur. Periphyseon I.468c
"We're off to Scotland," said Tom clandestinely. "That way, the desire for knowledge, like the thirst for riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it."-48
"I used to be a paratrooper,” he explained, and "if looked at closely enough, with sufficient thought, there is only one thing to do about everything". So go ahead, and no one with the strength of common sense can accept the
claim from a philosopher that he cannot know something. At least provisionally, any lemonade stand is as as readily simple and common as the divisible present. After all "presence is always divided",
and it does not have to be profound.
For instance, the bubble of French intellectuals, and before communism in Paris there was "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs"; and there are about four mintures
for any degree of arc of the ecliptic. Such knowledge may seem little perhaps, but functions also for a sign of relation, to understand and appreciate things. For all the world not just the stars, the minutes at times, in this or that turn, may be as simple
as any interpretation of the lines at the post office or bricolage and traffic of the road.
"The moment rules over everything",
reckoned Tolstoy, who for one regarded the present with utmost importance, since he presumed that it is the only time when we have any power: and if anything is known for sure and certain, it is the power and reality of division by one, since it touches all
things singly and together. The mind, therefore, "which is good for anything follows the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them."-48 Since knowing and understanding, "may be regarded as a kind of conclusion", and implies "the
progression of the mind in company with the nature of things,"(49) the right way is as important as anything that would be better, and the what-how and now that exists wherever anyone opens his eyes is not too difficult to see.
There is a pulse, in fact, and twitter, even in the optic nerve, that registers what is seen in the visual pathway about as fast as the "speed of light". If knowledge
like that may seem like magic, and seeing is believing, without some acuity of vision and intelligence of perception who would propose to recognize, measure, or discuss the speed of light anyway?
the peanut galleries of the internet, an anonymous voice said that Socrates said, "the beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms". Although this text today is impossible to find, Antisthenes
said that "the investigation of the meaning of words is the beginning of education"; and for terms, the divisible present in its larger sphere can be as simple as Scrabble, or finding the way to Scotland from the Hebrides, or Edinburgh, or St. Andrew's.
It was not Scota but Cleopatra who cried deep in denial, "do not let me drown in Egypt". And as much as they say in deconstruction, "Il
n'y a pas de hors-texte", there is nothing in existence without its relation to the here and now, miraculum orbis universali, and nothing without the present. Without the present, there is no past or future, and without these there is not much time, "si nous
pouvons dire", which even God would transcend, "si nous nous souvenons d'un peu".
If he can, an omnipotent being may transcend "the
countless series of years and flight of ages", and monuments more lasting than bronze, but not nothing, since it does not make any sense to say that a Supreme Being transcends nothing. However, without the present now, quod adhuc est hic et ubique terrarum,
time itself obviously would become like nothing, if it were possible. But that is impossible, for something that God transcends to become nothing, since even God cannot transcend nothing, not even for a little while.
See the inspection, therefore, at the library or the parade, that any parallel of transcendence, for any instance of one of even the least among many little one's, like
simplest this to simplest that, for even a little while, that also would involve God in any way, that could be such as would be for any elevation, even if only in a small way, always is and
must be. Some sort of creative circle attends everything, and life indeed is a reality to be experienced.
If the sea encloses the land
with the wall of the deep, and there is nowhere else to flee, in an impasse of impossibility it becomes evident that hidden in the present is a universal form of ontological necessity. Therefore, with reason, stuck between next and last, science must agree
that a bridge is a bridge, as much as the lack of a way out or across is not, and the Firth of Forth is the Firth of Forth and not the Dardanelles, et cetera.
Geometry and geography attest that
from one location, one hour is never another, and for one town it never is two days of the week at the same time. As much as the day is always changing, moving its place from midnight around the Earth, space is the place for all the days of the year, and time,
of course, functions in a circular pattern of identity like waves. "One must always try to see the truth of a situation. It makes things universal,"(51) and one of the mysterious things about now is that whenever it is, it always is local as much as it
is more than that.
"Whenever he thought of the past, it brought back so many memories, that sometimes he could not let it go".-50
He was only a clown, but if the here and now are the thing-in-itself, hic et nunc, everyone should know it as much as the day of the week, that follows in sequence, the succession going 1,2,3, under the cope of heaven. For it is impossible that the
same thing be and not be, or that the same thing be all red and all green all over. Therefore, the divisible present and fairness in observation are not only a question of time, but also right judgment of place, "hic et ubique", and the "now" of them
is also everywhere.
It may be impossible to get rid of, even if meaningless or absurd, since the meaningless or absurd would
still have an expression of time and place. Therefore, if all things known to mankind by experience and self-talk, were withdrawn from the cosmos, and all the world was made perfectly deaf and dumb, it would still be impossible to ever withdraw those properties
which are strictly attributive to substance, and "now" is such a case of connection.
Since substance is ultimate, and not to be strange, it may even become in some sense something like the representation
of a corporate body. Now suppose then, in the manner of an empirical idea of a body, or a vehicle like a car, that science successively removed all its empirical constituents, such as color, passability or impassability,
consistency, weight, monthly payments, and so forth, then science shall find it still impossible to remove as well the space that it once occupied.-52
Like the parable of the fox and the
crow in Fontaine's fables, if ever there is a strange feeling from obviousness, "un sentiment etrange de l'evidence", it may be well to remember that "tout flatteur vit
aux dépens de celui qui l’écoute". All flattery lives at the expense of pleasure, and space itself may as well remain indifferent to such things, since space may provision objects,
but objects do not provision space.
Therefore, glimpse or discern the riddle, if it is, that "hoy es siempre todavia".
Today is still always. It always is today.
"Adivina adivinanza, entre el vivir y el soñar, hay una tercera cosa. Adivínala".-53 Between living and dreaming is a third part. Guess
it, guessing it as the continuation, if there is one.
By all means of experience and logic then, if it is somebody's turn to
move in a game, it is that way now for the entire game at the board and also in concurrence for everywhere else. Since entity is absolute and quantity has no contrary, "numbers must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once
becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number."-54 So it goes that the science of numbers "can have a foundational status lacking in any other form of knowledge,"(55)
including when it is somebody's turn.
Even for the most mysterious substance, constitutive of whatever place in space too, "mathematics
consists of necessary truths which cannot be changed by empirical evidence".-56 Therefore, it would not make fair sense, without including the principles
and proofs of geometry for background analysis, that science should dominate by counting so many numbers to crunch them over people's heads -- since no other creature or ghost can overcome the numbers either, as the numbers must always prevail, as much as any proper place or valid argument.
Of course, by some ontological
necessity then, mathematics would seem connected or linked to theology, and to the theory of the sphere also, where there is the direction called up, where people look on high, as up above, to see if anything good may come from higher realms or any essential
relation, et cetera. For if second sight, which the Scottish call intuition, and empirical knowledge would be regarded as fallible, mathematics would yet remain infallible. So the infallibility of mathematics could be regarded as having a source beyond the
human, even as it includes simple arrangements around a counter or at a table.
Then the fundamental characteristic that sensible people should know in common about das-Ding-an-sich-selbst-betrachtet
is that, like "now", and other windows and doors, or somebody's turn at a game, it is divisible, even if it would be everywhere and here at the same time. After all, Satan, for his part, assumes that "all
the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them" are his. He said further that he would sift poor St. Peter like wheat, and the cognitive impression of divisibility that comes from human experience is unmistakable, and everybody knows it as well as
dust in the wind.
"Pulvis et umbra sumus", we are but dust and shadow, sometimes sifted in a handful of worry.
"All dust is the same
To go peacefully
And enjoy the eternal
Wherefore thought that is unopposed to ordinary notions, even if wormwood and gall, as compassed within the domain
of reason, recognizes that the sphere of now is as comprehensible as any bookstore receipt, and everywhere too, "ubique". Since the divisible present abides comprehensively, one thing leads to another by nature, whether by contact or succession; and even little
trivial things add up, for example, if people take note of them, and have a way of becoming connected.
Like the old philosophical contention of the one and the many, now always adds up. If "all
that is transitory is but a metaphor",(58) the divisibility of transition at least must be something real, a knowable thing-in-itself, otherwise mankind would not know the breath of despair, and the way of living in denial as well as he does. Escapism too
and the passage of existential doom, quo vadis, quo vadis, and a turning of descents with age and pain are like a ritual that is impossible for many if not all to avoid.
"Desire is poison at lunch
and wormwood at dinner; your bed is a stone, friendship is hateful and your fancy is always fixed on one thing."
.. facilis descensus Averno
atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis.
The gates of hell are open night and day
Smooth the descent, and easy is the way
And "with every increase in the degree of consciousness, in proportion to that increase, the intensity of despair increases: the more consciousness the more intense the despair".-59
Kierkegaard and the metaphor of oblivion would not exist without the extremes, and the extremes must exist beyond the veil of appearance, because there is no other simple way. Even at the worst, the simple way is best on either side
of the curtain, and the best is always good enough, since things must also be in themselves as well as the others. If it seems to be a pain or not, besser ist besset, und das beste ist gut genug.
putting one's toe in the water, one knows the water and one knows the pool. It should not be too difficult to understand, without having to put one's toe in every single part, that that sort of knowledge should not be a problem for a philosopher, to comprehend
das Ding-an-sich, and that the Earth does not rotate or orbit the Sun.
The caverns of hell may be smoky lakes of fire, yet
return, and view the cheerful skies,
In this the task and mighty labor lies.
If there is any faith left in the earth, "nothing
is more active than thought, for it travels over the universe, and nothing is stronger than necessity for all must submit to it." Therefore, simplicity of intention is common to beatitude, for it constitutes the happy form of peace, and "to be happy is necessarily
the wish of every finite rational being."-60
"We seek happiness by our very nature and man's happiness consists in understanding,"(61) since the intellective form, in fact, is proper to man. For example, as an illustration, there was a clown at the UN who admitted to the audience that he was driven by an interest in entertainment and popularity. He confessed his theory of common interpretation, that reason
could be social, and that he would "collect moments", as he called it, as he went riding his highwheeled bicycle by the Rockefeller Compound of the UN.
"This operation, in fact, in which such felicity
of intention consists is in me too, formally, and is part of the act", he said.
A jolly man of bells, balls, and whistles, to all social theory of the central banking system 2019, and to
heliocentrism as well, he liked to toot his horn for contracts and wave to the innocent children. He was a splash in his colorful costume and make-up, and would carry tunes all of a sudden. It was a little strange, kind of funny, but "sunshine almost
always makes me high", he would sing at favorite moments, when he would do funny pratfalls and slapstick routine by the Judeo-Masonic Foucault pendulum, which he knew was one of the most absurd hoaxes in all humanity.
For the history of the world is stranger than an octopus: driven damped, and tuned.
"Sunshine on the water looks so loverly", and the angels who sing too know that between
any extremes there is always something there.
"We have a little commotion", he said for proof, tapping his over-sized old leather shoe, "and a wave of sweetness shoots through me
from top to toe when the sun shines. Esse quam videri", he declared, "for a clown. So it goes a long way, if all the world were a birthday cake, and you should take a piece, but not too much."
difference between a philosopher and an actor", he said one time, when he took a dangerous spill from his highwheel bike, "is that an actor knows what he's doing, and he can feel it more" he added.
as thinking's no good, if you don't feel it," cried an unknown man from the crowd.
"Yes, almost all absurdity of conduct arises from the imitation of those whom we cannot resemble"(62), the clown
replied. He dusted himself off as needed, and should it be that the idea that there is no fair explanation of comportment, as such-and-such that would be in common, would be accepted?
some it may become an apodeictical reflection of apperceptive apprehension, if not a matter of direct intelligence, that the shortest distance between two points is forever a straight line. After all, there are two sides to everything, and "he that keepeth
justice shall get the understanding thereof".-63
Yet "there is no understanding where there is bitterness, and the heart of
a fool is like a broken vessel, and no wisdom at all shall it hold."-64 Even that way, an inattentive clown with a touch of schizo-affective disorder, lost among bicycles and volkswagens, may fall into the accidental subsistence of nothingness one day. "We
can regard our life as a uselessly disturbing episode in the blissful repose of nothingness"(65), said one, yet memory makes a mirror, sine qua non, that dwells as much as it informs.
If it could
have happened anywhere, therefore, some occurrence of authenticity and a little circle of intelligence, it could have happened in pure space perhaps, yet as much as the hand writing was on the wall at Belshazzar's feast -- mene, mene, tekel, upharsin -- and
not at the North pole, locality has some definite scale of importance, and time is easily fixed by events. Certain places and events have an atmosphere all their own, like words, names, and memes; and at times there comes an affective rapport, even for what
could be called a sort of universal fame and declination by the stars.
Common sense should be as famous too, as the stars, since many would say
it is the best thing shared in the world. Words and aspects are also natural, not merely conventional; and for some the occasion of place may create a special sense of awareness, viz. das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet. In its own way then, between
mind, cloud, and tower, the sense of verbal awareness and etymology of location may become of the greatest importance for reflection and access to meaning. As much as any castle and its drawbridge
would have defintion, or any pleasant hope, "without knowing the force of words, it is impossible to know more."66
If the question
is how do we rightly know about the world then, and that the Earth does not orbit the Sun, for example, and what is possible for the human mind to know beyond that, it may be an equivalent status question, not unlike a game of Scrabble. If one says "the world
is everything that is the case", and another says "the world is the totality of facts, not of things", can we not all still get along?
There are games in life, and Charades, and a holy mountain
with clouds on top, where the gods look down to see what nations and contracts will do. "For our God is a gallant foe that playeth behind the veil," yet language can copy reality precisely and completely. Wherefore, Scrabble may be an interesting way for a
circle of intelligence to develop, as much as there are jurisdictions, governments, entertainment, mouths to feed, and money. And if it were like Charades, "where the lightnings meet", at times the
best outcome may prove difficult to win.
Without the right letters, words may become difficult or impossible to spell. The circle of perception and the bag of tiles are like a well for the
intellect, in view of the mind; but if one does not draw the right letters, and the well runs dry, he may be left "naked as a blade"; and he will have to exchange, which could cripple his standing and his score.
Most Scrabble players often prefer to place small, low-scoring words that get rid of one or more of the letters they do not like, instead of executing the swap maneuver. If the situation arrives that one simply cannot place a word on the
board at all, then he can swap out the letters that he does not want, and choose from the remaining pile of unused tiles, as he would when replacing letters he has already successfully put in the game. "The supreme accomplishment", said Arnold J. Toynbee,
"is to blur the line between work and play", and learning rare word lists may help a professional obtain higher scores, and win a little money. Q, V, J, X, and Z are difficult letters, for example, but sometimes may allow placement of a winning combination,
and so forth.
Just as sounds and letters go in the right place, in words, there are natural relationships of veriloquium hidden between different meanings and the ways that people have of saying
how things are. Some are as obvious as the similarity of divisibilty and visibility, for instance, as well as diversion, which show that the powers of division and vision go together by a sort of turning along the way. As Caesar wrote, "omnia Gallia in tres
partes divisa est", and he could also see it through experience, like "visa", of course.
Science itself comes from separating one thing from another, since that is the way
to know and distinguish things. Scire and scindere in Latin used to mean to cut and divide, and splitting one thing from another is a way to see.
Channel surfing, there are TV commercials, and
so many colors, passports, countries, and credit cards, and people almost everywhere who, like Billy Pilgrim, can see the visible since it is divisible, and see that every Visa account starts with a 4, but the indivisible is invisible. Hidden from natural
sight, the indivisible and invisible, perhaps invincible, home of the immortal gods is far away it seems, even from high-altitude airplanes, and difficult to find.
To cross the Rubicon with a
legion was one thing for Caesar, yet without some special magic it would be another to catch a strange and mysterious bull like Jupiter by the tail. Even for a bucolic moment, however, some things impossible to take back may be worth the danger, if not the
horns, and the Spanish verb "divisa, divisar", which means to see from afar, shows the same intuitive sense of things: that to see and grasp with understanding in natural terms is also to divide. Like the Latin verbs dividere and videre, the experience is
It is aesthetically pleasing and a blessing of nature, of course, to see that humans have two eyes, which also parallels the way affection produces knowledge and understanding.
What the eye sees will also depend to some degree on what is sought, with a little preference, a poco a poco, and people develop a dominant eye as much as they develop a dominant interest or taste.
must admit that if he likes something in itself, or even merely the appearance, even if it is only a word that he wants to spell, he should also know what it is, as much as it would come close to the apple of the eye. For what is in the apple of the eye touches
the portal of the soul, and the soul is the principle of life, "the ordering and containing principle of all things".68
Scrabble, like life, every player gets his turn. It may be interesting to note as well, that when people correct the spelling of a word, they say "now that is correct", like it is already understood that there is always something more correct about "now" itself,
the proper sense of which is not only a matter of time but also of place, of course. "There is a place for everything, everything in its place", said Franklin, and if there is a when, there is always a where.
Like the letters of an alphabet, all the hours and minutes of the day are around the Earth at once. Yet it is still better, if it always is today, that we should hold our destiny in ourselves and our words, more than in the stars, since any
natural desire like a chance to win at Scrabble or know more about things cannot be in vain.-69
As much as the little days of the week and the cosmology of the stars have theirs, confusion
should not reign over places; and everybody wants his turn, and everybody wants to be a winner, certainly. At least that much is known for sure and certain about the divisible visible present and the sphere of das Ding an sich selbst betrachtet that humans
"The whole collection of rules applies to anybody"(71), and from words about science to those about space and philosophy,
proper spelling, pronunciation, and inner direction of meaning are no accident, any more than the number ten as content or the many elements of which it may be composed. The circle of return for any feeling of certainty can only remain open as things that
would come back must continue in substance.
For instance, Bellarmine and Socrates knew that the character and location of the Earth within the cosmos was central, and what the difference would
be between hemlock or a dental appointment, for example, instead of an afternoon fishing or a round of golf. And "to assert that the earth revolves around the sun is as erroneous as to claim that
Jesus was not born of a virgin".-72
So it goes without saying, that the days of the week and months and seasons of the year fall in where they belong like circular functions too. The meaning is
as natural and conventional as because because and the correct spelling.
One of the best things in life is to look for a chance to vindicate common sense, and then keep doing it, and it is the smallest things sometimes that may start us seeing anew: little gimlets of light reflected
in a river or mountain lake, an aureole of visibility that owing to the three dimensions of space would also be the center of another sphere. Like an atmosphere of sunlight on cars, one may recognize that light spreads successively by spherical waves.-73 And "without light, vision is impossible and that the inner part of the eye consists of water is easily intelligible, water being translucent" and divisible.-74
Nothing in a day can describe better the smallest point of division in space than a tiny circlet of light. Since
there is no mote or particle that can be understood without its division and a light, which provide some simple form of distinction, as in Scrabble so in life: for the expression of intelligence, at times,
may be as little as any consonant or vowel, that could become important for the same universal sound.
In a world of intrigue, any shibboleth, for instance, could be kept also as a secret password in a labyrinth. And a circle closely guarded
like that always comes close to the same difference, and if it is a total secret who else would know? As much as treasure maps and pirate skulls and bones, necessity has an excellent way of coveting influence and understanding: like sticks and stones between words and things,
and also for the flower of the mind, the eye will create its own reflections per ratione.
Since any primary status is formal, like division
by one, and space is a prime concept, whatever exists is also inevitably part of some triangle. Triangulations as much as the renditions, there is
no math or number without its trigonometry, of course.
Where there is some
light and another that is close or far away is some instance of a space, and however many may be the places in this world they are not more unlimited than an alphabet. Therefore, if the Earth is not flat,
neither is infinity, but visibility as knowledge that is obtained by principles of divisibility cannot comprehend more than what any two points represent even for certainty. And as we are certain that a
simple plane in itself is not infinite, neither is the projection of any one of its lines, et cetera.
"Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily
and securely in the province of pure a priori cognitions, without needing to ask from philosophy any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental conception of space," etc.-75 And
perhaps a mirage and the French Foreign Legion in a movie would prove something scientific too, as the Sun orbits the Earth, where all around is the open desert air and unbroken sky, for a lost corner of the mournful kingdoms of sand.
"O, Sunlight! the most precious gold to be found on Earth." Beyond despair, beyond the debris and monumental debts of modernity, nous allons enfants de la patrie. Le jour de gloire est arrivé ...
chérie des rêves, et
"Without doubt, good infantry is the sinews of an army" even if they do not speak very much. The word infantry,
in fact, comes from Latin "infantem", which means a young child or toddler during the earliest period of life, or a babe in arms. Called "infantis" as infans means not able to speak, tell, or say, and so it was and still is infantem.
It was an Emma Fosdick, a high school geometry teacher, who asked, "how many miles to Babyland?
Up one flight, to the right
Please to ring the bell"
Merely a line or the plane of an argument, however, is not enough, for everything to be all right; and in space, there is always a third separate point, that is not of the same placement, direction, and radius
as the first two. Since everything divisible cannot go more than one way at once, it is apodeictically clear for all retro-analysis that from any first point there must always follow at least two more and a triangle. There is an opposite in one plane, of course,
and then an opposite in another, and if there are so many triangles, as there would also be so many points, as much as tiny bubbles in the wine, then there also must be so many pyramids, boxes, and spheres, and places of destination, et cetera.
However, even for all the triangulated destiny in tiny people and frogs, if they added up all of the things in space, and all of the time,
it could not take up all of the entity as area, qua orignis infinitum. Not more than tiny bubbles unless it were "infinity" caught somewhere in the mix of an "infinitesimal".
There is no summation
of objects or fine points that is infinite anyway as much as there is no largest prime. There is no largest prime since there is easily one more, of course, and such a number as one more is never infinite. Therefore, another way to consider the big picture
is that infinity will never run out of room, as infinity cannot be overcrowded or cramped for space, not even in an elevator or bottle of wine.
In the 5th century BC, Socrates described justice
"as that which penetrates all things"(76), including intelligence and reflection; and Kant described judgment as the faculty or power "for thinking the particular under the universal".-77. To be fair to the subject, Kant then went on to some length to distinguish
transcendental apperception from empirical perception.
In epistemology, to summarize, apperception is the "introspective or reflective apprehension by the mind of its own inner states."-78 For
philosophy then, the question whether one knows something also becomes a question of metacognition and self-conscious percolation, which is "cognition about cognition", "thinking about thinking", or "knowing about knowing". There are generally two features
of awareness involved in metacognition: namely the knowledge of the notion, and the regulation of the cognition as it happens as well.
it may seem elusive, mostly a resource for meta-headaches, to investigate the best interpretation of some of the obscurities of metaphysics, that turn around metamemory and metacognition, it yet should
become apparent one day, via studious contemplation, that truth and right judgment concur with the realists, and that the concurrence also must be substantial. After all, if one has a vision, but not the correct sort of diligence, it could be for nothing
and only complications. Even for a poor way of subsistence, the best reward for diligence is love not irony, where "love is patient, love is kind, it always hopes and perseveres, and love never fails".-79 Even in the greatest austerity, there may also be some
greater benevolence in reality.
If at one turn a philosopher describes judgment as the faculty or power "for thinking
the particular under the universal", at another point of triangulation he could say as well that it is the faculty or power for recognizing and considering the universal under the particular: and, when and there, where he spies the form of a universal, he
can be certain that he has also spotted the thing-in-itself, and something substantial, for in those cases of duality there can be no other way.
To the mind of a reasonable man, therefore, it becomes
apparent one day that living reality is as substantial as a composite of at least two dimensions that manifest in matter and form. As entity is absolute, yet governed by form, ultimo ratio, it follows by logic that there are also at large an extensive set
of abstract entities known as universals. Thus the world of common experience is built up in a duality of particulars and universals, as much as a hammer is still a hammer, no matter how or from what it is made. If it works like a hammer, it is still called
a hammer, and thus it is in the form of a hammer.
Hoo eee, so it goes in the Great Green Book of the way
things are, and with all the recluse powers, flowers, and songs of tautology all over the place, the divisible present abounds in a summer's day yet more than sunshine, and as much as theorems
"All the heights of the high shores gleam
Red and gold at the sunset hour:
There comes the spell of a magic dream,
And the Harbour seems a lotus-flower;
A blue flower tinted at dawn with gold,
A broad flower blazing with light at noon,
Its beauty burns like a ceaseless fire,
For all mute things it would seem, aspire
catch a glimpse of the lotus-flower."(80)
St. Dominic would agree
that truth values count among all extensions, and that everywhere the four winds and poor suckers go, we perceive an abridgment of substance -- with recapitulation of forms that bubble on like a
river. It is from the relation of substance, in fact, that people have their perception, and if one ascends into the heights, it is there, and if one falls down into a cave, it is still present.-81 Si
ascenderis in altitudines, ibi est, et si iacueris in antro, adest adhuc.
If there is a secret of the ages in ontology or in any good fortune, it is that "excellence resides in quality not
in quantity".-82 For example, if there are so many ways of "a", and so many ways of "b", but not at the same time, then there are only "a and b" ways to choose one. Therefore, qualitas refert potius quam quantitas, thought Tully,
since quality comes closest to the sharpest question of identity before quantity, and, to create any excellence, so does form come before matter.
In the simple way of a bridge, without
which there is no passage or escape, the form of quality in the connection is prior to the matter and quantity. If there is no disposition, no temper, no nessnessness, and no shape to atoms in the void, there is no way across, and the way things work properly
is as necessary and correct as the way they fail. The strength of things and materials is not only strength in matter but also essence of forms, since the way things are put together is as important as what is put together. The how comes before and after the
what. The spring line and the rise, the columns and keystone of an archway, for example, are in the forms of the elements as they are in the extremes, which are consubstantial from end to end.
The wings of consubstantial similarities and dissimilarities flutter and whisper in the breeze. Sometimes a spooky rendition plays in the wind between a churchyard and the cemetery trees: for while
the elements are changed in themselves, as in an instrument the sound of the quality is changed, yet all keep their sound innuma.-83
Space is a formal property also, of course, quantum satis.
As much as the ladder of the octave goes up, then goes down, space is the place for all auditions, and such attributions of importance as whatever in the sounds or colors, and as much as entity is absolute and essential.
The same thing cannot be red and green all over, and what must be must be. There is no situation that is totally informal, or that is totally without something in contrast. Whether Aristotle says "substance", or Plato says "form",
there is little in the question of universal comparison, that if elemental things would be reduced to the subject of matter as attributive quantity alone, such radical reductions of content would only rehearse and objectify something like chaos. "Bereave matter
of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annhilate it and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of our perceptions".-336
Vae victis, and to have the undefined faith, like division by zero, even the way of deconstruction follows a formula or program that is necessary.
Yet "woe to him who believes in nothing."-84 He would deny everything worthwhile of necessity and any value of his own work.
If an absolute removal process of form and substance from the material
elements were possible, extinguishing the appropriate properties in quale quid, leaving only matter qua matter, then chaos and the blob would not even survive the terrible violence of nihilism for logic and a win. As
whatever is is, the objects and attributions of scientifc knowledge are only as necesssary and universal as mathematics allows, and a formless heap cannot account for itself or balance an equation. There must be at least one proper thing since
there must be form and quality in numbers. If there is no outline, even a poor one, there is no content; and if the thing that is unintelligible cannot be recognized, the meaning even of the unknown is lost, confused, or destroyed.
So it goes, yet "men were deceivers ever, one foot in sea and one on shore, to one thing constant never", and once it was that way then, it apppears that it will be that way forever.
"The fraud of men was ever so,"(85) and in the medieval past of castles, sand pebbles, and metaphysics, in fact, a divergence developed between two schools of thought, the via
antiqua of the realists and the via moderna of the nominalists. Logic it seems would still show that the via antiqua was correct where the via moderna was wrong. As Anthony Trollope confessed the liberal position years later, "life is so unlike theory".
Yet "mortal life is the same for all", and the experience of it in some degree or other rather would be like reality, even before progress and modernity, in life if it could. Where the methods
of denial involved in nominalism, modernist phenomenology, scientific materialism, and the dialectics of Copernicanism have a strange difficult blend -- even as far as fake trips to the Moon, Mars, and Pluto, et cetera, and at the cost of bags of money --
there is still relief that there are at least three simple universals to refute them and the deceptive balance:
1. the universal of resemblance
the unviversal of impossibility
3. the universal of the city
One of the certainties about knowledge as necessity is the appreciation
one feels when one sees that that is the way that it must be. As it is or is not, as much as something would be universal, the theory of forms answers the problem and impossibility of infinite regress with the magnitude of simplicity: that things simply are
the way they are between this and that and these and those and the others. Here and there, therefore, with the greatest convenience of place and function in the universals, a creative and mysterious circle is provided to make all things make sense in finis.
For all parallel, if a wheel of omniscience goes rolling by, it must be the Divinity. And the universal projection of relation in the
elements of the forms proceeds from so much simplicity, representing so much work, that it is difficult at times to understand why "making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy".-86 Indeed, however, after so many books, for some complex thinkers, there
may at least be a kind of suicide by denial or broken pencil if not martyrdom.
As much as an omen seen from another angle, there is no theory of resemblance that can avoid postulating any characteristic
similarity among many pairs of particular things without postulating some other resemblance about them as well. Although if all are unlike something, even unlike each other, then all are alike in being unlike something and have something in common another
way round. As much as what is shared is shared in common, even if each would be different whatever, to the degree that they are unlike one something such as, they are alike in another way.
should be at least one proper thing, and not to reverse roles of the clear and the obscure for no good reason, still it is not easy, according to modern science, to say that the Earth is not moving, not any more than hundreds of parked cars in a lot with emergency
brakes on, and that everyone can tell. Once the forewarned scientist says that the parked cars on emergency brakes are moving, per relativity of inertial frames of reference, even though no one can tell, except for the theory -- yet the emergency brake would
grind, if the car was on the road -- then so for the lot and Geico headquarters, Chevy Chase, Maryland, and the Earth, of course.
Without falling into the colors of some vicious infinite regress,
or some irrational system of denial, therefore, even regarding the roots of trees, and all the other things at rest or that would be, admitting even one universal of resemblance among things makes it absurd to avoid others. If one would say that each resemblance
among many pairs of whatever similarities is not the same, but unique and different from the others, and, therefore, that there is not too much sameness in likeness at the root, even among dodo's and unicorns, to avoid the evident fact of a universal for the
process, then it still must be acknowledged that oddity is oddity, as whatever is placed among oddities for whatever reason would be there for interpretation.
By an odd distance in the modicum,
at least, even as much as they do not fit one exact thing, per causa operationis they may fit another. For as little of the difference as possible ...
"thus at last we shall be forced to admit resemblance as a universal. The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal. And having been forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer worth while to invent difficult and implausible
theories to avoid the admission of universals", even such ones as would be merely of colors, pigments, or figures of imagination that any artist may prefer, one to the other, etc.-87
in life at times may become so diverse that, for all the difference in the world, there could be as many universals of resemblance as there are ways of being at tempo in the reverse. At that tempo is tempo, therefore, even if it seems strange, a universal
could be hidden in the question and answer at any time, as much as in the cause and effect.
As to the ontological medium itself, and the total domination of correct grammar, besides the universal
of resemblance, there follows the universal of impossibility: for it is impossible that any property of being should not concur with its own nature. Yet the nominalist skeptic who denies universals and as well their forms will even go so far as to deny that
colors exist in themselves.
Yet the nature of something like a car or a tree, or the color of paint in a can, or of a cat in
the neighborhood, must have a universal form, since all these instances are examples of the unification of concurrence: and any concurrence is in an actual mode of at least one duality, at least for the material and essence involved. The existence of matter
by itself can account for only one part in the sensible dynamic of impression. Whenever the tension and subsistence of form is inaccessible, dissolved, ruined, or removed from matter, the dissolution of the subtlety that was in the missing way and substance
of the form becomes obvious through lack of the continuing concurrence. Without the form of the black cat, there is not the cat, or the other ones, of course.
The expression of sameness, therefore, carries another sign of a universal, when there is no other way for something to be than the way that it is. As much as all things are in division by one, for the same difference, the same questions
and answers bring themselves around to the end, so they can bring themselves around to the beginning, ever and anon, and around again.
Since knowledge is assimilation, and like as
like, divide all things in the common round of learning by one, and what is the result? The same difference, of course ... "a quo est omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo; a quo est mensura, numerus, pondus."
To experience the truth of things, there is a noticeable similitude in many ways. Yet like the largest prime number of Euclid, of which there is always one more, infinity is still further away than that. If there is a similar way in division
of all things as many things, a form of parallel appears for every circumstance, yet that still does not touch infinity as the infinite itself remains indivisible.
"Virtually all things large and small throughout the world are proportionately equal"(114), and "the world is everything that is the case", of course. As though one idea would be expressed in however many words, and the cosmic isotrope,
enti ibidemiteresse additur quidvis aliqua natura. To say that being adds whatever to a thing's nature, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens, since, however things go, being is essential to all, is simple enough. Entity, therely-being, as soon as any
instance or place is, adds itself however to whatever hermeneutic of cause and effect.
Even with ease, the great oneness superintends, and if school, for example, never went further than
division by one, everybody would get A's; and everybody's report card would be the same yet different, since in different individuals rates may be different, but in any one they are something alike. According as apeiron, the hyperion way, contains the whole
cause of the coming-to-be, and the end of school, as division by one goes through all things, as oneness subsists, so does the center have a unique property to prove it all the way around.
there is a quality of sameness in all things, when it comes to divisibility by one, and the relation of having or not-having, the logic that is in this phenomenon is always there. Since all students are virtually alike when equalized by the rule of proportion,
seeing so many people through the years is like circumference over diameter, in the sense of radius and curve, and for one relation over all.
When the quotient is the dividend, it is the same quality
of sameness that comes through. The power of parallel by attribute, property, and number, ibidemiteresse issimus, that relates itself to any perception and all perceptions of it, creates a standard for being there in the semblance of things.
Virtue is always green, "virtus semper viridis", where the color green, for instance,
has no other way to be than the way that it is. As matter destitute of form is unaccountable to any improvements or retainer, except for materialistic deconstruction and chaos, science has no better way to go into things without form, except down, and nothing
better to become, since it is impossible that any property of being should not concur with its own nature.
Yet for a supreme genus as much as when, the universal effect of color as a property is
difficult to avoid, especially in the form of it. The greenness of cactus in the desert, for example, is more than name only. In an atmosphere of climactic dryness, the cactus stands out for being green and alive. The resilience of nature therely represents an ontological operation with substance, also an ablative of construction, as a gramalogical property, and a kind of brightness in the moonlight. The greenness, thorniness, and sheer obviousness have a form and way to be, and have that cactus effect utima ratio.
In the fields and forests of the climate map, there is a quantum leap in green, in fact, that represents a universal connection among the differences and the measures. Since there is also a oneness behind
all things that are like so that is, the sameness for all such things exists in a oneness of relation that is at least the parallel between: for the trope is the trope is the trope, from the tropics to the poles. As much as it is impossible for it not to be
green, where springtime vines and roots may come sprouting through the masonry, after human habitation has gone, something more than separable parts and crumbled ruins makes green green.
by nature the color cannot be separated from itself, there is discovered something secret of a universal, and that something already was green by at least a kind of temper or mood. Since it not only is an impressionable mask of atomic theory, but something
tempered with consistency and form, that makes green green, all the instances of green are indifferently related in terms of being green as green. Whether less or more, more or less, therefore, the simple color is evidence of another universal, and a sign
of some fundamental relation of substance in common.
If Kermit the frog used to sing about "the rainbow connection", and that it was not that easy being green, as much as green is green as green,
and that way it seems to blend in with so many ordinary things, it follows that green is indifferently related to its own material essence. Not even touching the matter but the form, the property in the attribute thus offers the embodiment of a universal even
in a wavelength spectrum.
Sometimes people notice that in terms of temperature and the breeze, it could be any year by a golf
course, or the library, and that way the weather that comes back around is another sign of a universal. Besides the magic of colors, Aristotle says that "each of the units in 2 must be prior to the 2", which is true, even in the seasons.-88 And as the concurrence
of matter and form is divisible to the intellect, but the unity of the form in itself is not, the one that is first must come first.-89
If there is a typical first principle in nature of the concurrence
of quality and form with matter, that also would exist as a knowable property in itself, it would have to be expressed in the act of seeing and knowing. To see and know for the standard of reason forms a definitive triangle, a sign in the way of being that acts with a note of existential clarity, also as in a universal. The acuity which follows the intellect (dwelling in the memory and understanding) and will united in sense and perception would
be a knowable property and something primary in itself. That way, where the shadow and breath of the living is what there is of light and skill, the knowing knower would represent a third universal, the universal of the city.
Ghengis Khan said, "remember that you have no companions but your shadow". And over the hills and through the trees they go, like a band of shadows, to find bright
lights in big city, where the markets count forms by counting numbers as substance. And so the realization of archetypes that come from civilization transforms the people who must encounter various impossibilities and crazy dreams in the course of life.
To obtain that which is precisely different yet exactly similar, like two sides of the
street at the same time, or two identical bags of gold coins, no two points in space can be separated by nothing, of course. So there must be a universal form in things, as much as any transcendence or balance is related to all.
Roaring Chicken said, "war dance like rain dance ... only drier", and if the infinite exists, then forms as universals must exist, because there is no better way to bridge the gap between quantity and quality in experience.
For instance, as Fitzcarraldo proved, stuck between a rock and a hard place, it is not easy to haul some things like steamboats across steep mountains; and the differentials and percentages encountered in such adventures remain as they are, heavy as they may
be. Besides the greatest difficulty of any situation, there are times that are unmistakable in general for the circumstances of immanence.
Many of the same things, in
fact, seem to happen or make themselves present from a common origin. Otherwise, if it were not so, even insurance claims and their tables would not make sense in
the extensive occurence of various accidents, impossibilities, and tales of coincidence, et cetera. Therefore, if not for the joy of securities invested in a ball of fat, the universal of the city could
be described also as something like an infantry handbook or office of signs and numismatics.
"Relatio secundum esse", related
according to the way they have being, the employee of the month and the Mayor have their parking spaces, of course, and people on the bus see the stamp or the sticker and where. The numismatics of relation, as such and such, coined according to the way of
being, is what the universals address; and they are in the numbers and frequency of ways of processing facts, even like the question, "does the bus stop here?" or "how many credit cards should a student have"?
The common course of life in the city may dissemble as much as credit card companies and their students, in virtue of the same universals, particle and wave, yet since the universals already are in the ones,
and the ones like so, the numbers and ways of being must be expressed when truth is discovered. As much as a formula is coined of the one over the many, and the many everywhere around the one,
without a background of universals the depth in forms and their clues in the dualities of existence do not make good sense. The parallel over any duality, therefore, has a process, that even points to some triangulation, and some way or temper that at the
very least should make a little sense.
Like all the other universals, the one of the city is a type of necessity, and the necessity that exists within any expression is also in the order of what
is first. As in the Latin verb "exprimere", and the French "exprimer", to express, the effect is from the order of parts (ex) from, out of, and (primo) at first, from the first: in the beginning.
the way the number one relates to the number four is always the same, from the way a squirrel recons pecans, for example, to the way John McEnroe played tennis, then science has discovered another universal in the hands of nature at least. For the hands of
nature, duo duo, are never very far from the ultimate ways of things or quarters in the city.
A lapstrake ship in comparison to a carvel in a medieval harbor would show that the workmanship and
method are the same expression, the same coin and stamp, in all times and places. Whoever did it, necessarily did it the same way in the result for everywhere that the boat was built. Being the one way done by the one who did it in the result, for all times
and places, the universal sign penetrates through all the matter. The image of the city and ship of state, therefore, is stamped among universals in the equity and exchange process of whatever entity in commerce. As much as the consonant, vowel,
and breath are set in any syllable of Scrabble, the universal sign pentrates through all the matter, pardi, as much as words are things themselves, and there are no words and no cities without universals.
for the reputations and advantages of officialdom, and championship Scrabble, "let no rank puff up anyone; for faith and love are paramount - the greatest blessings in the world; and nothing is more precious than peace, by which all war, both in Heaven and
Earth, is brought to an end."-90
Adding to the logical justification of universals in forms, as they relate to refinement of
ultimate substance and reality, there are many illustrations of the distinction that exists between the formal and material predication in objects. A strange one in particular comes from a Renaissance painting of St. Lucy by Domenico Beccafumi.
Martyred in 304 AD, she was cruelly tortured and her eyes were gouged out. In the painting, she is shown with them on a plate looking out at the audience. She also has her normal eyes in her face, and like
St. Lucy's eyes in the painting, not only can one know das Ding-an-sich-selbst-betrachtet, without too much effort one can recognize as well the universal condition and emotion of such things in the meaning there and the archetype. The sign that is there is not only in the eyeballs about themselves but also in the sign of relation.
One way to know from formality the thing-in-itself is to know that all
things, as much as they are also properties of being, should at least belong with some eventual credit to the ultimate responsibility and probabilities of God, if not to the lesser chances of somebody
else. People know the lost-and-found, church bells, and the activity of the optic nerve, and when they have an abscessed tooth or hear screams of torture and pain. Even not knowing is knowing in these and other cases, and sometimes from as close as across
Since people know when they do not know, or when they have forgotten why, as much as when one cannot see except for total darkness and pitch black, the funny feeling of knowledge still
seeps in. It is simple enough to know, therefore, how the elements of mere appearance, even in a painting, are predicated and related one to another, in quale quid, and to know also the reiterations of the end of a sensitive nerve to its function, as
it would be known per occasion as the thing-in-itself.
For fear of dangers or any menacing phenomena along the way, the blind man knows his blindness and his nerves better than skepticism in philosophy.
The form of perception that is missing is sensible as much as an epiphany. If by chance he is robbed, he understands again that something more or less essential and material has been lost, and can recognize again a universal form of things in himself and the
mystery of the thief. People always know and see the form in and for itself, come whatever of the matter.
For instance, as well as a doctor at a walk-in clinic, one sees that a poor bloody eye
plucked out has lost its better state and first light of color in the natural connection. When the constructive benefit is gone, as much as any circle would have lost its geometry, the removal of the form and property of sight that obtained in the thing-in-itself
leaves the native faculty that was the principle in the object to remain in name only.
Yet the haunted eyes of a ghost are still eyes over the
matter. The appropriate name in the object is still there, for an eye is called an eye since eyes are for seeing, and so are the eyeballs, even if both have been plucked out after a sort of
cruel nominalist deconstruction.
"Los ojos por que suspiras,
los ojos en que te miras
son ojos porque te ven."
"The eyes how why
one knows it well,
the eyes that look at yourself
they are eyes
because they see you" -91
The right knowledge is full of eyes, and when the essential property of the universal form has been
lost, due to materialist deconstruction of the meaning, and violent invasion of the thing-in-itself, it is agony and oblivion, pain too heavy to describe. Crushed and scattered around the broken sphere of a ruined castle, like lost souls, to be less than moonlight
in shards of glass, the formless void is no cakewalk for attributions, no pleasure cruise.
No bed of roses in nessnessness
to be damned, et cetera. No matter how fast the race or the career, the shadow more than keeps up for radius and the curve. Sometimes in front, it never tires, and when an hour of darkness was a candle, "vision is the art of seeing what is invisible to others".-92
"Is there truth?" asked the almost totally ignored and marginalized Bishop of River-by-the-Sea. He was almost in punitive exile, ridiculed as an idiot, where he wrote in his notebook "does justice from the
mountain penetrate all things, even ghosts and watercolors? What is truth? Quid est veritas?"
Kant proposed that his purpose
was "to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its circumference as well as in its contents," yet he only undermined the effort to be fair by reducing the sensible world to an inaccesible plane of skeptical indifferentism.-93
A Copernican and Newtonian academic, a skeptic and modernist in phenomenology, a master of dismisive terms of synthetic illusion, and another nominalist, he missed the boat to say that it was only an appearance and a perception.
However, rather than nominalism, transcendental numbers like Pi would reinforce metaphysical realism, and the consitutional authenticity of the circle, like tiny bubbles in the wine and the apple of the eye. Since nominalism is radically
synthetic and reduces fundamental properties to coincidental attributes, it undermines nature and makes good things disappear. If what is good has no lasting effect, no lasting thread, things may as well be bad.
Without the correct sort of formality in the apple of apperceptive appreciation, in the first place, therefore, to say that one does not know Pi in itself, but only the appearance, is to say that the circle does not really exist in essence,
except as an attribute of coincidence. Even if it were mere coincidence, and not a property of magnitude like cause and effect, to investigate the question of correctness and universal equivalence in circumference over diameter, as the case may be in nature
or the mind, there is still something true or false.
As much anyone would want to think about anything in philosophy, or drive himself totally insane, the
same thing cannot be red and green all over. It is stop or go, and "what is true is precisely what is made", yet the nominalist academic would even say that colors do not exist in themselves, but in name only, only as reflections of some sort, and that they
do not have entity beyond the appearance. In an ironic and repetitive way, therefore, painful to reason and history, heliocentrism and relativity are only further hyper-nominalist schools of synthetic illusions, where truth exists in name only not reality.
To say that the Earth moves at astronomical rates to orbit the Sun is to say a lot. To say that it all happens with an unaccelerated and
undetectable motion due to universal gravitation is to say even more. Yet for the dimensions of practical experience in so many gigatons, so many billion trillion metric tons of Earth in the sunshine, the theory in the applied sciences part of it adds up to
less than zero. Less than dust in the wind, the theory is only for an appearance of opinion that plays in the mind, a sort of mental illusion, an unscientific prop even, and an escape from reality.
in fact, is an art of historical interpretation where everything has only one meaning, and the reverse of what everybody sees. If no one from the philosophy department, the world unknown of the unknown
unknowers, can know the material content and form of the thing-in-itself, even to a reasonable degree with a Disney Park Hopper, then can one notice its complete removal, when it is utterly taken away? Einstein
abolished the aether, where Kant already paved the way a century and thirty-seven years before by abolishing reality, so how did a straight line between theme parks survive all the deconstruction?
It must be that ratio as proportion as much as overall direction are in each other all along. Since there are
no evaulations without ratios, the Platonic n-ness of space is n-times in all theorems of geometry -- a tautology of nature, qualitas
refert potius quantitas, and the cube. Even in relativity it goes one to this one to that, where a repetition comes back around, as if the pain and confusion should at least be as simple as another
division by one.
The division by zero, however, is as impossible in direction as undefined. A strange place to nowhere, where it is as impossible to remove Pi from the iron ball at the end of a prisoner's chain, as it is to remove the center from a circle, and the straight line from inside the radius of a sphere. If an inmate could crush
it with his fists, perhaps, that could be a way to stop the injustice of things that keep making too much sense in reverse. But if people cannot know the essence of things like cast iron, and the ratio
of Pi, when they are inside the circles of a prisoner's ball and chain, but instead know only an appearance, how do they recgonize with such greater clarity the ratio, proportion, heavy weight, and direction or motion of it, going away, when they would be
If a blind prisoner does not recognize the form of sentence placed on his head, and know with an act of simple understanding and right judgment the substance of imprisonment that
follows, how does he notice the removal of the punishment so well? Since noticing the removal is to know somewhat the matter and form involved, to know even vaguely what was before and after, between so many things, is to grasp the vestige of a universal.
As much as government and market bonds, they would say justice is that which penetrates all things. Solving the problem, therefore, in the mathematical
sense is sufficient for all cases, as there is no prisoner of reason who cannot add up and understand a convict's ball and chain.
All numbers are not equal, of course, as division by zero
remains undefined, and it represents a strange experience, within the Copernican reversals of epistemology, if the system of relativity would say that one does not see and understand a ball and chain
for what it is, and whether it spins. A stranger experience comes round, perhaps in the raw nerve of an abscessed tooth, or the eyes that have been gouged out, if one were to say that one does not
notice any relief in the removal process of such horrible pains.
If one cannot recognize with an act of simple understanding and right judgment -- and the complete proof of mathematics -- that
the Earth is not rotating, can one then at least recognize its removal from space? Would a modernist skeptic of phenomenology not notice if the Earth were totally removed, as much as if it had slipped away from under his feet, all of it gone one day, as much
as he would notice the taking away of a ball and chain?
In the movie "Cast Away", an expressive FedEx employee named Chuck Holland survived a commercial plane crash at sea, and became stranded
on a deserted island, where he used to talk to a volley ball. To be on the deserted island was a question of survival, and it developed that he would talk to the volley ball, and it seemed that the volley ball would talk to him.
He even named it "Wilson", and it seemd "Wilson" said good things. If his comments were brief, almost mute, nonetheless he seemed to have an echo of Aristotle and the good, in his spherical sort of way. If a castaway can talk to a
volley ball, any prisoner of modernist phenomenology and the philosophy department can talk to a ball and chain, as well as the Earth, or the depths of an island cave.
Like a playable word in Scrabble, stuck between strange friends, perhaps, what any of them would say that would be logical and true would have to be the same inference among all of them. The difference between them
and what they say is the same when they say what is true. The truth is not without its place of reference among things, and universals, having the simplest property of sameness for transcendence and comparison. Among as many things as there may be, through
the extent and repetition, it remains the simplest second measure, and a healthier and better coconut, since what is false always involves complication.
If they played Scrabble, they would have
to follow the same rules of participation and verbal interaction. Space, after all, is a matter for numbers and sounds, as they go from place to place without contact except succession.
Everything its place, and a place for everything, and what goes for words from Scrabble also goes for things and actions. The word has an image that represents a thing or action, and also that is in the way that it is written
and pronounced, that represents another thing that is the concept and object involved in the expression. It is about the meaning and sign at the table, and the rules are for proper communication of content and love of the game, and that way for more than mere
convention. There is a natural sign and measure in the word even more than the sound and the letters, which is the actual thing in itself. Actuality, after all, has the greatest potential excellence of meaning, and it, therefore, should be as knowable as the
lime in the coconut, as much as the one and the other are potential and divisible.
If the volley ball from "Cast Away" was called "Wilson", the cast iron ball and chain from the philosophy department
could be "Philo", from one of the Greek words for industry and diligence, φιλοπονία. In head to head scrabble, "Philo" and "Wilson" would prove that a placement value and unity of form obtains in things and the thing-in-itself
that is also shared in the word and the referent object. It is no accident that Scrabble has the same government everywhere, and the syllable is the syllable as much as any syllogism is a valid argument.
In virtue of the natural connectivity with reality, and in accord with the language used, the mind reckons only one way to spell the one syllable
word bat, for example, even if the word may have at least three different meanings in two or more languages, and so forth. "Everything possesses its own certitude, which is its own essence." Unaquaeque
res habet certitudinem propriam quae est eius quidditas.-94
The concrete identity, the haecceitas of discrete individual entity, in fact, among lastingly and correctly spelled words, and their
things, objects, and attributes of relation, may be something "Philo" would want to emphasize, from his own experience with heavier weights and such advantages -- and "Wilson" probably could not agree more about the apparent density of an object.
There is a necessary tension and appropriate accomodation in things. Intentio entis in rebus necesse. Being has tension since it is necessary in all things, or, ens intentionum habere quod in rebus omnibus
id necesse. So it goes, and if "Wilson" played Scrabble as fast as lightning bugs and starquest volley ball, floating like a feather, stinging like a bee, and spelling better to run circles around a prison ball and chain, there easily follows also the need
to be careful.
"Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectur includitur in omnibus quaecumquae quis apprehendit. That which first falls under apprehension is
being, which the intellect includes in all things, whatever they may be, that it apprehends."
Necessity and the measure used to measure remain equal to themselves, and when something
like a lucky word in Scrabble crystallizes, it is unlikely that such a particular score will come again. Not soon anyway, and the way of being, in virtue of the neccessity and skill in distinction of space, ebbs and flows like an alphabet rhyme. The signs
and meanings always must fit, whatever the circumstance, as much as correct spelling and division by one. A missing letter is like a missing tooth, and it is the same one problem, relatio secundum esse, for all the words.
A map maker knows he knows what the descriptive thing is that is metacognition of place, and also the geometric validity of its universal representation in the form of intersecting lines of longitude and latitude around a geographic
sphere of location, et cetera. The rule and expression of place prevail both in cause and effect as much as correct grammar and spelling. Materially, formally, efficiently, and eminently, the one that is ultimately real is the one also closest to itself. Within
itself and of itself, through itself, in loco etiam, quod proxissimus sibi sic in loco ipsi, suimet enim in ipso locoissimus est. The one closest to itself is in its own place itself, to itself also in itself, thus the ultimate place in regard to itself, as
much as place provides a universal of existence in its own way.
The simple necessity of being, therefore, is first and the most, and rests the most, subsisting as something simple after all divisions.
As oneness precedes in order that which is compounded and contingent, and each one in two precedes the sum, the orb and notion of Jupiter in the cosmos becomes as much a question of logical consequence
as anything else. Z and Zed in the line of the alphabet result from the same necessity of A and B, if it would be impossible for Z and Zed to be false, when A and B and the alphabet are true. And if science counted sheep from Earth to Jupiter, and called the
distance and total number an "EJ", as a number and sign of relation it also would have no contrary.
For virtue of ingenuity
then, to keep a certain place, divide the EJ by the EJ to get one, like gravity all over, and from either end "manent optima coelo", as they say in Scotland. Pipe in the haggis to divide the rest of the cosmos by the quotient, by Jove, to get the same difference.
Where it would represent simple entity qua entity (ens realissimum sed et rationis) it would also be absolute even for universal place.
For universal placement, as Aristotle and Euclid would say,
the line from A to B is AB, and there is still no contact in numbers, even for a straight line -- but only separation in the little points and succession. Therefore, since a number is realized as
it is, like a color is a color and chiromancy is in the hands and podiatry the feet, so Earth to Jupiter in space is as Jupiter to Earth without contradiction of place. There is overall unity of forms in any staircase of meaning, of course, such as white is in and on rice, for the extent and measure every step of the way.
Like geometry and spellng,
everything that people know, understand, and realize is from some proportion or relation. Nature and experience are a common world, and for Hume's billiards and everything else, the cause and effect
are in the operation. Five does not cause six per se, as numbers by themselves do not cause things; but 5 +1 = 6, as the operations in the combinations do.
To know the divisiblity of things, like where Jupiter is in the sky, for example, and its relation to Earth, does not require one to follow an unreasonable argument, if not a portal to the abyss, or catch a leprechaun, or discover the infinite home of the gods. It
is enough to recognize and understand the unity of forms in common words and measures, in as many instances as there may be, and for Jupiter. E.g., where there is enough room to fit them in the mind,
there is also the scale, and wise people know when a situation speaks for itself.
Between coincidental, accidental, and essential matters,
good sense may know the relation of the thing-in-itself, as much as there is any straight line from Earth to Jupiter, or any sense of repose between any fairway and green. Golf is a game for life, and good sense, and Sarazen's double eagle at number 15 in
Augusta, 1935, is a fine example of the method of division in virtue of comparison. Such skill practiced between straight lines and circles could
be interpreted as another mirror of the golden ratio, even in a wilderness of mirrors.
As if it were from any other universal dimension in space, before he hit the shot, Sarazen said, "they might
go in from anywhere". Thus the argument begun from a 4-wood is still the same as the argument from the straight line of a gnomon, or of a putter, and are the same as the argument from a circle, that nothing represents A better than A, and nothing represents
B better than B. Likewise, thoughts can be scanned by measuring the waves, and the shape, temper, and intention of thought is in the extremes and the means, none of which exist without the measure or
If ever there have been confederacies of dunces, there always has been a confederacy of numbers and signs. As much as 1 represents a point and a circle, and 2 a straight line and a pillar, all numbers are figurate and confederate quanta in the round. The substance and question of direction is the closest business to the
game called life, and it is as impossible to get the white out of rice or cotton, and the right eye out of Horace, as it is impossible to get geometry and the golden mean out of the shape of everyday
life and everyday thought. Therefore, the sheep in total for the distance to Jupiter from Augusta, Georgia stand like one measure for all.
must know that the measure of things is not only for quantity but also quality, and "quality is never an accident", as much as the double eagle was the best that Sarazen could do. To choose the means and avoid the extremes on either side, if it would
be a wise witness for improvement, science must admit then that, like Sarazen's score card, there is no better way or place for Jupiter to go, that it should be so well represented by nature or convention, not other than where and when it is. As much as the line between Earth and Jupiter is the only one that it is, absolute and without contrary, there is a unique and excellent quality involved
for the distance as entity, as much as the map cover of an old book.
For example, Gene Sarazen may have felt that there was no better way to describe 235 yards, which represents about 164 sheep,
than with a 4-wood at number 15 of Augusta National. For all the differences and samenessness in the cosmos, there may be many people who would agree. When there is no contrary in the quantity and no better representation, there is another unique sign, et
cetera, and a chord, and another sphere at least as much as the radius."
"As much as much", they kept saying, "as much as much", when they heard the news. Some people thought and said that they
were drunk, perhaps retarded too, as much as such and such, and this, that, these, those, and the others.
"The feeling of the
world as a bounded whole is the mystical", and name that tune, therefore, "Das Ding an sich". Experience and necessity must have something to do with it. As much as there is only one way to spell "bat" or "cat", in International Phonetic Alphabet, to sing
an octave there is only one series of do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si, do. And there is, at any given time, one straight line between this point and that point, that are this way and that way from each other, like the centers between Jupiter and the Earth, for
example, which for a segment could be called a universal and an EJ.
Special indeed, a quantum leap like that -- dot, dot, dot, toodle loop, toodle loop -- and when another one lands on it, as simple
and excellent as it is, it should be easy to find. Like the "a" in cat and the "a" in bat, and the alphabet soup, backwards or forwards, there is only one measure of the golden ratio that it represents.
a measure of simple entity, in itself for distance all the way around, the way that space is between the stars, and between perigee and apogee of the Moon, it is the same space from point to point for all the world for all the days of the year, of course. Like geometry of a cosmic alphabet, from alpha to omega, all the hours of the day are around the Earth at once. Therefore, overrunning everywhere in simple measures of logic, frequency, and form, the great space and
outer space contain all the things in themselves, hidden or revealed.
Without the simple time of an hourglass or reliquary, however, it does not appear that there would be enough total space.
Since any natural motion requires time, as much as the day of the week, everything has ratio and proportion. Therefore, science can be reasonably sure of what many things are, as the measure used to measure
remains perfectly equal to itself.
The vast compass of the oceans, for example, and the terrible teeth of megalodon cannot exist without
the extremes, and the extremes cannot exist without the measure. If either of the extremes is destroyed, so the measure. Therefore, it is as difficult to remove the one singular distance that is between
Earth and Jupiter from simple entity, as it is pure quantity at any given time, as it is to remove the Earth away from itself, or any straight line from geometry.
As much as the wonder of geometry
is projected in all of them, straight lines are universally simple, of course. If some in particular may disappear, still "what is simple cannot be separated from itself".-95 General simplicity in consequence cannot be separated from its own existence, "for it does not have its existence in virtue of some form other than itself".-96
of simplicity in proportion can be profound too, so that it may bring together even the oddest people and things at times. The occurrence may or may not be gratifying, ipso facto, but it seems true enough that even the littlest things can add to the total
reckoning of science, ars gratia artis, since it is with particular and universal virtue that the necessity of being, and the extremes of the measure, and the measure used to measure remain equal to themselves.
Median and mode, and if anybody from science would notice the Earth being removed from itself, or losing its simple excellence, from where it is in the means, he should have noticed it spinning and turning in the first place, slip sliding
away, since the signs and meanings are in the concurrence of what-for and the what-how expressed from the primary place. As letters go from A to Z, with
an a,b,c,t, a word in Scrabble can go for a "bat" or a "cat"; and, like astronomy and the game board, there is the simple question of which is where first. If an astronomer at Scrabble in a windowed room should recognize which star is Jupiter, distinctly when it is on the horizon, and that, just like the Moon and the Sun, it goes from east to west every day around the Earth, then he should
also be able to tell when the window frame is not moving.
Is it so hard to see, in the necesity of being, that the particular and universal virtue of the extremes in the measure and the measure
used to measure remain equal to themselves? It is a circular function and normal human expression, for example, that everyone would like to have good teeth, and not be struck by bolts of lightning
-- "to die of thirst beside the fountain, hot as fire, shaking tooth on tooth". The concurrence of relation in the question, also in the substance of direction, would have the same overall placement, universal
16 over 16, and not struck by lightning, and not dying of thirst by the fountain, et cetera. As much as place is for placement value, therefore, and placement is a key, there is another universal
in such pains or delights, as the chances in astronomy or dentistry may be.
some fair sense of truth then, even for teeth, and to simply recognize that the Earth does not orbit the Sun, but the Sun orbits the Earth, and that the distance between Earth and Jupiter is unique, it would come to pass that "matter and all else that is in
the physical world [would] have been reduced to [only] a shadowy symbolism". But the involvement, the life, the ontology, and the teeth are more
to question than shadows. Even if there is sameness and peculiarity at the same time among many things, the place to fit in is unique
for all, as there is universal clockwork yet with difference, and a ghost in the machine.
Since the excellence of all measures as they relate to the stars is difficult to deny, divide all by one
for the same difference by any proportion. "With what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again", in qua mensura mensi, fueritis metietur vobis. In any case, if reason would be a fair measure
too, sensible a solis ortu cardine, for it to be objective it must have contact with reality.
If everything in the world "is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen," it should not be
too difficult then to admit that everyone can tell when the Earth is between a full Moon in Aquarius and the Sun in Leo, and that when the Moon begins to wane in Pisces it has nothing to do with any rotation of the Earth. "Uniform experience amounts to a proof"(299), and such an observation as the full Moon that is that way not this way is another universal sign, with a formal relation in the summer as
much as any other season.
The middle of a golf club is essential not only relative, as much as Thursday is Thursday as always when
the fifth one of the week is five. When it is the fifth day of the week, in fact, it is uncanny how Jupiter is in only one sign at the end of a line at a time. The Earth meanwhile is in the same one and all the others, which cannot be without that one and
those that are far away going around the other in the middle. By the quantity of geometry in astronomy, therefore, the Earth has the middle, and quantity has no contrary.
If people think, and,
therefore, reckon that they are, they shoud also know where they are. The quality of place is no accident, and the seasons, to be honest, are not just seasons but feelings, "si vices rerum aevum putes".
universality of place in limit resolutions of space provides a parallel for all identity, in such a way that the world and its providence must be of a certain kind, both in things and propositions. The way things are edgewise, therefore, including the
EJ, represents a genuine and elementary mystery in the cosmos maybe, that as many stars as there are, ultima ratio, there could be almost infinitely more, and as many places from the center of an umbrella, even if the when and where are always only one line
of direction in location along all the meridians, et cetera.
"The world is a common world", as much as any oneness is essential, and the analysis of such questions is not an accident, certainly
not for the math, and neither are the defintions of the distances and times involved. Therefore, the almanac must be free and will be free, even in daily rotation of ages, at least as much as the numbers and words that would climb up to the skies in so many
mythy codes, et cetera.